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The Mexican state of Chiapas entered the world's consciousness on I January 1994 when, 
coincident with the implementation of NAFTA, anned peasants briefly occupied the city of San CristObal 
de las Casas. The government's military response is well known. Less widely appreciated are government­
sponsored projects to provide new income sources for the rural population. One such is the subject of this 
paper: a scheme to enable smallholders to plant 50,000 hectares to oil palm in the tropical lowlands, land 
hitherto given over to forest, extensive cattle grazing, or maize cultivation. 
The goal of the paper is to project the profitability of oil palm cultivation for smallholders, and in 
doing so Ms. Wolff considers three factors. The first is the Mexican fats and oils market and the price 
palm oil is likely to command. Consumption has grown rapidly over the last 40 years and, as per capita 
utilization increases as incomes grow, it is likely to continue to do so. Mexico imports most of its vegetable 
oil and oilseeds, and soybean imports from the United States dominate the market. It is anticipated that 
soybean prices will continue to be the benchmark around which palm oil prices fluctuate. 
The policy environment is a second factor. Mexico has radically reformed its agricultural policies 
since the late 1980s. Involvement of the state in input, credit, service, and output markets has been 
reduced; and guaranteed prices have been abolished. Trade barriers are being reduced. PrOduction incen­
tives are thus being shifted away from formerly subsidized staple foods such as maize and beans, and 
towards cash crops for export or the domestic market. 
Finally, because oil palm fruit needs to be processed quickly, the institutional arrangement under 
which it is grown and marketed is of crucial importance. Forms of vertical integration which have proved 
successful elsewhere include plantations which own their own processing facilities, and cooperative or 
contract farming arrangements with processors. Two institutional arrangements have been proposed for 
Chiapas: contract farming or a model in which fanners are shareholders in the processing plants. 
Taking these three factors into account, Ms. Wolff analyses profitability for smallholders in two 
ways: through farm budgets and through evaluation of the net present value of oil palm and alternative 
uses for land. The budgets show that the profitability per hectare of oil palm is much higher than that of 
maize and of most other crops. The costs of transporting the palm fruit from the field to the processing 
facility are very high and a better organized system oftransportation could increase profits even more. The 
-

net present value analysis is based on a series of price, cost, and yield scenarios. The results indicate that 
oil palm is a much more profitable crop than maize under all but the most pessimistic assumptions. 
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ACEPALMA 
BEPASSA 
cajete 
carnpesmo 
Chiapanecos 
coyote 
desgranadora 
ejido 
ejidatario 
EZLN 
fib 
ha 
jornal 
jomalero 
latifundio 
milpa 
NAFTA 
nuevos centros de poblaci6n 
parcela 
pequeiia propiedad 
pequeno propietario 
peso 
SAGAR 
t 
Zapatista 
GLOSSARY 
a fanner association in Zone 3 that is requesting an additional processing plant 
from the state. 
Beneficiadora de Palma Africana Soconusco S.A. One of the cooperative 
processing plants in Zone 2. It was founded in 1993. 
a circle with a radius of 1 m around each palm that should be kept weed-free. 
small farmer. 
the people who live in Chiapas. 
a Mexican term for the traders who buy com and other crops from farmers,
 
usually at the farm gate.
 
maize sheller (a small machine that farmers usually rent).
 
a Mexican agrarian community characterized by communal land ownership; the
 
land is usually divided in parcelas.
 
a member of an ejido.
 
Ejercito Zapatista de Liberaci6n Nacional, or Zapatista National Liberation
 
Army, the guerrilla movement in Chiapas. 
fresh fruit bunches.
 
hectare; an area of 10,000 square meters, or 2.47 acres.
 
a working day, in the Soconusco from sunrise to lunch time, or about 6 hours.
 
a person who engages in wage labor.
 
a large land holding.
 
the traditional maize field cultivated by Chiapas' peasants.
 
North American Free Trade Agreement
 
agrarian community established by land distribution after the reform of ejido 
law. 
the plot of land assigned to an ejidatario for individual use. 
literally "small property"; refers to farms that do not belong to an ejido. These 
"small properties" can be quite large. 
the owner of a pequeno propiedad.
 
refers to constant J997 Mexican pesos unless otherwise specified. 1 peso =
 
0.13 US $. 
-

Secretaria de Agricultura, Ganaderia y Desarrollo Rural, formerly SARH. 
metric ton. 
a member of the EZLN, Chiapas' guerrilla movement. 
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Chapter I
 
INTRODUCTION
 
On January 1, 1994, when the Zapatistas took over San Cristobal de las Casas, one of Mexico's 
poorest states suddenly became famous. Formerly known only to a few tourists interested in the ruins at 
Palenque or in the colonial architecture of San Cristobal, Chiapas suddenly became the focus of national 
and international attention. Journalists, activists, anthropologists and other scholars suddenly went on pil­
grimages to study this remote region, producing a stream of literature on everything from indigenous cul­
tures to social movements, agricultural practices, natural resources, socioeconomic indicators, history and 
future of the area and its people. Most Chiapanecos are at the low end of Mexico's widely unequal income 
distribution. The state's polarized land-tenure pattern and insufficient physical and social infrastructure 
are accompanied by a lack of democratic structures to give a voice to the disadvantaged population. The 
Mexican government answered the campesinos' demands with military violence. Although the amount of 
attention international media and internet resources devote to Chiapas has forced the government to think 
about peaceful solutions, conflict and repression continue to this day. The government promised to 
improve its performance on social programs in the area. 
While social services such as education and health care are essential to improve the Chiapanecos' 
situation, sustainable income sources are just as important. Since 54 percent of Chiapas's population work 
in agriculture, raising farmers' income is a key way to reduce poverty. The Chiapas rebellion was partly a 
response to a changing policy environment which, through the reform of land tenure laws and the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), seems to threaten poor farmers' livelihood. To avoid further 
violent conflicts, the Mexican government implemented policies designed to ease the transition to the 
market-oriented rural sector it envisions. One such policy is the search for profitable cash crops for small 
farmers combined with the promotion of private investment in processing industries. Since domestic pro­
duction is far from meeting oilseed demand, and the market for vegetable oils is growing rapidly, oil palms 
are a potentially profitable crop for tropical areas which could constitute a sustainable source of rural 
mcome. 
This paper will evaluate the profitability of oil palm cultivation for farmers, analyzing several 
factors that affect profitability. First, farmers depend on the price they receive for their products. This 
price in turn depends on fats and oils prices in general, which are determined in domestic and international 
markets. Second, as the Mexican government reduces its heavy involvement in agriculture, incentives to 
produce certain crops are likely to shift. The policy environment is therefore an important influence on 
relative oil palm profitability. A third factor determining the economic viability of oil palm arises from the 
importance of close connections between palm growers and the processing industry. Since palm fruit are 
not edible and spoil quickly, farmers need a secure market for their product; likewise the processing indus­
try depends on a steady supply of raw materials. The main chapter is devoted to studying the impact of oil 
palm cultivation on farmers in the project area, analyzing the sensitivity of oil palm profits to variations in 
yield and price. The last chapter evaluates the results, and ends with recommendations to consider in the 
design of the institutional connection between farmers and the processing industry. 
-

Before the analysis of palm oil production in Mexico begins, this chapter provides an introduction 
to Chiapas and the oil palm project area, a statement of purpose, and a preview of some of my conclusions 
and recommendations. 
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Section A. "A Rich Land, a Poor People"· 
The contrast between vast wealth and stark poverty which characterizes much of Mexico is espe­
cially pronounced in Chiapas. Figure 1.1 shows the location of Chiapas in Mexico, and two maps of Chia­
pas. The political map includes towns and roads, while the other map shows rivers and the major agricul­
tural areas. The state's rich natural resources have done little to ensure a minimum living standard for its 
people. Chiapas accounts for only three percent of Mexico's population, but it produces five percent of 
total oil and twelve percent of natural gas, 13 percent of maize, 46 percent of coffee, and 50 percent of all 
hydroelectric power generated in Mexico. Yet only one third of Chiapaneco households has electricity. In 
1990 only 58 percent had running water, well below the national average of 79 percent. Social services are 
notoriously insufficient, and literacy in Chiapas lies 17 percent below the national average at around 70 
percent (Renner, 1997). 
The majority of Chiapanecos engage in agriculture, which differs greatly in the state's major geo­
graphic zones. The central highlands are poor, and small peasant farmers still widely rely on traditional 
systems like milpa maize and bean production. The small plots, often located on precarious hillsides, can 
no longer sustain the rapidly growing population. Between 1970 and 1990 the state's population doubled 
to 3.2 million; and although the area under cultivation is still expanding, cropland per capita has been 
declining since 1975. Growing population pressure, as well as timber and cattle enterprises are responsible 
for increasing exploitation of the eastern lowlands, including the Lacand6n rainforest. Since 1960, 
population in the Lacand6n forest has increased 25-fold, and most of the people in the eastern lowlands are 
deeply impoverished (Renner, 1997). The relatively prosperous western part of Chiapas where the oil palm 
scheme is located is dominated by large-scale commercial farming in the Grijalva Valley and coffee planta­
tions in the hills close to the Pacific Coast. 
Agriculture on the Pacific slopes, in the central depression and the northern part of the state 
accounts for 80 percent of Chiapas's production, on three-fifths of all cultivated land. The wealth gener­
ated by the large farms in the area is concentrated among the landowners; day laborers Gornaleros) and 
small farmers have remained poor. The state's main crops include coffee, rice, sugar cane, potato, sor­
ghum, tobacco, sisal, oils and vegetables, cocoa, cotton, maize, kidney beans, and wheat (Alvarez, 1988). 
Approximately 36 percent of Chiapas's households live in extreme poverty. The Mexican revolu­
tion and ensuing land reform in the first half of the twentieth century gave peasants access to land, gener­
ated widespread political support among the carnpesinos and maintained peace for decades, while agricul­
tural development policies favored large-scale irrigated farms in the northern part of Mexico. In 1992, the 
reform of land tenure laws implied the end of land redistribution2• The passage of NAFfA further demon­
strated that the Mexican government gave priority to industrial and agribusiness interests in the north of the 
country. Although the plan to lower maize prices to international levels represents a threat to small farm­
ers, the connection between the Zapatista uprising and NAFTA (which both occurred on January 1, 1994) 
is mostly symbolic (Lustig, 1995). The free trade agreement represents the fact that peasant agriculture no 
longer plays a central part in Mexico's political agenda, and that changes in agricultural policy will mean a 
gradual end to subsidies and transfers to the peasant sector. The lack of political alternatives and demo­
cratic structures left Chiapanecos without a way to make their needs known. The Zapatista uprising 
succeeded in attracting attention to a part of the population excluded by Mexico's successful growth 
­record. It called attention to the flip side of the country's petroleum-led economic expansion that 
1 Title of a book by Thomas Benjamin (1996).
 
2 Chapter III includes a more detailed analysis of land tenure and agricultural policy.
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fueled development of the industrial and large-scale agricultural sectors, but neglected rural poverty and 
peasant production. 
Section B. The Coastal Plains: "EI Soconusco" 
Historically, the Soconusco has had closer contact to Guatemala than to Chiapas or the rest of 
Mexico. In the maps in Figure 1.1 it comprises the lowlands and slopes between the Sierra, the Guatemalan 
border and the Pacific Ocean. During colonial times, the Soconusco was part of Guatemala and produced 
mainly cocoa for export to Europe. Although after independence the state of Chiapas was annexed to 
Mexico by majority vote in 1824, the Soconusco remained neutral until Guatemala and Mexico settled their 
border conflict in 1842. The Soconusco's close ties to Guatemala continued; people moved across the 
border freely until immigration regulations were put into place in 1917. When coffee land in Guatemala 
became scarce at the tum of the century, German capital and entrepreneurs bought up land on the Pacific 
slopes and established plantations. They relied largely on migratory Guatemalan laborers, many of whom 
settled permanently in the area (Alvarez, 1988; Bartra, 1997). While coffee and cocoa production were 
concentrated on the slopes, the lowlands were always dominated by cattle production, and in the early 
decades ofthe century rubber plantations were established with US capital. 
The Soconusco's population differs from that of Chiapas; it only has five percent indigenous 
population, compared to two thirds in the rest of the state. Most farmers in Chiapas work on family-based 
holdings, including ejidos, while in the Soconusco 47 percent of the population engage in wage work, often 
on commercial farms and plantations. About 12,000 laborers from the highlands work temporarily on the 
Soconusco's coffee plantations each year, in addition to about 30,000 migratory Guatemalan workers. 
Commercial agriculture in this area produces most of Chiapas's export products, including 65 percent of 
the coffee. In the plains, cattle still dominates as the most important large-farm product, but fruit produc­
tion for export, including bananas and papaya, is gaining importance. While traditionally most highland 
farmers engage in subsistence food crop production, smallholders in the Pacific coastal plains produce a 
variety of cash crops apart from maize, including tobacco, rice, sesame, mango, cocoa, plantain, and oil 
palm. Cattle, once popular because it allowed farmers to overcome the Soconusco's isolation which made 
access to markets very difficult, has maintained and increased its importance. Larger landowners switched 
to livestock because the Agrarian Reform Law allowed larger plots for cattle than for crop production, as 
long as a minimum number of animals was maintained on the property. Cattle raising is very extensive; 
farmers use an average of 20 hectares to raise one steer. Increased demand for meat in northern and central 
Mexico, combined with improved roads and communication links have helped to further increase the 
popularity of cattle. 
The plains, where oil palms are cultivated, are densely settled; cultivable land is becoming scarce. 
Virtually all the land is deforested, much of it is pasture with isolated trees. Two or three decades ago, 
ejidatarios received about 20 hectares each; now the plot size has been much reduced. Although officially 
land distribution ended in 1992, the government is still distributing land in the Soconusco. Landless 
peasants' organizations such as the Emiliano Zapata Proletarian Organization invade large landholdings, 
and though it contradicts official policy, the government has been buying up large landowners' land and 
distributing it among invaders. These new communities are called "new population centers" (Nuevos 
Centros de Poblaci6n), but people still refer to them as "ejidos," ignoring the unpopular change in govern­
­ment policy. The land most recently distributed tends to be close to the mangrove swamps by the coast; 
soil quality is rather low. Farmers receive about five hectares each; they generally are much poorer than 
those who received better quality land earlier on. Some older ejidatarios have managed to increase their 
plots through land purchases, and often more than one family member owns a plot, leading to a polarization 
in land tenure. 
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Section C. Why Oil Palms? 
To decrease dependence on government subsidies, as well as to reduce expenditures, the Mexican 
Secretariat for Agriculture (SAGAR) is encouraging private investment in the production and processing of 
cash crops, one of which is oil palm. Since oil palms are already successfully cultivated in the Soconusco, 
it is clear that they grow well in the area. Oil Palms require an evenly distributed average annual rainfall of 
2000 mm or more, which is found on the pacific coast ofChiapas close to the Guatemalan border. A tropi­
cal rainy climate with no dry season is ideal. The Soconusco has a short dry season. While palms can 
survive a dry season, yields fall when precipitation is low. Temperatures (between a minimum of 22-24°C 
and a maximum of 29-33°C) are ideal, as well as at least five hours of sunshine per day. The Soconusco 
has average annual temperatures between 25 and 28°C. Apart from the existence of a short dry season, the 
Soconusco thus seems almost ideal for oil palm cultivation, which is confirmed by high yields and fast 
growth of palms when they are well taken care of. During the dry season yields decline as expected, and 
farmers harvest less frequently. 
Oil palms furthermore have both economic and ecological advantages which make them a desirable 
crop both for small- and large-scale producers. Ecologically, tree crops are more sustainable on tropical 
soils than annual crops. Previous cash crops such as tobacco exhaust the tropical soils, and afterwards the 
land is only suitable for cattle grazing. Oil palms have a productive life span of two to three decades. 
After about 25 years yields start to decrease and, more significantly, the palms are so tall that harvesting 
costs rise and it becomes more desirable to replant. While monoculture never has the same ecological value 
as forest, oil palms do not exhaust the land; rather the permanent cover protects the soil and prevents 
erosion, especially when palms are combined with leguminous covercrops (Tailliez, 1995). During the 
rapid expansion of oil palm areas in Malaysia and Indonesia, the crop received criticism for its association 
with deforestation, but since the Soconusco is already deforested, additional loss of tropical forests is not a 
concern in the area. 
Economically, palms have several advantages besides their profitability, which will be explored in 
great detail later on. Their main attraction lies in the relatively steady income stream they provide for 
farmers, as compared to other crops which are only harvested once or twice a year. Additionally, oil palm 
production exposes farmers to less production risk than most alternatives. Other crops in the area such as 
maize and plantain are very susceptible to diseases and pests, while oil palms have not been significantly 
affected by either of the two problems. In an area subjected to frequent flooding, the palms' resistance to 
water is a great plus. Virtually all other crops fail when the fields are inundated, but oil palms survive, 
though the yield is lower than in the absence of flooding. Plantains are affected by storms which induce 
lodging; palms are sturdy enough to withstand even the most serious winds in the area. Furthermore, palm 
cultivation demands less drudgery than annual crops. Once they reach a certain height, they almost take 
care of themselves. Some skilled labor is required for pruning and harvesting, weed control is necessary 
from time to time, but overall, farmers can reduce the amount of hard physical labor required to earn a 
living or hire workers to carry it out. 
Lately, cattle theft has been a serious problem in the Soconusco; many farmers remarked that they 
are switching to oil palm because palms cannot be stolen. Even plantains are subject to theft, but since oil 
palm fruit have to be sold at the extraction plant, they are less attractive to thieves. Farmers do not 
­
constantly have to watch their fields to avoid theft, which reduces risk, worries, and labor requirements. 
... 
Large farmers cite an additional advantage: in an area where land invasions by landless peasants are 
common, land already planted to oil palm seems to be less attractive to settlers than pasture. 
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Naturally, oil palms also have disadvantages. As with any tree crop, during the first few years oil 
palms produce no revenue. This can be mitigated somewhat by intercropping with maize, but remains a 
serious concern, especially for poorer farmers. Oil palm fruit are not edible, and thus farmers are very 
dependent on market access for their product. In the case of adverse prices, or if a monopoly evolves in the 
processing industry, revenues may be seriously affected. Farmers also lose the flexibility to respond 
quickly to market incentives; once land is planted to oil palm, their removal is costly and time consuming. 
Apart from its impact on individual farmers, oil palm cultivation has an effect on the regional 
economy. Farmers' increased purchasing power benefits business owners and merchants. Extraction 
plants can create employment for landless peasants, providing alternative rural income sources and thereby 
alleviating poverty. In the future, the processing industry may expand to include a refinery; bottles or 
packing materials could be produced locally. Thus palm oil production can help to revitalize the local 
economy, improving income earning opportunities in an area characterized by increasing outmigration. 
The possibility to earn a reasonable livelihood in the countryside lowers the probability that people will 
migrate to the cities, helping to avoid higher urban unemployment and the problems associated with 
Mexico's enormous cities, as well as illegal immigration into the US. Where migration networks are firmly 
established, raising rural income is not effective in lowering migration; alternative activities simply cannot 
compete in profitability (Winters, 1996, cited in de Janvry and Sadoulet, 1997). Initiatives to lower migra­
tion thus have to concentrate on areas where migration is not very common yet, but where it is likely to 
happen in the future, as is the case with Mexico's Southeast (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 1997). 
Beyond regional benefits, oil palm has advantages for the country as a whole. Since Mexico has a 
large deficit in vegetable oil production and imports large quantities of oilseeds, mainly US soybeans, the 
government views oilseed production very favorably. Oil palms present the opportunity of producing oil­
seeds in tropical areas not suitable for traditional oilcrops such as soybean or sunflower. Furthermore, oil 
palms yield more oil per hectare than any other crop, over ten times more than soybeans (Pigott, 1995), 
reducing the need for imports and thus freeing up foreign exchange for other purposes. 
Section D. The Purpose ofthis Study, and a Preview of Some Conclusions 
This study evaluates the viability of smallholder oil palm production in the Soconusco region of 
Chiapas. Chapters II through IV analyze vegetable oil markets, the Mexican policy environment, and 
institutional setups in oil palm production. I conclude that the Mexican market for vegetable oils is 
expanding rapidly, and that therefore demand for palm oil should not constitute a problem. The policy 
environment is characterized by a reduction in state intervention in the market, accompanied by reduced 
support for producers of primary food crops such as maize. The policy environment is thus favorable for a 
switch from maize production to the production of cash crops, including oil palm. The analysis of institu­
tional arrangements shows that while oil palms are often grown on larger plantations, they can successfully 
be produced by smallholders. The institutional arrangements, and especially power dynamics in this insti­
tutional arrangement can have important effects on fresh fruit bunch pricing, and thus profitability. 
To evaluate oil palm profitability, I first analyze the farm budgets of existing oil palm producers, 
comparing the per hectare profitability associated with different crops. The major alternative to oil palms 
for most farmers is maize. To introduce a time element into the comparison of profitabilities, I calculate 
the net present value of one hectare of oil palm and maize, using price and yield data obtained in farmer -

interviews during the sununer of 1997. Predicting returns from oil palm requires establishing different 
cost, price, and yield scenarios and analyzing their effect on net present value. The aim is to determine how 
sensitive profitability is to future price and yield developments. The information gained from already 
7 
producing palm farmers serves as a starting point to judge the impact oil palm production will have on new 
farmers. 
Farm budgets as well as field observations show that oil palm has a positive impact on fann 
income. The crop is profitable for those farmers who already produce it, and yields higher returns than 
virtually all alternative land uses. The net present value analysis shows that returns on investments in oil 
palm are higher than returns from maize cultivation under most scenarios. Only the most pessimistic 
assumptions regarding costs, prices and yields lead to such a low return from oil palm cultivation that 
maize appears superior. Costs have a major impact on profitability, especially transport costs. A better 
organized transport system could thus lead to a significant reduction in farmers' costs. Although naturally 
prices have an impact on profitability, returns from oil palm are more sensitive to changes in yields. Thus 
extension services which improve farmers' care for palms and thus yields can have a major impact on 
fanners' incomes. 
The first few years, until oil palms become productive, constitute a critical phase in detennining 
the project's success. Farmers have committed to oil palm, but are not yet receiving any benefits. Maize 
intercropping mitigates income loss, but this loss can still be important, especially for poorer fanners. The 
project tries to make oil palms more accessible by distributing the seedlings for free, and furthennore giving 
each fanner a subsidy of 900 pesos for the first two years. This subsidy is partly distributed in kind (i.e. 
fertilizer), and partly in cash. Technical advice is also available for free. The farm budgets also serve to 
evaluate the fanners' cash flow situation during the first few years. This analysis shows that most farmers' 
economic situation is comfortable enough to make the cash subsidies dispensable. For the poorest fanners 
however, the oil palm subsidy can make up an important part of total income. Targeting subsidies to the 
poorest fanners may enable the project to avoid wasting money while having a greater impact on those who 
really need the support. 
-

... 
Chapter II
 
FATS AND OILS MARKETS
 
Since oil palm profitability is directly connected to vegetable oil prices and thus to fats and oils 
markets, this chapter provides an overview of these markets, both globally and in Mexico. The aim is to 
assess future demand for palm oil both on the world market and in Mexico. The fats and oils market is 
both among the most important and among the most complex markets in agricultural products. Its impor­
tance derives from the value of international trade in oilseeds and products; in 1992 it constituted the third 
most valuable component in total world agricultural trade, after meat products and cereals (Hui, 1996). 
Virtually every country cultivates some of the world's hundreds of oil producing plants, and oils, fats and 
protein meals are consumed everywhere in growing amounts. Oilseeds are not only used for cooking oils 
and shortenings, but also for industrial purposes, and to produce oilcakes and meals for animal feed. The 
complexity of the fats and oils complex stems from the intense competition between products within the 
group. lbis group consists not only of annual oilseeds and perennial oil crops. but also includes animal fat, 
marine oils, and synthetic (petroleum-derived) products (World Bank, 1991). Many of these products can 
be substituted for one another, which makes their prices very highly correlated. Furthermore, most oilseeds 
contain both oil and protein meal, and depending on relative prices, either product can be the driving force 
in oilseeds markets. 
The international market for fats, oils, and protein meals has changed substantially in the second 
half of this century. Not only have traditional producer countries found increasing competition from new 
producers (such as Southeast Asia, South America and Europe), but, simultaneously, traditional oilseeds 
have encountered growing competition from new oils (such as palm oil and canola oil). After giving an 
introduction into the substitutability between oils and the possible uses of palm oil, this chapter demon­
strates how closely oil prices are correlated. It shows how the relative importance of different oils has 
changed, focusing on increasing competition between soybeans and palm oil. As income and population 
grow in many countries, demand for fats, oils and oilmeals increases. Since Mexico is undergoing both 
population and income growth, its vegetable oil consumption is likely to continue to increase in the future, 
providing an expanding market for palm oil from Chiapas. In the United States and other developed coun­
tries, rising income has also led to increasing concern with the health effects of different oils. Therefore, 
after a section on income and dietary change, a section in this chapter examines the health concerns associ­
ated with palm oil and other fats and oils, and the effect these concerns may have on preferences for differ­
ent oils. 
Mexico satisfies part of its growing demand for fats, oils and protein meals with domestic produc­
tion. but most of the supply is imported in the form of oilseeds or their products. Since NAFfA implies the 
elimination of tariffs on soybeans, and US soybeans and products are the most important source of oils and 
meals for Mexico, the US soybean oil price constitutes a price ceiling for vegetable oil in Mexico. Soybean 
imports are expected to increase with Mexico's expanding livestock industry and the corresponding demand 
for protein meal. To be successful, palm oil from Chiapas will have to compete with US soybean oil, 
which is readily available as a by-product from meal production. Oil palms produce only very limited 
quantities of meal from the palm kernels, and palm oil producers thus depend virtually exclusively on the 
vegetable oil price for their profits. 
-

Section A. Substitutability Between Fats and Oils 
The fats and oils market is even more competitive than most commodity markets. lbis is due to 
the high degree of substitutability between vegetable oils for most end uses, which implies a very high 
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elasticity of demand for individual oils, although the demand elasticity for oils as a group is quite low. In 
contrast, the short-term supply elasticity of most vegetable oils is relatively low because palm oil and other 
tree crops take a long time to mature, and other oils, such as soybean oil, are by-products of oilseed 
crushing for animal feed (Nusbaumer and Franco, 1978). Thanks to techniques like fractionation and 
interesterificationJ, today palm oil can be used for a much wider variety of end uses than a few decades 
ago, and interchangeability of different oils in general has increased. As a result, vegetable oil prices have 
become very highly correlated. 
Technically, substitutability is high within certain categories of oils, but lower between categories. 
Economically, there are factors apart from technical constraints which limit substitutability. Thus, con­
sumers have preferences for certain oils, for example because of taste or health concerns. Customs and 
lack of information lead to a preference for domestic oil in many countries, although increasing trade and 
global communication are making consumers more accepting of foreign oils. Furthermore, relative prices 
reduce the substitutability of oils even where it is technically possible. Consumer preferences are more 
important where price differences are small (Meinunger, 1975). For industrial uses, vegetable oils do not 
only compete with each other, but also with synthetic oils, and to a diminishing degree with marine oils and 
animal fat. The complexity of competition between different fats and oils makes the prediction of demand 
developments extremely difficult. 
Oil and Fat Classification and Uses 
Classification According to Sources 
There are five sources of fats and oils: Oilseeds, oil-producing trees, domesticated animals, marine 
animals, and petroleum. Oilseeds include mostly annual varieties grown in temperate climates, such as 
soybean, rapeseed, and sunflowerseed; others such as peanuts are grown in tropical climates. Some of 
these oilseeds are grown mainly for oil, such as sunflowerseeds, while other crops, such as cotton, produce 
oil as a byproduct. Most vegetable oil worldwide is produced from oilseeds. Oil producing trees have 
become increasingly important with the rise in palm oil production; other trees include coconut, olive, and 
babassu trees. Most oil-producing trees grow in warm or tropical climates; their oil production per hectare 
is much above that of other oilseeds (Hui, 1996; Palma-Gomez, 1977). Animal fat is mostly from hogs, 
sheep or cattle. Major animal fat products include butter, lard and tallow; they are very important in 
countries with a large livestock industry. Marine oils have lost much of their importance with the growth 
of synthetic oils, which has had a positive impact on the whale population. 
Classification According to End Uses 
There are several ways of classifying fats and oils according to their chemical properties, but for 
the purposes of this study, a classification according to end uses is most relevant. However, one chemical 
distinction is important as it determines the range of products that can be obtained from an oil: drying 
versus non-drying oils. As their name suggests, drying oils dry to a uniform, resistant finish and can be 
used to produce paints and varnishes. They include polyunsaturated oils such as soybean, castor and 
linseed oil, as can be seen from Table 11.1. 
-

J The process called fractionation consists in separating the liquid (olein) and solid fractions (stearines) contained 
in palm oil and other oils. Interesterification involves exchanging the fatty acids of different types of fat or oil, for 
example to change the melting point. Both processes are quite complicated; for a more detailed description see Hui 
(1996), vol. 1, pages 8-10. 
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Table 11.1. Drying and Non-drying Oils 
, 
Drying I Semi-di'y~l15 
1" 
I Non ~'':'''l!> 
, . 
Linseed I Maize I Palm 
Castor : Sesame : Palm kernel 
Fish : Sunflowerseed : Coconut 
Soybean I I Cotton 
Tung : : Olive 
• Source: Bailey's Industrial Oil and Fat Products, 1964. 
While only drying oils can be used for paints, oils from all three categories can be used for many other 
purposes, including human consumption. 
For simplification, fats and oils can be divided in two basic groups: liquid oils and solid oils or 
fats. Palm oil has an intermediate consistency and can be fractionated into a solid and a liquid oil. It is 
usually classified as a solid fat, because it is "usually used as such in Western countries" (Voituriez, 1996). 
Solid oils and fats include animal fat as well as solid vegetable fats, while both marine oil and vegetable oil 
are liquid. 
Solid Fats and Oill 
•	 Butter fats contain a high percentage of butyric acid and are almost exclusively used for butter produc­
tion due to their high price. 
•	 Animal fats such as tallow and lard are becoming less popular for human consumption due to their high 
degree of saturation. Their price is low compared to other fats and oils, and they are frequently used for 
soap production. 
•	 Vegetable butters such as cocoa butter are relatively valuable. Most are from the seeds of tropical 
trees. They can be used in confections, chocolate coatings, and for pharmaceutical products including 
cosmetics. 
•	 Lauric oils receive their name from their high lauric acid. The two most important lauric oils are coco­
nut oil and palm kernel oil. They are relatively inexpensive and are suitable both for edible uses and for 
soap production. 
•	 Palm oil is the most important palmitic acid oil; it contains between 32 and 47 percent palmitic acid, 
and 40 to 52 percent oleic acid. It can be fractionated into its solid and liquid fractions (olein and 
stearine). It is usually used for shortenings, margarines, and in soap. Its price tends to be slightly below 
that ofother vegetable oils. 
LiqUid Oils 
•	 Oils with a high oleic and linoleic acid content are highly unsaturated and include oils made from oil­
seeds such as cottonseed, peanut, sunflowerseed, safflower, sesame but also tree oils like olive oil and 
­
almond oil. Although they are mostly non-drying, the oils in this group are very versatile in their uses. 
They are good for human consumption, and can be hydrogenated to a semi-solid consistency. Their 
price is low compared to vegetable fat such as cocoa butter, but tends to be higher than that of other 
vegetable oils. 
2 The following two sections are based on Hui (1996) and Palma-Gomez (1977). 
12
 
•	 Oils high in linolenic acid include mainly soybean and linseed oil. Selective breeding of rapeseed plants 
to reduce erucic acid contents has led to a recent addition to this group: canola oil. It has the lowest 
content of saturated fatty acids of the vegetable oils. These oils are good drying oils and are widely used 
for paints and varnishes; but they are also extremely important for human consumption. They are gen­
erally cheaper than the oils in the previous group, although there are exceptions. 
•	 Marine oils are usually mostly unsaturated and are used principally in the elaboration of soaps and var­
nishes, although they can be an important source of Vitamin A and D in human consumption. Their 
price is very low and their importance has declined rapidly with the introduction of synthetic oils. 
•	 Castor oil is the only important oil with a high content of ricinoleic acid. It can be used for paints and 
protective films, but is unsuitable for edible uses or soap production. It also has specialized uses such 
as lubrication, hydraulic fluid, and in the textile industry. 
The substitutability of different fats and oils is summarized in Table 11.2. The table illustrates that 
most oils have many uses. In general, processed oils are more interchangeable than crude oils, but their 
storage and transport costs are higher. Since oil crushing creates relatively little value-added, local proces­
sing may not always be desirable (Nusbaumer and Franco, 1978). The dynamic rise in palm oil production 
and exports is explained both by its low and falling production costs, and by its versatility in edible and 
non-edible uses. The substitutability among oilcakes and meals is lower because the "usefulness of oilcake 
as a livestock feed stems primarily from its digestible protein content, which varies substantially among 
different kinds" (Meinunger, 1975). 
The Relationship Between Oils and Meals3 
Most oilseeds contain both oil and protein; the latter is used as animal feed. Some oilseed.s have a 
relatively low oil content; soybeans contain only 18 percent. When soybeans are crushed and the oil is 
removed, the residue is a meal that contains about 44 to 50 percent protein. Oil palm fruit contain mostly 
oil (around 50 percent of the mesocarp), but almost no protein (Hui, 1996). Palm kernels can be used as 
animal feed, as can palm kernel meal. Both meal and oil are experiencing rapid growth: "Increasing pro­
duction and trade of oilseeds and their products have occurred due to both the rising consumption of live­
stock products and the concurrent rapid growth in meal demand, as well as strong demand for vegetable 
oils" (Hui, 1996:53). 
Since demand for oils is quite independent of meal demand, oil and meal prices do not necessarily 
move together, although they are interrelated because the two products are usually produced together. 
Thus, strong demand for soybean meal will have an impact on the world supply of vegetable oil, and influ­
ence the prices of other oils as well (UNCTAD/GAIT, 1990). Castaneda (1995) explains: "Soybeans are 
crushed primarily for soybean meal -- used mainly as a protein ingredient in animal feeds -- with oil gener­
ally a by-product. However, [in 1993/94 and 1994/95], soybean processing has been heavily influenced by 
the demand for vegetable oils". 
Oil Palm Products 
Until the beginning of the twentieth century, palm oil had mostly industrial uses, for example in tin 
plating, and the production of stearic candles and soap. In West Africa, where the oil palm originated, 
­
crude palm oil is consumed directly. It is a good source of Vitamin A, but its red color and strong taste 
make it unacceptable for most consumers in other areas. With growing demand for liquid oils and better 
fractionation techniques, refined, bleached and deodorized palm oil (RBD palm oil) increasingly went to 
3 I use the tenns protein meal, oilmeal and oilcake interchangeably. 
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Table 11.2. Fat and Oil Substitutability 
Fat/Oil 
Cooking! 
salad oil 
Shorte­
ning 
Mar­
2arine 
Confec­
tionery Soap 
Paints 
etc. 
Lubri­
cants 
Cosmetics 
etc. 
Almond X 
Babassu X 
Castor X X X X 
Cocoa butter X X 
Coconut X X 
Copra X X X X 
Com X X X X X 
Cottonseed X X X X 
Fish X X 
Lard X X X X X 
Linseed X X 
Olive X X X 
Palm X X X X X X X 
Palm kernel X X X X X X 
Peanut X X X 
Rapeseed X X X X 
Sesame X X X X X 
Soybean X X X X X 
Sunflowerseed X X X 
Synthetic X X X X X 
Tallow X 
Tung X 
Source: Based on HUl, Y.H. 1996. Bailey's Industrial Oil and Fat Products. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. New York; and Palma­
G6mez, A. 1977. Substitucion de Importaciones de Productos Agropecuarios Alimenticios en Mexico: Analisis de Posibili­
dades; el Caso de las Grasas y Aceites (sic). Cornell Agricultural Economics StafTPaper No. 77-7. Ithaca. 
edible end-uses such as margarine and shortening, and later also to salad and cooking oils (Nusbaumer and 
Franco, 1978; Pigott, 1995). Today, 90 percent of world palm oil production goes to food uses, while 10 
percent is used in other applications such as cosmetics, detergents, and even fuel (Garces and Cuellar, 
1997). Figure 11.1 shows products made with palm oil, and the processes through which they are produced. 
Possible uses include margarine, shortening, vanaspati (a type of shortening used in tropical Asia), frying 
fat, ice cream, salad dressing, confectionery, bread making, frying and cooking oil, and infant formulas. 
Palm oil is the most widely used industrial frying fat because it has no unpleasant odor, and a high resis­
tance to oxidation when compared to unsaturated oils (Hui, 1996). In addition, there are non-edible uses 
such as diesel substitutes, lubricants, cosmetics, soaps and detergents, and uses in plastic and rubber proc­
essing. 
Palm kernels can be ground, which yields meal (for animal feed) and palm kernel oil. This solid oil 
belongs to the group of lauric oils and can be refined and used in margarines and shortenings. It is also 
used to substitute for milk fat in ice cream, non-dairy creamers and creams. Due to its high melting point, 
­it is ideal for use in confectioneries, chocolate coverings for ice-eream and sweets, and cream fillings. The 
...price of lauric oils is generally above that of palm oil, and correlation between palm oil prices and palm 
kernel oil prices is lower than correlation between prices within one group of oils. 
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Section B. Prices and World Supply 
Like most commodity markets, the fats and oils market is very dynamic. Not only can buyers 
choose from many different vegetable fats and oils, they also decide whether to buy them as oilseeds, or in 
their processed form as oil or meal. Both oilseeds in unprocessed form, and processed vegetable oil and 
meal are traded internationally. The value of trade in oilseeds has increased with world population and 
income as oilcrops are an important component of the world's food supply. Morgan and Sanford write: 
"(t)he growing globalization and complexity of oilseed markets have resulted in ever-growing uncertainties 
and risks" (Hui, 1996). Over this century, production of oilseeds has moved geographically; first from 
mostly tropical countries to temperate zones. In recent decades, this trend was somewhat reversed by the 
phenomenal growth of palm oil production in Malaysia. The move to temperate growing areas coincided 
with the emergence of soybeans as the most important oilcrop, which has dominated production and trade 
for most of the century. Again, palm oil has been responsible for reducing the dominance of soybeans on 
the world vegetable oil market, becoming the most widely traded oil. To understand the supply and trade of 
oilseeds, it is necessary to study the complex way in which their prices are interrelated. They are examined 
in the next section, to be followed by a closer look at supply. 
Prices 
Oilseed price formation is not simple; it depends on product prices: 
Determination of oilseed prices is unique, because seed prices are normally a function of 
the value of their products (meal and oil). The production of protein meal and vegetable 
oil is determined by the spread between the value of the products and the price of the 
seed -- the gross crush margins. Crush margins vary constantly, influenced by the 
demand for both protein meal and edible oil. Because soybeans are the largest oilseed 
produced in the world and soybean products are the most widely consumed, their prices 
usually reveal the movement in the overall oilseeds markets (Castaneda, 1995:16). 
Soybean and product prices can thus be used as an indicator for world oilseed and product price trends. 
As can be seen from Figure II.2, vegetable oil prices are extremely volatile. Real prices have a 
downward trend since 1950, interrupted by high prices in the early 1970s during the world food crisis. The 
prices of major vegetable oils move more or less together, but their relative positions change periodically. 
The graph shows how closely palm oil prices follow the soybean oil price. Coconut oil is a lauric oil, and 
since substitutability between lauric oils and soybean and palm oil is lower, their prices are not as highly 
correlated. Groundnut oil is a special case whose price was kept artificially high, more affected by gov­
ernment policies than by supply and demand. Figure II.3 makes a similar point, although the great number 
of oils it includes makes it hard to follow individual developments; rather the focus is on general trends. 
The graph shows how the seven major vegetable oils have evolved since the 1970s. The prices of lauric 
oils (coconut and palm kernel) are consistently above the other oils except groundnut oil. Rapeseed (or 
canola) oil, which used to be one of the cheapest, is now sold at a premium because of its health benefits. 
Sunflowerseed, rapeseed, and soybean oil prices are extremely highly correlated as they have virtually iden­
­tical uses. Palm oil almost consistently has the lowest price, but it also closely follows the ups and downs 
of soybean oil. 
Over the last twenty years, the rise of new oilseed production areas outside the US com belt have 
decreased the influence of US weather and policy shocks on world markets, thereby reducing a source of 
price variability (World Bank, 1991). The joint production of oils and meals however ensures a continued 
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high volatility in the market. Conditions in those two markets can be quite different, which leads to 
interesting market developments. For example as oil prices drop, vegetable oil supply need not decline if 
meal prices happen to rise during the same time period (World Bank, 1991). Figure 11.4 shows soybean, 
soybean oil and soybean meal prices since 1950. Clearly these three prices are much less correlated than 
the prices of different vegetable oils. While initially soybean oil was much more valuable than soybeans or 
meal, over the last decades their prices have become closer, reflecting the availability of competitive 
tropical oils such as palm oil. Soybean and meal prices display a very high correlation, illustrating the fact 
that soybeans contain mostly meal. When oil prices are high, increased soybean crushing for oil raises the 
price of soybeans relative to meal prices. Despite the growing importance of palm oil, soybeans and 
products are still the most important oilseed worldwide, and their prices can be used as guidelines for most 
other oil products. 
World Vegetable Oil Supply 
The structure of world fats and oils supply has changed considerably during this century. Not only 
the relative importance of different producers has shifted; some oils have grown considerably faster than 
others, altering the market's composition. While historically, colonies in Asia and Africa produced most of 
the world's oilseeds, after World War II the market became dominated by the major soybean producers, 
specifically the United States (Hui, 1996). In the 1990s most oilseeds are produced in temperate zones, 
with the exception of palm oil and coconuts. While most oilseeds can be traded in processed or unproc­
essed form, both coconuts and oil palm fruit cannot easily be stored and transported and are thus processed 
in the country of origin and exported as copra and crude palm oil, respectively. Thus trade in other oil­
seeds reacts to changes in both meal and oil prices, but palm oil trade depends only on oil prices. 
Figure 11.5 shows the evolution of world vegetable oil production between 1960 and 1994/95. 
Overall production has grown fourfold over this time period, but this growth has not been evenly distrib­
uted. Soybeans are still the most produced oilseed, and their production has grown faster than the total, or 
about six-fold. The most dynamic oils were rapeseed (or canola) oil and palm oil, growing about 10- and 
12-fold respectively. Other oils, such as cottonseed, peanut (or groundnut), and olive oil did not experience 
such d)l1amiC growth, partly due to their small role in international trade. The lauric oils experienced some 
growth, although it was not spectacular. 
The success of palm oil in the world market is striking, especially when looking at exports in 
Figure 1I.6a. Palm oil production was consciously promoted by the Malaysian government as an alterna­
tive to rubber. Starting in the late 1950s and during the 1960s Malaysia implemented extensive programs 
called FELDA schemes to lessen political unrest in the countryside and reduce rural poverty. Peasants 
were settled in newly developed areas, where they produced crops such as rubber, and, increasingly, oil 
palm. These projects have a relatively long gestation period, and results are reflected in the percentage of 
palm oil in total production of the major oils included in Figure 11.5. From less than one tenth of total 
vegetable oil production in 1960, palm oil grew to almost one fourth in 1994/95. Soybean oil, by 
comparison, grew more slowly from one fifth of world production in 1960 to a little less than one third in 
1994/95. Figure 1I.6a shows palm oil's even more impressive growth in world exports. Palm oil exports 
grew sixteen-fold during the time period, compared to a fivefold increase in total vegetable oil exports. Its 
growth is surpassed by that of canola oil, which grew 25-fold, starting from a very low level. Other oils ­
displaying rapid export growth are sunflowerseed oil and olive oil. In 1960, both production and exports 
were almost evenly divided among several important oils, none of which were dominant. Over the last four 
decades, some oils, such as palm oil, soybean oil, rapeseed oil, and sunflowerseed oil displayed rapid 
growth rates, while others stagnated and lost relative importance, for example peanut oil and cottonseed oil. 
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The spectacular growth of palm oil is reflected in the increasing importance of Malaysia and Indo­
nesia as oil producing countries. The major oilseed producers are illustrated in Figure 11.7. North Ameri­
can production, mostly of US soybeans, is still the largest component, although competition from other 
areas has increased. Overall, no one country predominates oilseed production; it is spread out fairly 
evenly. In exports, however, illustrated in Figure II.6b, North America is predominant, although Europe 
and South America now each have a significant share of the market. Oilseed exports do not include palm 
oil, which is traded as oil; therefore Figure 11.7 only includes oilseeds traded in their unprocessed form. 
Palm oil exports are shown in a separate graph in Figure 11.8. The international palm oil market is domi­
nated by Malaysia and, to a lesser degree, Indonesia. Malaysia accounts for roughly half of world palm oil 
production, and almost two thirds of exports. Other important new producers, mostly of soy-beans, are 
Argentina and Brazil in South America; Canada and its canola oil and the European community have 
experienced rapid growth as well. 
Ironically, the loss of US predominance in the market was partly a result of US policies. Until the 
1970s, North American oilseed production dominated the world market. Soybean cultivation had expanded 
rapidly in the US to meet the growing demand of the feed-lot and poultry industries. Prices fell due to 
abundant supply, and the government instituted support prices to protect farmers' incomes. Support prices 
resulted in huge stocks of agricultural commodities, and were eventually replaced by direct payments to 
farmers in exchange for reduced production. When in 1973/4 a failed crop in the USSR and in Asia trig­
gered the "World Food Crisis", the US sold huge amounts of grain to the USSR, and oilseed prices rose 
together with prices of most agricultural commodities (Poleman, 1975; Johnson, 1975). This provided 
incentives for South American countries to increase their soybean production dramatically. Simultaneously 
South-East Asia expanded its cultivation of oil crops, and palm oil expanded its market share from 26 
percent of total vegetable oil exports in 1975 to over 40 percent in 1992/934 . US vegetable oil exports 
declined from 15 percent of world exports to six percent over the same time period (Morgan, 1993). Since 
the mid 1980s, growth in demand for oils has outpaced the demand for feed protein and the associated 
supply of oils from "conventional" oilseeds such as soybeans. The gap has been filled by palm oil, which 
yields ten times more oil per hectare than soybeans. 
In 1997, the USDA published the Agricultural Baseline Projections to 2005, Reflecting the 1996 
Farm Act, accompanied by the International Agricultural Baseline Projections to 2005. The reports are 
published by the ERS, based on analysis carried out by committees including the World Agricultural 
Outlook Board, the ERS, the Farm Service Agency, and the Foreign Agricultural Service. These projec­
tions do not forecast the future; rather they are based on certain assumptions such as steady economic 
growth, continuation of the current trade and agricultural policies in the US and abroad, and average 
weather. Although US oilseed policy aims to give more importance to price incentives in the future in the 
framework of the 1996 Farm Act, the ERS does not foresee any dramatic changes in production levels as a 
result of policy changes. The expected modest decline in area planted will probably be offset by small 
gains in yield, leaving overall US production levels unaffected. In Europe, budget constraints are restrict­
ing the amount of resources available for support programs, and production growth is projected to slow 
down; GAIT rulings should additionaHy reduce the use of support programs. The USDA projects South 
East Asian suppliers in contrast to continue their growth, especially Indonesia, as suitable land in Malaysia 
is becoming scarce. In Latin America, improved transportation and low production costs should also lead 
to gains in production. Overall, falls in soybean oil are projected to be more than offset by other oils, but 
­
... 
4 The switch from the use of calendar years (like 1978) to marketing years (1992/93, from August to July) in 
USDA publications reflects the growing importance of crops produced in the southern hemisphere. Producers in 
one hemisphere can now react quickly to crop failures in another part of the world; the time delay in reaction to 
price incentives has become shorter in the soybean market. Tree crops such as oil palm have a much lower supply 
elasticity and can react only to long term price trends. 
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soybean meal is too important to be replaced by other oilseeds, leading to forecasts of continued high 
demand for soybeans. 
Section C. Global Demand 
The growing production of oilseeds is driven by increasing demand for both oil and meal. Part of 
this growth is explained by population increases, but additionally, rising incomes, especially in developing 
countries, contribute to higher demand for oilseeds in two ways. First, as people have more income at their 
disposal, they consume more fats and oils, both directly and as part of processed foods. ''The global growth 
in consumption of vegetable oils is outpacing that of most other agricultural products. Consumption of 
vegetable oils worldwide grew at an average annual rate of 4.2 percent over the past decade" (Morgan, 
1993:26). Second, people consume more meat and animal products as their income rises, which fuels the 
demand for oilcakes and meals. The effects of rising income on people's diets is analyzed in the following 
section, with special attention to the consumption of fats and oils. 
In addition to income effects, another factor has had a major effect on people's fats and oils con­
sumption in the past two or three decades: health concerns. Demand for some oils has grown faster than 
for others, and changing consumer preferences are altering the composition of the edible oil market in most 
developed countries. Palm oil is one of the oils that has been most affected by this trend; its consump-tion, 
along with the consumption of most tropical oils, has been reduced dramatically in the US. Most of the 
growth in vegetable oil demand is taking place in developing countries, where people tend to be more con­
cerned with oil prices than with effects on human health. However once their incomes reach a certain level, 
health concerns may gain importance, and thus after the analysis of income and dietary change, a section is 
devoted to health issues. 
Income Growth and Dietary Change 
As income grows, fat and oil consumption increases. At very low income levels, when people have 
access to around 2,000 calories per day, cooking oils are a luxury constituting about 2-3% of the diet. 
When per capita income in these very poor countries rises, people mostly increase consumption of preferred 
staples, but also use more oil and fat to add flavor, calories and diversity to their diets. Until people get 
about 400 calories per day from fats and oils, any small increase in income leads to a large increase in the 
consumption of fats and oils. When income increases further, to between $1,000 and $10,0005, people add 
meat to their diets, which raises the demand for oilseed meals used as animal feed. Eventually, during the 
next stage, the amount of oil used in cooking levels off, but the consumption of processed foods and foods 
prepared outside the home keeps increasing. In 1997, Mexico was at this stage, where demand for higher­
valued food increases. This is partly due to urbanization, which makes processed foods conveniently avail­
able for many people. Pre-prepared foods usually contain more fat than home-cooked meals, and per 
capita fat and oil consumption keeps rising. Above a total energy availability of about 3,000 calories per 
day, demand for fats and oils tends to taper off, although demand for vegetable oils continues to expand 
slowly as people switch from animal fat to vegetable oil (World Bank 1991, ERSIUSDA 1997). 
Most of world population falls into the category below 400 fat calories per day, where small 
changes in income lead to large increases in demand for fats and oils. Since dietary change slows down and • 
eventually stops when income per capita has reached a level of about $10,000 per capita, most of the 
growth in oil demand occurs in countries whose income is growing from a relatively low level. In 1990, 
average world per capita consumption was around 12 kg per year. Figure 11.9 shows vegetable oil 
consumption in different countries and the associated income level. In general, fat and oil consumption 
5 All income Figures are in 1985 US dollars, adjusted for purchasing power parity. 
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increases with income. Ghana, Guatemala, China and India all show low income levels, and relatively low 
fats and oils consumption per capita. Brazil, Mexico and Malaysia are in between, with both mid-level 
income and fat consumption. Finally, most developed countries display both high income and high fat and 
oil consumption. Japan is the notable exception, where despite high income, oil consumption has stayed at 
a relatively low level. In developing countries, fat and oil consumption also tends to increase much faster 
than in the developed world. In Latin America, vegetable oil consumption is about half that of the US, or 
an annual average of 9.5 kg (Stuart, 1994), and countries such as Mexico (in 1992 at about 14.7 kg) are 
likely to experience rapid growth in per capita consumption as their income grows. Overall, demand in 
Latin America tends to increase with local production and crush; imports are very dependent on the avail­
ability of foreign exchange (CEPAL, 1991). 
In the future, most demand growth is likely to keep taking place in developing countries because 
their current consumption is relatively low, their incomes are expected to rise, and their populations tend to 
grow faster than those of developed countries (ERSIUSDA, 1997). Today, the US and the European Union 
are the largest consumers of vegetable oils; together they account for about one third of world consumption 
(Morgan, 1993). Consumption in the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) of Asia is growing very 
rapidly, as it is in China, India and Pakistan. All these countries consume large amounts of palm oil and 
should provide a large market for this product, although at higher income levels health concerns may shift 
preferences towards unsaturated oils. 
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Other areas of potentially growing demand are the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and Eastern 
Europe. Recently consumption in these countries has dropped as a result of falling incomes. Since in the 
late 1980s, the FSU and Eastern Europe accounted for 13 percent of world consumption of fats, oils, and 
oilmeals; their reduced demand has contributed to a slowdown in the growth of the world oils and oilmeals 
economy in recent years. As their economies recover, demand in these countries in expected to rise again, 
but in the near future consumption levels are likely to stay constant. There may be an increase in the con­
sumption of vegetable oil at the expense of animal fat as internal prices start reflecting intemationallevels. 
The mature markets such as the US, the European Union and Japan are likely to continue growing slowly 
but steadily (FAD, 1994). Meal demand for livestock in the US, Japan, the NICs, China and Latin 
America is expanding, contributing to continued high demand for oilseeds, especially soybeans for meal 
production. 
Health Concerns 
As their income increases, people tend to switch from animal fat to vegetable oil, and from satura­
ted to unsaturated fats and oils. This is in part due to the increasing importance of health concerns. Since 
the 1960s, there is growing preoccupation with the quantity and composition of dietary fat intake in the US 
and around the world. Oils and fats constitute a major component of daily food intake; Americans get 
about 37 percent of their calories from fat. Although the body can generate fat for energy storage from 
carbohydrates, humans need to consume at least some fat for the essential fatty acids, which the body 
cannot generate. Fat is also needed to absorb vitamins that are soluble in oils, such as Vitamins A, D, E, 
and K. Additionally, fats and oils are an important component of many foods, both in preparation and 
because they improve texture and flavor. Americans tend to consume more fat than they need, and in 1988 
the surgeon general recommended that people lower their fat intake, especially of saturated fat and choles­
terol, which can block arteries and thus raise the risk of heart disease (Morgan, 1993). The resulting 
concern about fat consumption has had an effect on the composition of the market. As average per capita 
income in Mexico rises, health concerns will probably gain importance there, too. Since palm oil is 
partially saturated, and along with other tropical oils has been vilified to such an extent that consumers 
con-sciously avoid it in the US, it is important to take a closer look at the current information available on 
the health effects of different fats and oils. 
Although many consumers in the US and elsewhere are concerned about their cholesterol levels, 
few really understand the differences between saturated fat6 , unsaturated fat and cholesterol, and their 
effects on health. Only animal products such as butter and lard contain cholesterol; all vegetable oils are 
cholesterol-free. Vegetable oils differ in their saturated fat content; in general saturated fat tends to be 
solid, while unsaturated oils are liquid. All vegetable oils contain 100 percent oil and about nine calories 
per gram; their health effects are determined not by calories but by their saturated fat content, which varies 
even among the liquid oils. Palm oil has a liquid, mostly unsaturated component, and a solid, saturated 
component that can be separated through a process called fractionation. Palm oil contains about 51 percent 
saturated fat; canola, safflower, com, sunflower, olive, and soybean oils all contain less. The fact that con­
sumers have become more health conscious is reflected in the fact that US consumption of canola oil, 
6 The word "saturated" refers to the chemical bindings within fat molecules. These molecules consist of chains of 
carbon atoms, each of which can additionally have bindings to two hydrogen atoms. When all carbon atoms on the 
-chain are connected to two hydrogen atoms, the chain is "saturated". "Unsaturated" fats are those where one or 
more carbon atoms are not linked to a hydrogen atom, but instead have a double binding to the next carbon atom. ,... 
Unsaturated chains tend to be shorter; they can be monounsaturated (one double binding) or polyunsaturated 
(several double bindings). Saturated fat molecules are very stable and inflexible; unsaturated chains are much 
more flexible and therefore have a lower fusion point, which makes them liquid at room temperature. All oils 
contain several fatty acids, with different chain lengths, usually some saturated and some unsaturated (Reuben 
1993). 
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which is very low in saturated fat, increased by 200 percent between 1987 and 1991, and olive oil 
consumption even rose by 300 percent between 1980 and 1991. Still, both oils together only account for 
six percent of US vegetable oil consumption, while soybean oil (also largely unsaturated) dominates the 
market. 
Consumption of tropical oils such as palm oil has declined in the US, at least partly in response to 
the American Soybean Association's anti-tropical oils campaign (Overseas Development Natural Resource 
Institute, 1989). Palm oil's high saturated fat content induces buyers to switch to other oils; many food 
manufacturers advertise "no tropical oils" on their labels. Although in Europe health concerns are also 
gaining importance, palm oil remains attractive because of its low price. Europe continues to be a major 
importer of palm oil, and is in fact the world's largest importer of palm kernel oil (Morgan 1993). In 
Mexico, part of the city population is becoming increasingly aware of health issues related to oils, but the 
market is still largely driven by price considerations. As income rises and people become more health­
conscious, preferences in Mexico may develop similarly as US preferences. 
Originally preferred for their lower price, margarines have benefited from increasing awareness of 
the adverse health effects associated with the cholesterol contained in butter. Similarly, vegetable shorten­
ings have all but displaced lard from most people's diets. In margarine and shortening production, liquid 
oils are hydrogenated to make them solid at room temperature. During hydrogenation, unsaturated vege­
table oils are saturated in the presence of a metal catalyst at high temperatures. The degree of saturation, 
and thus the consistency of the final product, can be regulated. Unfortunately, hydrogenation generates a 
large number of bio-chemical fragments and substances whose effect on human health are unknown. Fur­
thermore, hydrogenation transforms the structure of the fat molecule, creating so-called trans acids. The 
effect of these trans acids on human health is known; they raise total levels of cholesterol and in addition 
seem to lower levels of "good" cholesterol, which prevents heart disease. They also have a negative effect 
on enzyme activities and normal metabolism. Trans acids foment the formation of fat deposits in internal 
organs and in arteries, increasing the risk of heart disease and blood clots, which can be life-threatening. 
All margarines contain trans acids in varying amounts of up to 50 percent. Butter contains only three 
percent trans acids, but it contains one gram of cholesterol per pound; it is hard to decide which of the two 
is the lesser evil (Reuben, 1993). One alternative could be margarines from tropical oils such as palm oil, 
which is naturally solid (saturated) and therefore needs less or no hydrogenation and contains much less 
trans acids. Public acceptance of tropical oils in the US is very low; however, and current research is 
searching for a trans-free margarine from unsaturated sources. In other countries, margarine from tropical 
oils could be a better-tasting alternative, and palm oil may capture an important part of this markee. 
Section D. The Mexican Market 
As was discussed in the previous sections, Mexico finds itself in a situation where income growth 
will lead to a strong growth of vegetable oil demand. Most vegetable oil consumed in Mexico is not pro­
duced from domestically grown oilseeds. Oilseeds and their products are Mexico's most important agricul­
tural import. About 75 to 80 percent of the edible oil and protein meal used in Mexico is imported either as 
oil or meal, or as oilseeds to be crushed domestically (ERS, 1996). In the available statistics, no distinction 
is made between vegetable oil from domestically grown oilseeds and oil from imported oilseeds, which 
makes the data display rather complex. I made an attempt to distinguish between crush of domestic and 
crush of imported oilseeds by calculating the percentage of oilseeds available in Mexico that is imported. 
This percentage I then applied to vegetable oil production, which may not be accurate, but conveys a 
general idea of the proportions involved. Figure 11.1Oa shows that imports of vegetable oil and of oilseeds 
for domestic crush increased steadily since the 1970s. Figure II. lOb shows the availability of different 
7 Infonnation on margarine and health effects from Juan Jose Pellecer. 
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types of vegetable oil in Mexico. Soybean oil has the largest market share in Mexico, although other oils 
are gaining importance. Most soybean oil is crushed domestically from soybeans imported from the US. 
To protect the domestic crushing industry, Mexico has reduced tariffs on soybeans more than those 
on meals and oils, giving incentives to import unprocessed oilseeds and crush them in Mexico. When 
NAFTA was passed in 1994, tariffs on soybeans were at 9 percent; they will be lowered by one percent 
every year to reach zero in 20038. Tariffs on canola oil from Canada are also eliminated, which may lead 
to higher oil imports in place of the unprocessed canola seeds purchased at the moment. Sunflower imports 
switched from seed to oil and are evenly split between the US and Argentina. The traditional Mexican 
oilseeds, cottonseed and copra, which accounted for most of national production in the 1960s have lost 
importance; their growth rates have been negative. Palm oil presently only constitutes a minor part of the 
market. 
Figure 11.11 illustrates Mexican consumption of fats and oils per capita. Mexicans use more 
vegetable oil than separated animal fat as a source of dietary fat; on average they consumed 3.8 kg of 
animal fat per capita per year in 1994, while for vegetable oil the figure is 10.9 kg. Overall fat consump­
tion has doubled since 1961, reaching 14.7 kg per person per year in 1994. This growth has not been 
evenly distributed over the time period, instead it is strongly correlated with periods of economic growth. It 
is striking how the rapid consumption growth associated with the petroleum boom of the 1970s slowed 
down considerably during the various debt crises of the 1980s and the peso crisis of the 1990s. During the 
fifteen years immediately preceding the 1983 debt crisis both vegetable oil and animal fat consumption 
doubled. From 1983 to 1992, in contrast, vegetable oil consumption actually decreased slightly, while 
animal fat consumption grew. Animal fat can be seen as an inferior good, which people consume when 
they cannot afford vegetable oil. As Mexico (hopefully) returns to steady economic growth, vegetable oil 
consumption should also grow again, until it reaches the 23 kg average currently consumed in developed 
countries. 
To fulfill this growing demand for oil, Mexico will have to expand production and imports. 
"Mexico's import decisions for oilseeds and products are based on price and the availability of credit, 
rather than quality or strong consumer preference" (ERS, 1996:24). Demand for oilseeds and products 
was therefore severely affected by the 1994 peso crisis, but is expected to recover as economic growth 
picks up. With the growing industrialization of the poultry, egg and pork industries, demand for meal from 
US soybeans is expected to grow. Figure 11.12 illustrates the dramatic increase in the utilization of soy­
beans; they are by far the most important oilseed in Mexico, especially when taking into account that the 
second most important oilseed shown in the graph, coconuts, does not compete directly with soybeans as 
coconuts are used mainly to produce lauric oil. As incomes rise, Mexicans are going to consume more 
animal products, which will further increase meal demand. The ERS projects soybean imports to grow at 
4.2 percent annually until 2005 in its International Agricultural Baseline Projections to 2005. Based on 
information available as of 1997, these projections assume strong economic growth and expanding trade 
within NAFTA. 
As its meal demand expands, Mexico may shift to imports of already processed soybean meal 
rather than whole soybeans, especially as trade barriers are eliminated. This implies that less vegetable oil 
would be entering the market as a by-product of domestically crushed imported soybeans. It is impossible 
to foresee in which way importers' preferences will shift in the future, however, and this paper is based on .... 
the assumption that Mexico will continue its current policy of importing oilseeds, and that soybean oil is 
readily available, both from Mexican meal producers and directly from the US. Due to the proximity of the 
US and intensified trade under NAFTA, soybean oil is expected to maintain its importance in the Mexican 
8 Trade policy is discussed in more detail in chapter III. 
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vegetable oil market. In view of these circwnstances, it is reasonable to use the likely price of US soybeans 
as a price ceiling. Palm oil is usually sold at a discount as compared to soybean oil. Since for shortening 
and margarine soybean oil needs to be hydrogenated whereas palm oil is already solid, palm oil has a com­
petitive advantage. Considering that today the Mexican market is driven mostly by price rather than 
quality or health considerations, palm oil should be able to compete well with soybean oil. Soybean oil as a 
by-product from meal production will be available in large quantities. Economic expansion combined with 
population growth will lead to rising oil demand. The ability of palm oil to compete in the Mexican market 
thus depends primarily on competitive pricing. 
-

Chapter III
 
AGRICULTURE IN CHIAPAS: LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
 
Apart from palm oil prices, the profitability of oil palm for smallholders can be significantly 
affected by government policy. Production subsidies, trade barriers, and pricing policies have a direct 
influence on the relative profitability of different crops. This chapter attempts to give an overview of the 
agricultural policies which affect oil palm farmers. 
Farmers in Chiapas find themselves in a rapidly changing policy environment. Accustomed to 
receiving inputs and services at subsidized prices from the government, since the late 1980s they have 
increasingly faced market prices for inputs and products that have forced them to abandon traditional maize 
production and adopt nontraditional cash crops, including oil palm. This change is the result of a complete 
change in government policy--from an interventionist method to a more market-oriented, liberalized 
approach. To understand Mexican agricultural policy, it is necessary to have a broad grasp of the larger 
economic development strategies pursued by the Mexican government in the second half of the twentieth 
century. Before discussing agricultural policy, this chapter will therefore give a brief introduction to the 
history ofthe Mexican economy. 
From the mid-1950s until the early seventies, Mexico pursued import substitution industrialization 
(lSI), much like the rest of Latin America. This strategy was based on industrialization for the domestic 
market, with much government investment. It required strong state intervention to protect domestic pro­
duction from international competition, and was accompanied by an overvalued exchange rate which made 
exports uncompetitive. Thanks to widespread political support for the government, and to foreign direct 
investment from the US, this model resulted in a period of rapid economic growth, slow inflation, and low 
budget and trade deficits. By the late 1960s, however, lSI began to run out of steam. The domestic mar­
kets for many domestically produced consumer goods had been exhausted, and additional capital for further 
investments was not readily available. Industrial development had not benefited the population evenly, and 
increasing inequality and persisting poverty led to the bloody student and worker protests of 1968. The 
government intensified its control over the economy to maintain the growth rate high, but growing inflation 
and deficits were signs that during the 1970s lSI was becoming unsustainable. A more profound crisis was 
averted by the discovery ofnew petroleum reserves, which led to a boom in the late 1970s, when petroleum 
prices were high. Although it led to renewed growth, the boom was accompanied by continued macro­
economic disequilibrium and high government spending, which was partly financed by international 
borrowing. Eventually this combination led to high inflation, growing deficits, and accumulating debt. In 
1981 international capital fled the country at the same time as global interest rates were rising, and the 
Mexican balance of payments deficit deteriorated rapidly. In 1982, the petroleum price fell by 14 percent 
compared to a year earlier, drastically reducing government revenues, and Mexico ran out of foreign 
reserves. The government declared that it was unable to maintain its foreign debt payments, which was the 
beginning of the debt crisis. 
Mexico experimented with several stabilization packages during the 1980s, but economic recov­
ery did not start until 1989. The decade ofthe 1980s witnessed the continuation of a trend that had already 
begun during the seventies: At the beginning of his sexenio1, each new president introduced some reforms, 
and the economy survived until unsustainable government expenditures and overvalued exchange rates led 
­
... 
J The Mexican period of government lasts six years, and is called sexenio. At the end of the six years, the 
president designates his successor from the same party, the PRI, which has been governing uninterruptedly for 
most of this century. In the 1997 elections other parties have been able to call one-party role into question when 
other parties scored important electoral victories, including the mayor of Mexico City. 
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to a crisis at the end of the administrative period. Thus, the debt crisis in 1982 hit during LOpez Portillo's 
last year. De la Madrid assumed power, his agreements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) led to 
devaluations and, in 1983, to an orthodox stabilization policy. The reforms temporarily succeeded in 
reducing the current account deficit, but were unable to control inflation, and the crisis soon continued. 
Real wages and GNP fell during this period, although 1984 and 1985 saw a moderate recuperation of the 
economy with growing private investment and exports, and some improvement in real wages. lbis modest 
recovery was interrupted by more shocks, including an earthquake in Mexico City in 1985, and a renewed 
fall in petroleum prices. The ensuing crisis was again characterized by rapid inflation and large deficits, 
and big reductions in real wages. With the support of another IMF agreement, the government embarked 
on the next austerity program. The de la Madrid government again experimented with different policies, 
which were successful in reducing inflation but were unable to restore growth. 
In late 1988, Salinas de Gortari assumed the presidency. He was the first president who radically 
questioned Mexico's state-eentered model of development. Salinas implemented a much more profound 
reform program (including structural adjustments and external support), renegotiated Mexico's external 
debt, and sought additional international resources. Beyond the traditional austerity measures, this time the 
reforms included a drastic opening of the economy to international trade and competition, and a complete 
change in the state's role in the economy. lbis implied the privatization of state companies, fiscal reform, 
financial liberalization, changes in the regulation of foreign direct investment, and a generalized deregula­
tion of economic activities. The policies begun by Salinas were continued by the current president of 
Mexico, Ernesto Zedillo, who assumed power in 19942. 
Salinas' reforms in agriculture have been just as profound as the changes to the wider economy. 
The old Mexican parastatals which provided everything from fertilizer, credit and insurance, to marketing 
and storage services have been liquidated or privatized, and the accustomed system of support prices and 
subsidies is being dismantled. Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRJ) has used transfers to the 
carnpesino sector as a means of securing political support for much of this century (Collier and Lowery Q. 
1994). Through the 1970s, Mexico's petroleum-led growth allowed it to maintain costly support 
programs, but the debt crisis and tight government budgets of the 1980s made the cost prohibitive. The 
government tried to reactivate the agricultural growth rate through subsidies and enormous public invest­
ment projects in irrigation. These efforts included the Mexican Food System (SAM) begun in 1980, which 
absorbed an average of 1.5 percent of the government budget, but could not be sustained during the debt 
crisis (de Janvry et al. 1995). The government was forced to rethink its agricultural policy; and the Salinas 
administration decided to reduce state intervention in input supply, credit, insurance, marketing, and price 
setting. In addition, his administration ended the land tenure system that had been instituted after the 
Mexican revolution, making it possible to acquire individual title to communally owned ejido land. The 
government's new objectives were to increase the role of market mechanisms in the sector while addressing 
rural poverty more effectively through area-based payments, instead of distortive price intervention. As a 
result, relative profitabilities, and thus incentives to grow different crops are changing. Campesinos have 
to adjust to an environment where income from subsidized traditional crop production and government 
transfers has to be replaced with more profitable crops and activities. 
Trade liberalization, begun unilaterally before the free trade agreement, but expanded and 
cemented through NAFTA, has further affected carnpesino livelihoods. Mexico's traditional staple, maize, • 
can be imported from the US much more cheaply than it can be grown in most of Mexico. Mexico not only 
2 Salinas was no exception in the aforementioned trend: His period of government ended not only with the 1994 
peso crisis, but also with a wave of political scandals and assassinations which unsettled the Mexican government 
for years to come. 
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subsidized maize producers heavily; in addition it had a price policy where a government agency 
(CONASUPO, the National Basic Foods Company) bought maize at relatively high prices in rural areas 
while keeping urban prices low. Since a sudden introduction of market forces into this sector would 
threaten the subsistence of many of Mexico's poor, these policies cannot be dismantled abruptly. Instead, 
support prices are being ended gradually, and PROCAMPO, a system of direct payments to producers of 
traditional crops, is designed to support farmers while they switch to more profitable crops, such as fruits 
and vegetables for the US market and other cash crops. The changes in agricultural policy and their effect 
on the Soconusco region are examined in the following sections. 
Section A. Agricultural Policy 
Intervention in Input, Credit and Product Markets 
Until the late 1980s, the Mexican government was directly or indirectly involved in providing a 
multitude of inputs and services to the agricultural sector. Many of the state companies were restructured 
at the end of the 1980s or the beginning of the 1990s. Thus FERTIMEX, the national fertilizer production 
and distribution company, privatized its local distribution infrastructure. The improved seed market, for­
merly in the hands of PRONASE, was opened up to competition from private producers. The animal feed 
production and distribution company ALBAMEX was privatized, and INMECAFE, the institute responsi­
ble for the storage, processing and marketing of coffee was dismantled in 1990 (de Janvry et al., 1997). 
Agricultural credit and insurance were once completely dominated by government agencies. Sev­
eral different government bodies, such as BANRURAL (the National Rural Credit Bank) and FIRA (Trust 
Funds for Agriculture) were involved in agricultural credit, providing financial services to different classes 
of agricultural producers. Small farmers and ejidatarios, who formerly received credit from BANRURAL, 
since the reforms have to rely on PRONASOL (National Solidarity Program, since 1995 called Poverty 
Alleviation Program) and its credit without collateral program (credito a la palabra). PRONASOL is a 
new organization which works in three ways: it supplies basic infrastructure such as housing, electricity 
and roads, works in social welfare programs including health, education, and nutrition, and supports pro­
ductive activities, which includes the provision of financial services. It disburses interest-free loans. When 
repaid, these resources go into funds that were meant to be used for community projects. In Chiapas, how­
ever, the governor set up a state-wide fund under his control, and created a state Ministry of Community 
Participation to administer these resources (Harvey, 1994). Whereas commercial banks replaced govern­
ment institutions in credit to larger farmers, ejidatarios, who usually have bad credit histories, rely mostly 
on PRONASOL, which gives very small loans only. These small loans are usually for current expendi­
tures, while BANRURAL credit had a significant investment component. The decreased access to 
BANRURAL credit through and increased access to credit through PRONASOL implied a fall in the 
availability of investment credit to ejidatarios (de Janvry et al., 1997). The government's crop insurance 
company ANAGSA, famous for its "fake disasters,,3, was eliminated. Voluntary crop insurance at market 
rates is since then provided by AGROASEMEX (SARH, 1994). 
The company which provided heavy machinery and harvest equipment for small farmers, Servicios 
Ejidales S.A. was eliminated in 1990. Several new agro-industrial development organizations were created, 
for example the National Fund for Solidarity Businesses (FONAES) and the Capitalization and Investment 
Fund for the Rural Sector (FOCIR). FONAES promotes state and private investment in small and • 
.. 
3 The crop insurance agency colluded with ejido authorities and farmers in claiming that the harvest had been 
affected by a disaster when in fact production had been normal. The insurance payment for the "fake disaster" was 
usually split by ejido authorities and insurance agents. This practice is also known as the "disaster industry" 
(industria del siniestro). 
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medium-sized peasant enterprises; FOCIR does similar work on a larger scale (de Janvry et al., 1997). 
The National Basic Foods Company CONASUPO was once crucially involved in agricultural price and 
income support, but at the beginning of the 1990s its role was reduced to maize, bean and milk marketing. 
Price policies are the subject of the next section. 
Price Policy 
In Mexico, price controls date back to the 1950s, when low food prices were desirable for lSI to 
keep urban wages low. Until 1970, the government maintained low producer and consumer prices. During 
the 1970s, it started to support agricultural production by raising and stabilizing producer prices. Its aim 
was to reactivate the agricultural growth rate which had fallen after a period of expansion following the 
introduction of high-yielding varieties. The government implemented guaranteed prices for most basic 
products including maize, beans, wheat, soybeans, sorghum, rice and cotton. Producer prices were more 
stable than international prices under this policy; in fact real prices were kept more or less constant until 
1985. After 1985, when the debt crisis had shrunk the government's budget for support policies, producer 
prices began falling rapidly, leading to a profitability crisis in agriculture (de Janvry et al., 1995). The 
government abolished its guaranteed price policies for almost all products in 1989; the most important 
exceptions being maize and beans. Guaranteed prices for maize and beans were actually increased in 1990, 
as Figure IlL 1 shows. As a result, much land was reallocated to these two crops, until guaranteed prices 
were abolished and replaced by minimum prices for maize and beans. 
Mexican maize policy before the late 1980s had several components. Farmers were protected from 
international competition through an import licensing regime, which only allowed a certain quota of maize 
imports and kept Mexican maize prices well above those on the world market. As a consequence of 
NAFTA, this system has been changed to a tariff rate quota. Under the new trade regime, in 1994 the US 
could export 2.5 million tons of maize into Mexico duty free (it actually exported 3 million tons). This 
duty-free amount will grow at 3 percent every year during the 15 year adjustment period. Imports in excess 
of the quota are assessed a very high tariff, initially above 215 percent. The tariff will also be phased out 
over the adjustment period (FAS Online, 1998). In addition, price variability was reduced both within the 
year and across years by the guaranteed price system, which announced producer prices at planting time to 
reduce uncertainty for farmers (Larson, 1993). 
Figure III. 1 compares the US export maize price and Mexico's guaranteed price for white maize. 
The export price, which is for yellow maize, has been adjusted to reflect the fact that white maize prices 
tend to be higher than those for yellow maize. In Mexico, 95 percent of maize production is white maize 
for consumption, while yellow maize is grown mostly for animal feed. The guaranteed price has mostly 
been higher than international prices, and it was raised again, even in real terms, in 1990, when most other 
guaranteed prices had been discontinued. In 1993, the Mexican government decided that the market distor­
tions created by price support schemes had to be removed. Until a private marketing sector develops, the 
government will still protect producers by setting minimum prices for maize and beans. Guaranteed prices 
were ended, and minimum prices begun in 1995. Figure III.l shows that the Mexican minimum maize 
price in 1995 was below the US export price. However, the average domestic market price in 1995 was 
about 40 percent above this minimum price. For the first time in decades, maize prices are allowed to vary 
between regions, and only areas with favorable transport and marketing connections will be able to com­
pete. This policy change will lead to significant reallocations of land to more profitable crops. ­
----
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Figure II!.l. Mexican and International 
White Maize Prices 
Source: Based on OECD. Review ofAgricultural Policies in Mexico, 1997. Converted into constant 
USS with exchange rate data from the World Bank's World Tables. 
NOTES: 
p: provisional 
(a): Guaranteed prices for 1979-1994, minimum price in 1995. Weighted average of of the prices 
of the two crop seasons. Sources: Sexto Informe de Gobiemo. /994. and SAGAR. 
(b): US export price for yel10w com #2, fob, vessel, Gulf Ports. Source: USDA, Agricultural 
Outlook, various issues. This price in increased by 20 percent to take rnto account the difference 
between white and yel10w maize. This is based on the fact that the Mexican guaranteed pnce for 
white com was set 20 percent above the guaranteed price for yel10w com for the years 1992-1995. 
(Before there was only one guaranteed price for all com.) 
The National Basic Foods Company (CONASUPO) had intervened in grain and oilseed marketing 
until 1991, when its role was reduced to maize and bean marketing. CONASUPO used to buy maize and 
other basic foods at uniform guaranteed prices in the entire country, subsidizing storage and transport 
costs. In 1995, the share ofCONASUPO in maize and bean marketing declined, and its staff was reduced 
to 1/1 5th of the original number. Instead of providing direct marketing services through CONASUPO, the 
government began to promote the marketing ofgrains and oilseeds, as well as the export of fruits and vege­
tables through ASERCA (Support Services for Agricultural Marketing). Initially, ASERCA made pay­
ments to domestic millers to compensate them for higher domestic prices, and thus make them indifferent 
-

between national products and imports. This policy was discontinued in 1995, and ASERCA began to play 
a more indirect role in promoting marketing. It provides market information and helps producers find dis­
tribution channels. Since 1994, ASERCA has been responsible for administering the PROCAMPO direct 
payment program which is analyzed in more detail below. 
36 
The New Policies: Free Trade and PROCAMPO 
The dizzying system of government bodies and policies described above was not only complicated 
and costly, it was also distortive and very inefficient. The policies targeting small maize producers are an 
example. The government kept producer prices artificially high to benefit poor rural producers for whom 
maize and bean production are the traditional subsistence strategy. Since prices were the same everywhere, 
transport costs did not playa role in determining where farmers grew maize. Prices were also evened out 
over the course of the year, which prevented the development of private storage facilities. This price policy 
was extremely inefficient as a measure to alleviate rural poverty because 31 percent of the ejidos' maize 
producers do not sell any maize at all; they produce for their own consumption and are thus not affected by 
maize prices. In addition, 28 percent ofejidatarios are net buyers of maize (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 1997; 
SARH, 1994). Since the government stores that sell subsidized maize are not accessible everywhere in 
rural areas, farmers end up buying their maize at the higher producer price, which actually hurts them. 
This leaves only 41 percent of net sellers, who were benefiting from the guaranteed price; and for them 
maize and bean income represented only an average of 15 percent oftotal income (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 
1997). Buying maize expensively in rural areas and selling it cheaply in the cities is thus not an effective 
way to fight rural poverty. 
In 1994 Mexico began replacing its inefficient rural income support policies with what it hopes 
will be a more direct, effective and egalitarian way to improve rural welfare. Through PROCAMPO, 
farmers receive a payment for every hectare that they planted to a number of basic grains and oilseeds 
during the three-year period preceding 1994. The crops included are maize, beans, wheat, cotton, soy­
beans, sorghum, rice, and safflower. In 1997, the payment for maize farmers consisted of 560 pesos per 
hectare for each cropping season. This scheme benefits even those farmers who do not sell on the market 
and those whose yields are very low, which makes it more progressive than support prices. It furthermore 
provides incentives to switch to more profitable crops, since payments continue for 15 years, even if farm­
ers no longer plant one of the crops covered by the policy. During the last five years, PROCAMPO pay­
ments will be gradually reduced, until they are eliminated in 2009. Apart from its positive effect on 
inequality and government budgets, PROCAMPO is also more compatible with the GAIT, which forbids 
policies such as subsidies and controlled prices that affect farmers' returns from specific crops, but not 
income support payments which do not distort production incentives (SARH, 1994). 
A National Program for the Modernization of Agriculture was formulated for the period from 1990 
to 1994 to reform agricultural policy and make it more market and trade oriented. For 1995 to 2000, the 
Program is continued under the name Alliance for Agriculture (Alianza para el Campo), which coordinates 
agricultural policy to allow the sector to compete in an open economy. Its aims include raising producers' 
incomes, revitalizing agricultural growth, improving the trade balance, obtaining self-sufficiency in basic 
foods, reducing regional differences in productivity, employment and income, and contributing to the 
reduction of rural poverty, natural resource conservation, and better occupation of the territory by the 
population (OECD, 1997). The Alliance consists of a variety of specific projects to improve farmers' 
skills and to increase productivity through technological development. 
One of the specific projects which is part of the Alliance deals with the production of oilseeds. 
Since oilseeds constitute Mexico's largest agricultural import, increased domestic production is expected to 
­improve the balance of trade. The aim is to increase the production of oilseeds by expanding the cultivated 
.... 
area. The oilcrops included are soybeans, cottonseed, coconut, and oil palm. In Chiapas, a new body is in 
charge of carrying out the oil palm project; it is called PAPA (Programa Alianza Palma Africana). It 
cooperates with the National Institute for Forestry, Agricultural and Livestock Research, which produces 
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the palm seedlings in local nurseries. The oil palm project will be described in greater detail in the next 
chapter. 
Even before the passage of NAFfA, Mexico had unilaterally begun to liberalize trade. In 1986, 
Mexico became a part of the GAIT to increase overall trade flows and shift production to areas with a 
comparative advantage. Mexico went beyond its GAIT commitments, reducing the use of import permits 
and quotas. Tariffs on most agricultural products were lowered, and in 1991 the average tariff was only 4 
percent. Again, maize was an exception, as it is considered crucial for many rural families, and Mexican 
farmers could not compete with large-scale US producers. Export policies were much less restrictive than 
import policies, and since the mid 1980s export taxes were reduced and virtually eliminated. 
Until 1994, Mexican tariffs on vegetable oil imports were between 10 and 20 percent. Duties on 
peanut, virgin olive, tung, sesame, jojoba, and castor oil were eliminated immediately with the passage of 
NAFfA. Most other duties on vegetable oil will be phased out until 2004. For US soybeans, Mexico's 
seasonal taritr was reduced from 15 to 10 percent in 1994, and the season affected by the tariff was short­
ened from 6 to 3 months. The remaining 10 percent tariff is being phased out over ten years. For 1998 it 
will be 5 percent (Oct. I until Dec. 31). There was a 10 percent tariff on crude US soybean oil, which will 
be eliminated over a ten-year period. For refined soybean oil, Mexico is reducing its 20-percent tariff over 
the same period. For 1998, the tariffs on crude and refined soybean oil are 4 percent and 10 percent, 
respectively. For meal imports, Mexico is eliminating its 10 percent import duty over 10 years; in 1998 it 
was 7.5 percent (FAS Online, 1998). 
Overall, low-productivity landowners in Mexico are expected to lose from NAFfA because oilseed 
and grain imports from the US are expected to increase (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 1997). Since the low­
productivity category includes most small farmers in Mexico, they will be negatively affected by free trade. 
Some may be fortunate enough to find a profitable alternative to maize and bean production, such as vege­
tables for the US market or oil palm. PROCAMPO is an instrument to make it easier for farmers to make 
the transition to NAFTA, easing the adaptation period until they can start to produce crops for which 
Mexico has a comparative advantage. For many small farmers, however, NAFfA will imply that they 
have to find income sources besides agriculture, in which case PROCAMPO may only delay the date when 
these farmers sell their land and join the millions of underemployed "paracaidistas"s in Mexico's cities. 
The changes in agricultural and trade policy are having an effect on Soconusco farmers. Although 
virtually all farmers in the area produce some maize, few depend on maize as a main source of income. As 
one farmer put it: "Growing maize is just like buying it; our costs are as high as the purchase price". These 
farmers do not engage in traditional subsistence production like most highland farmers. They are accus­
tomed to cash crop production, which makes them less vulnerable to the new policy environment. They are 
also used to receiving support and many services from the state and central governments, and regard it as 
the government's obligation to keep helping them out. On the other hand, many promises were never kept, 
and some programs were interrupted, so that there is much suspicion and mistrust ofgovernment programs. 
While some highly capitalized larger-scale produce~s in the region are benefiting from access to 
the US market, for example for bananas and papaya, access to capital-intensive crops and to distant 
markets is more difficult for campesinos. Their remoteness from the main consumption areas makes effi­
­
cient marketing channels crucial for their competitiveness. The state no longer provides transport and mar­
... 
4 A tariff which applies only during a few months of the year. 
S In Mexico, "paracaidistas" , which literally means parachutists, refers to the migrants from the countryside who 
"land" on plots on the edge of a large city, where they hope to find a new livelihood. 
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keting services at subsidized prices, and efficient regional markets have not formed immediately. Producer 
associations for marketing, transport, and processing will be the only way for Soconusco farmers to com­
pete in distant markets. Both ejidatarios and larger landowners can form Rural Production Societies (SPR) 
and farm their land on a more commercial, larger scale, taking advantage of economies of scale. Some eji­
datarios are starting to form these societies; for some larger landowners an SPR has become a way to 
disguise a latifundio, pretending there are several owners when in fact there is only one. 
Reduced government intervention will translate into less public investment in agriculture. Instead, 
the government has set up programs to encourage private investment, for example in palm oil processing. 
This investment in tum is affected decisively by the structure of land tenure in Chiapas; since investors 
cannot buy large amount of land, they have to enter into agreements with small farmers, including ejida­
tarios. Oil palm farming can be an opportunity for smaller farmers to make a living in this changing policy 
environment. Through SPRs and with the help of a local processing industry, they can overcome the limi­
tations posed by distance, high transportation costs and difficult direct access to markets. A profitable crop 
and a local processing industry give rural people income sources which can help to prevent increasing 
migration and land sales, which could lead to growing land concentration, and increased social conflict. 
Section B. Land Tenure and Reform 
Land Tenure in Chiapas 
While in some parts of Mexico the Mexican Revolution resulted in extensive land redistribution, 
Chiapas' powerful landowning elites were able to make pacts with Mexico's post-revolutionary govern­
ments, which delayed the beginning of serious attempts at land reform until the Cardenas administration 
(1934-40). During the Cardenas presidency, the government distributed significant amounts of land in 
Chiapas (Collier and Lowery Quaratiello, 1994). However, apart from those years, "agrarian reform in 
Chiapas was never based on the actual redistribution of private holdings but on colonization of unused 
forested areas in the Selva region" (Harvey, 1994:20). Some of the tropical land was only distributed on 
paper, while actually it was used by large cattle ranches; these were the so-called "phantom ejidos". 
During the 1970s and 1980s population pressure had mounted, and campesino organizations began fighting 
for land, for example through land invasions. The government was forced to buy land from large land­
owners that was occupied by campesinos. With this land, the government then formed new ejidos. This 
practice led to conflicts not only between government, campesinos and private landowners; it also led to 
disputes between different campesino organizations claiming the same land (Harvey, 1994). 
In theory all land redistribution ended with the ejido reform law in 1992, but the government is 
reportedly still buying up land that has been invaded by campesinos in the Soconusco. The Emiliano 
Zapata Proletarian Organization is very active in the region, and has been successful in forcing the 
government to grant campesinos access to land bought from large landowners. The new communities on 
these lands are called New Population Centers (Nuevos Centros de Poblaci6n); and although they do not 
officially have ejido status, people perceive them as such. In the Soconusco, new land for colonization is 
extremely scarce, and the last settlements have encroached on the mangrove swamps along the coast. 
While once each ejidatario received 20 hectares of land, the area was later reduced to 10, and even 5 hec­
tares. Since new land is scarce, most farmers' children leave the area to find work in the cities or even in 
-
the US, which makes it even more important to find sustainable income sources both in and beyond 
farming. 
37 
the palm seedlings in local nurseries. The oil palm project will be described in greater detail in the next 
chapter. 
Even before the passage of NAFTA, Mexico had unilaterally begun to liberalize trade. In 1986, 
Mexico became a part of the GAIT to increase overall trade flows and shift production to areas with a 
comparative advantage. Mexico went beyond its GAIT commitments, reducing the use of import permits 
and quotas. Tariffs on most agricultural products were lowered, and in 1991 the average tariff was only 4 
percent. Again, maize was an exception, as it is considered crucial for many rural families, and Mexican 
farmers could not compete with large-scale US producers. Export policies were much less restrictive than 
import policies, and since the mid 1980s export taxes were reduced and virtually eliminated. 
Until 1994, Mexican tariffs on vegetable oil imports were between 10 and 20 percent. Duties on 
peanut, virgin olive, tung, sesame, jojoba, and castor oil were eliminated immediately with the passage of 
NAFTA. Most other duties on vegetable oil will be phased out until 2004. For US soybeans, Mexico's 
seasonal taritr was reduced from 15 to 10 percent in 1994, and the season affected by the tariff was short­
ened from 6 to 3 months. The remaining 10 percent tariff is being phased out over ten years. For 1998 it 
will be 5 percent (Oct. 1 until Dec. 31). There was a 10 percent tariff on crude US soybean oil, which will 
be eliminated over a ten-year period. For refined soybean oil, Mexico is reducing its 20-percent tariff over 
the same period. For 1998, the tariffs on crude and refined soybean oil are 4 percent and 10 percent, 
respectively. For meal imports, Mexico is eliminating its 10 percent import duty over 10 years; in 1998 it 
was 7.5 percent (FAS Online, 1998). 
Overall, low-productivity landowners in Mexico are expected to lose from NAFTA because oilseed 
and grain imports from the US are expected to increase (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 1997). Since the low­
productivity category includes most small farmers in Mexico, they will be negatively affected by free trade. 
Some may be fortunate enough to find a profitable alternative to maize and bean production, such as vege­
tables for the US market or oil palm. PROCAMPO is an instrument to make it easier for farmers to make 
the transition to NAFTA, easing the adaptation period until they can start to produce crops for which 
Mexico has a comparative advantage. For many small farmers, however, NAFTA will imply that they 
have to find income sources besides agriculture, in which case PROCAMPO may only delay the date when 
these farmers sell their land and join the millions of underemployed "paracaidistas"s in Mexico's cities. 
The changes in agricultural and trade policy are having an effect on Soconusco farmers. Although 
virtually all farmers in the area produce some maize, few depend on maize as a main source of income. As 
one farmer put it: "Growing maize is just like buying it; our costs are as high as the purchase price". These 
farmers do not engage in traditional subsistence production like most highland farmers. They are accus­
tomed to cash crop production, which makes them less vulnerable to the new policy environment. They are 
also used to receiving support and many services from the state and central governments, and regard it as 
the government's obligation to keep helping them out. On the other hand, many promises were never kept, 
and some programs were interrupted, so that there is much suspicion and mistrust ofgovernment programs. 
While some highly capitalized larger-scale producers in the region are benefiting from access to 
the US market, for example for bananas and papaya, access to capital-intensive crops and to distant 
markets is more difficult for campesinos. Their remoteness from the main consumption areas makes effi­ • 
cient marketing channels crucial for their competitiveness. The state no longer provides transport and mar­
4 A tariff which applies only during a few months of the year. . 
S In Mexico, "paracaidistas" • which literally means parachutists, refers to the migrants from the countryside who 
"land" on plots on the edge of a large city, where they hope to find a new livelihood. 
38 
keting services at subsidized prices, and efficient regional markets have not formed immediately. Producer 
associations for marketing, transport, and processing will be the only way for Soconusco farmers to com­
pete in distant markets. Both ejidatarios and larger landowners can form Rural Production Societies (SPR) 
and farm their land on a more commercial, larger scale, taking advantage of economies of scale. Some eji­
datarios are starting to form these societies; for some larger landowners an SPR has become a way to 
disguise a latifundio, pretending there are several owners when in fact there is only one. 
Reduced government intervention will translate into less public investment in agriculture. Instead, 
the government has set up programs to encourage private investment, for example in palm oil processing. 
This investment in tum is affected decisively by the structure of land tenure in Chiapas; since investors 
cannot buy large amount of land, they have to enter into agreements with small farmers, including ejida­
tarios. Oil palm farming can be an opportunity for smaller farmers to make a living in this changing policy 
environment. Through SPRs and with the help of a local processing industry, they can overcome the limi­
tations posed by distance, high transportation costs and difficult direct access to markets. A profitable crop 
and a local processing industry give rural people income sources which can help to prevent increasing 
migration and land sales, which could lead to growing land concentration, and increased social conflict. 
Section B. Land Tenure and Reform 
Land Tenure in Chiapas 
While in some parts of Mexico the Mexican Revolution resulted in extensive land redistribution, 
Chiapas' powerful landowning elites were able to make pacts with Mexico's post-revolutionary govern­
ments, which delayed the beginning of serious attempts at land reform until the Cardenas administration 
(1934-40). During the Cardenas presidency, the government distributed significant amounts of land in 
Chiapas (Collier and Lowery Quaratiello, 1994). However, apart from those years, "agrarian reform in 
Chiapas was never based on the actual redistribution of private holdings but on colonization of unused 
forested areas in the Selva region" (Harvey, 1994:20). Some of the tropical land was only distributed on 
paper, while actually it was used by large cattle ranches; these were the so-called "phantom ejidos". 
During the 1970s and 1980s population pressure had mounted, and campesino organizations began fighting 
for land, for example through land invasions. The government was forced to buy land from large land­
owners that was occupied by campesinos. With this land, the government then formed new ejidos. This 
practice led to conflicts not only between government, campesinos and private landowners; it also led to 
disputes between different campesino organizations claiming the same land (Harvey, 1994). 
In theory all land redistribution ended with the ejido reform law in 1992, but the government is 
reportedly still buying up land that has been invaded by campesinos in the Soconusco. The Emiliano 
Zapata Proletarian Organization is very active in the region, and has been successful in forcing the 
government to grant campesinos access to land bought from large landowners. The new communities on 
these lands are called New Population Centers (Nuevos Centros de Poblaci6n); and although they do not 
officially have ejido status, people perceive them as such. In the Soconusco, new land for colonization is 
extremely scarce, and the last settlements have encroached on the mangrove swamps along the coast. 
While once each ejidatario received 20 hectares of land, the area was later reduced to 10, and even 5 hec­
tares. Since new land is scarce, most farmers' children leave the area to find work in the cities or even in 
­the US, which makes it even more important to find sustainable income sources both in and beyond 
farming. 
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The 1992 Ejido Reform and its Expected Effects 
The Mexican Revolution had eventually brought about the Agrarian Law of 1915, which was later 
incorporated into the Constitution as Article 27. It limited private land ownership to 100 hectares under 
irrigation, or more for rainfed and pasture lands6• The Agrarian Law also officially established the ejido as 
a communal agrarian system for the peasantry (DECO, 1997). Ejido land was assigned to a community of 
peasants, with an ejido assembly to make decisions? The land usually included both communal plots for 
grazing and firewood, and plots assigned to individual members. These individual plots could not legally 
be rented or sold. They could be inherited, but remained national property. These plots were supposed to 
be worked directly by the "owner", without hired labor. The rules were often broken, and illegal land mar­
kets were operating before the reforms. The Salinas government felt that in an economy increasingly 
governed by market mechanisms, the ejido system prevented the development of flexible land markets. 
Unclear property rights lead to sub-optirnal investment, and thus lower production levels (de Janvry et al., 
1997). 
The 1992 ejido reform formally ended land redistribution in Mexico, and set a time limit to end the 
land distributions that were in progress. Latifundios are still forbidden under the new law, but many 
landless rural people lost their hopes of owning their own plot. Ejido land is divided into three categories: 
land for human settlement, parceled land, and communally used land. While individual families can sell 
their house plots, other land designated for human settlement consists mostly of public service facilities and 
is inalienable. Communal land cannot be sold, but it can be part of a society formed by ejidatarios and 
other investors for productive projects. This land can also be rented out for up to thirty years, after which 
time the contract can be renewed. All decisions about communal land are made by the ejido assembly. 
Individual parcels are also still ejido property, but the individual ejidatario has permanent use rights. Eji­
datarios can rent their individual plots to outsiders for up to thirty years as described for the common land; 
in addition they can sell to other ejido members or villagers (de Janvry et al., 1997; SARH 1994). 
One of the most significant components of the reform is that the ejido assembly can decide to end 
ejido rule over the land, in which case the ejidatarios can convert their land to private property and acquire 
legal titles. Once it is private property, the land can be sold to outsiders, mortgaged, and used as collateral. 
Several small private owners can form a production society, in which case the maximum land holding is 
expanded to 25 times the individual limit (for a society with at least 25 members). Since the reform, com­
mercial firms can own land, and ejidatarios can form associations and joint ventures with investors. The 
government hopes that with these new rules, land tenure will have a transparent and secure legal framework 
which will stimulate production, foment investment and stimulate a flow of resources to rural areas 
(SARH, 1994). 
In Chiapas, the reforms initially created much anxiety and confusion, as precise information about 
the new law was scarce. While many ejidatarios welcomed the right to buy and sell land freely, there were 
fears that land sales by poor farmers suffering from falling prices and lack of credit would lead to land 
concentration, and exacerbate rural poverty (Harvey, 1994). So far, in the Soconusco land sales have not 
increased dramatically, probably in part because unofficial land sales were already happening before the 
reform. Several small proprietors have formed rural production societies, pooling land and investment to 
• 
6 According to the Agrarian Law, one hectare of irrigated land is equivalent to two hectares of rainfed arable land,
 
four hectares of pasture, or eight hectares of brush.
 
7 Ejidatarios were represented by an executive committee (comisariado ejidal), which was integrated into a network
 
of state institutions related to the PRI. At the same time, peasants were represented in various ejido and peasant
 
organizations, and could influence government decisions, for example regarding further land distribution. The
 
ejido thus served as a mechanism both for peasant integration and for political control (de Janvry et al., 1997).
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operate on a larger scale, with more capital and inputs. Ejidatarios are also beginning to form SPRs, 
although not on the large scale desired by the government. Most small farmers however still think of them­
selves as ejidatarios, and communal plots, for example for schools and women's associations, remain 
common on ejidos. 
Although this is only occasionally happening in 1997, the reform of ejido legislation gives success­
ful oil palm farmers the possibility to expand their farms, while less successful farmers may be forced to 
sell their land. This will probably lead to some land concentration in the future, although it is difficult to 
guess how strong this trend will become. Since in Chiapas land tenure is so politicized, and land is rela­
tively scarce, oil palm production in the Soconusco will probably remain mostly a small-farm enterprise, 
although several ejidatarios and! or farmers can form an SPR and produce on a larger scale. The oil palm 
project plans to promote SPR formation to achieve economies of scale in input purchases, consolidate oil 
palm area and so on. Some larger land owners have demonstrated their skills in overcoming land tenure 
legislation by registering different plots under the names of different family members; this is common both 
in banana and other export fruit production, and in cattle ranching. In oil palm, there are only isolated 
instances of very large farms. To insure that oil palm production remains viable for small farmers, they 
have to receive adequate support until palms reach maturity. Furthermore, production and processing need 
to be linked in a way that distributes benefits between farmers and investors, allowing profits for both. The 
institutional links between farmers and processing industry will be explored in the next chapter. 
-

Chapter IV
 
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN PALM OIL PRODUCTION
 
Apart from vegetable oil markets and agricultural policy, there is a third factor that can critically 
affect the profitability of oil palms for smallholders: the institutional setup. Since oil palm fruit are a non­
edible commodity which requires processing before it can be sold on the market, farmers depend on 
processing plants as buyers for their production. The market structure and/or the institutional link between 
growers and farmers can have a large influence on price setting, and thus on farmers' profits. This chapter 
examines different institutional setups for oil palm, and analyzes the proposed models for Chiapas. 
In tropical agriculture, the most common forms of production are plantations and peasants or 
independent smallholders. Depending on land reforms, population density, and the history of settlement in 
an area, these two agricultural systems vary in importance over time and in different locations. Both have 
advantages and disadvantages that make them more or less suitable for certain crops and certain locations. 
Smallholders have the advantage of relatively cheap family labor, which allows for very intensive 
land use. Supervision costs are much lower on family farms than on large plantations. Small farmers tend 
to know their land very well, and can adapt crop selection and input use for example to variations in soil 
quality. But while small farmers' labor costs tend to be relatively low, they often face very high capital 
costs because of difficult access to credit markets (Hayami, 1994). Furthermore, smallholders usually face 
high transaction costs in processing and marketing. 
Small farmers' difficulties in access to credit, markets, and market information, and services such 
as infrastructure and technical assistance can be overcome through vertical integration (Delgado, 1998). If 
the smallholder system is at the low extreme of the vertical integration continuum, plantations are at the 
other extreme, where different stages of the production process, for example growing, processing and/or 
marketing are different activities carried out by the same enterprise. These larger farms tend to have better 
access to credit, markets, and services. Plantations can organize such that timing and quality of input 
supply are optimal. Furthermore, they are able to take advantage of economies of scale in production, 
processing and/or marketing. Because of difficulties related to labor supervision, plantations tend to sub­
stitute capital for labor. They also tend to achieve lower yields than small farms at comparable levels of 
input use (Hayarni, 1994). 
A couple of systems with intermediate degrees of vertical integration are able to combine some of 
the advantages of smallholder and plantation agriculture. Both cooperative and contract farming systems 
have the advantages of small farmers' low labor costs, high work incentives, and extensive information 
about the land. At the same time, they can organize production to optimize raw material supply, take 
advantage of economies of scale where they exist, and have access to cheaper credit. Like plantation 
systems, contract farming schemes can (to varying degrees) internalize the external effects associated with 
the provision of public infrastructure, pest and disease management, and technical assistance. Thus, some 
ofthese services, which usually are supplied by the government or not at all, can be supplied by the private 
sector. 
In the palm oil sector a close connection between growers and the processing industry is very 
-

important for several reasons. Palm fruit are not edible, and farmers need a secure market for their 
product. Similarly, the processing industry needs a steady supply of fresh fruit bunches to avoid wasting 
part of its capacity. Furthermore, palm fruit need to be processed quickly, otherwise the oil they contain 
becomes rancid, which lowers the quality of the final product. Thus farmers 'and extraction plants need an 
efficient institutional arrangement that ensures profitability for both sides. The Mexican Ministry of 
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industry in Chiapas. It has considered three institutional models, one based on large private plantations 
with processing plants, one where independent growers have long terms contracts with the private industry, 
and a mixed model, where farmers are shareholders in the mostly private plants. 
After an introduction to the history of the oil palm sector in Chiapas, this chapter analyzes the 
three proposed solutions. To this end, a few international examples of different institutional arrangements 
are included. Colombia and Honduras are included because they are recent examples, and they are from 
the Latin American region. The first example consists in large plantations that include their own processing 
plants; this model is frequently found in Colombia. But large estates are not the only viable setup for oil 
palm; small farmers can be successful producers. If peasants are organized in cooperatives as in 
Honduras, they can arrange harvesting and delivery to ensure smooth operation of the extraction plant. 
This model has the added benefit that farmers receive the profits from processing; but the organization of 
cooperatives is often problematic. Malaysia, the world's most important palm oil producer and exporter, 
relies primarily on new settlements of smallholders to grow oil palm. They are organized through the 
FELDA schemes, which have experimented with different institutional setups over time, including 
individual and cooperative land ownership. Finally, the emerging literature on contract fanning is surveyed 
briefly. Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana have very different experiences with contract farming in oil palms. A 
final section discusses the implication of the different models and case studies for Chiapas. 
Section A. The History of Oil Palm in Chiapas 
1948 - 1979: Isolated Plantations 
The Mexican oil palm industry dates back to 1948, when a German immigrant, Mr. Bemsthoff, 
established the first oil palm plantation in the Soconusco region, and built a small extraction plant. His 
plantation of about 800 hectares still existed in 1997, although due to inheritance disputes it had recently 
been divided in two. La Lima was the original plantation and extraction plant. The other, newer plant is 
called El Desengaiio. Their approximate location is shown on the map of the project area (Figure IV.l). 
1979 - 1991: Initial Government Involvement 
The two Bemsthoff plantations remained alone until two projects promoted oil palm in the 
Soconusco, first on a small scale in 1979-81, and then more extensively in 1989-91. Although their 
objective was to plant 23,000 hectares, only 5,000 hectares were planted, of which 3,119 hectares are still 
productive. Two thirds of the producers are ejidatarios The projects had difficulties convincing farmers to 
adopt oil palm as a cash crop because at that time the possibilities to sell oil palm fruit were very limited. 
The only extraction plant belonged to the plantation, and plans for new plants were not very concrete. 
Farmers received government credit to help them with the initial investments in oil palm, and to sustain 
them during the gestation period until palms became productive. Many farmers defaulted on these credits 
since even when palms started to produce, there was no market for the fruit except at La Lima. Later on, 
two cooperatives built their own extraction plants with credit from the state of Chiapas (El Arenal and 
BEPASSA). Another private one, El Desengaiio, was added on the divided Bemsthoff estate. By 1997 
prices were up, and oil palms had become profitable for producers. The two projects had a series of short­
comings, which prevented them from reaching their objectives1: 
• Inadequate planning: Planting started before investments in extraction plants were secured. When 
• 
palms reached maturity, extraction plants had not been built, and farmers received extremely low prices
 
for fresh fruit bunches at La Lima, if they could sell at all. Many farmers stopped taking care of the
 
palms before the processing plants were finally built.
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•	 Credit problems: The project was financed by BANRURAL, and farmers often did not receive the 
credit in time for planting. Since many farmers stopped taking care of the palms, BANRURAL 
suspended the credit program before the end of their contract with farmers. 
•	 Lack of extension services and organization: The project did not include technical assistance for 
farmers. No efforts were made to fonn producers' groups to achieve economies of scale in input 
purchases and transport. 
•	 Fragmentation: The area planted was very fragmented and spread out. This led to prohibitive transpor­
tation costs ofalmost 50 percent of fresh fruit bunch prices. 
•	 Lack of infonnation: No registration and statistics services were established; there are no records on 
yields, productivity, input use, etc. 
The SAGAR project of the late 1990s hopes to learn from the problems of the first two projects, 
and incorporate the lessons into its project design. 
The Mid-1990s: The Status Quo Before the SAGAR Project 
During my visit in the summer of 1997, oil palm growers in the Soconusco belonged to one of two 
types: ejidatarios, with an average of 10 hectares total land area, and pequeiios propietarios2, with widely 
varying fann sizes from 15 to over 400 hectares. Ejidatarios usually plant only a part of their land with oil 
palm, many between one and five hectares. On the rest of the land they grow other crops, including maize, 
mango, sesame, rice, cocoa, and plantain. Many farmers also own cattle, and use at least part of their land 
for pasture. In contrast to highland fanners, most ejidatarios in the Soconusco are engaged in cash crop 
production. The majority still retains some of their maize for domestic consumption, and the importance of 
subsistence production in household budgets varies. Backyard production of poultry, pigs and fruit for 
home consumption is very common. It is usually the responsibility of the women of the household; if there 
are no women in the household, these activities are usually not present. Most farmers are first generation 
ejidatarios, many of them are over 60 years of age. Many of their children have left the area and migrated 
to Tapachula or Mexico. Since not much more land is available in the area and alternative employment is 
scarce, many young people decide to pursue economic opportunities in the cities. 
The SAGAR Project Area 
In 1997,· SAGAR was starting to implement a revised oil palm project, incorporating lessons 
learned from past failures. The project area, shown in Figure IV. 1, is divided in three zones: Villa 
Comaltitlim, Acapetahua, and Mapastepec, named after the municipios where they are located. Each 
municipio also contains a town with the same name. Villa Comaltitlim is the first zone, and since it is rela­
tively large, it is divided in two parts. One part contains mainly pequeiios propietarios, the other contains 
mostly ejidatarios interested in oil palm. Villa Comaltitlim already has a significant oil palm sector; the 
two largest plantations La Lima and El Desengaiio are in this area. Here fanners also grow other valuable 
cash crops, including cocoa, mango, flowers, and sugar cane. 
The second zone, Acapetahua, is where oil palm production is already most firmly established. 
The main center of production is the ejido Luis Espinoza, with approximately 850 hectares under produc­
tion, some since 1979. Oil palm farmers in Luis Espinoza have done quite well. Many have replaced their 
traditional bamboo or wood houses with cement block houses, almost all have a TV, and some even own a 
-

2 Pequeila propiedad literally means small property, and refers to landowners who are not part of an ejido. 
(pequeno propietario thus refers to the small size of the land, not of its owner. Usually pequenos propietarios 
actually own more land than ejidatarios, which makes the name confusing. Latifundios (large landowners) are 
forbidden in Mexico, but some pequenos propietarios manage to run quite large farms by registering the land in 
other family members' names and similar tricks. Ejidatarios who decide to convert their land to individual 
property also become pequenos propietarios. 
45 
pickup truck or a tractor. Since oil palm is so profitable for these fanners, many are taking advantage of 
the project's support to expand their oil palm area. There has also been a considerable demonstration 
effect, and most farmers in this area are interested in growing oil palm, especially near the established 
production centers. AcaPetahua's municipal government has decided to encourage oil palm production by 
providing a subsidy of 100 pesos for each hectare of new oil palm. 
Zone three, Mapastepec, is located to the Northwest of the other two zones, and it is a bit more 
remote from the project headquarters in Escuintla. Zone three is noticeably dryer than the other two zones, 
where flooding is a problem. During the summer of 1997, some newly planted oil palms were suffering 
from drought stress in this area. Here cattle ranching is the most important economic activity. Since this 
area is more remote, farmers have less infonnation about oil palm and are more hesitant to commit 
significant proportions of their land to the crop. Some newer ejidos in the area are quite poor, and each 
fanner has about 5 hectares of land. These ejidos also tend to be closer to the mangrove swamps along the 
coast. Soil salinity is a problem, and affected areas cannot become part of the oil palm project since the 
palms do not grow well under those conditions. 
Processing Plants in 1997 
The two largest plantations in Zone One, successors to Mr. Bemsthoff's initial estate, each run a 
processing plant. They process their own harvest and buy from producers in the area. In addition, there 
are two cooperatively owned processing plants. One is owned by 29 ejidatarios from the ejido Luis 
Espinoza; it is called El Arenal, after the ejido village where it is located. Initially built with support from 
the state government, the cooperative was able to buy the plant from the government in 1994. It has the 
capacity to process 2 tons of fresh fruit bunches per hour, and employs 15 workers, most of whom are 
members'sons. In 1997, the plant was being expanded to double its capacity; the larger plant will require 
three more workers. El Arenal buys both from cooperative members and from nonmembers, although 
members have priority and get a 25 percent higher price per ton. Usually, members also receive dividends 
from the plant's profits, but in recent years these profits have been invested in the plant's expansion. There 
are serious conflicts in the ejido between cooperative members and independent producers who resent 
receiving a lower price. Cooperative members tend to be wealthier than other oil palm producers. 
The other cooperative is called BEPASSA3, and it was also established with state funds. It is 
located in Zone Two as well. It started working in 1996, and so far the cooperative does not have a repay­
ment plan; the government has not even infonned it how much it has to repay. This plant has the capacity 
to process 3 tons of fresh fruit bunches per hour, and in 1997 it was being expanded to 6 tons per hour. 
The expansion is financed from the plant's profits. This cooperative has 166 members, but it buys fresh 
fruit bunches from about 400 producers; members and nonmembers receive the same price. The members 
currently have 660 hectares of oil palm, and the cooperative is considering the admission of more members 
to have a larger area from which to buy raw material regularly. Two of the members are pequeiios 
propietarios; one with 76 ha, the other with 17 ha; the rest are ejidatarios with an average of 10 hectares of 
total land owned. This plant has 26 pennanent employees, who work in two shifts. During the busiest 
months, the plant runs a third shift with temporary workers. From December to February, the slowest 
months, the plant only works three days per week. Like El Arenal, it employs mostly members' sons. 
In Mapastepec and Villa Comaltitlcin, which are relatively far from the existing cooperatives, 
­
fanners have fonned associations to request additional plants from the state government. Profits from oil 
palm are much lower in these areas since transport costs are considerable. Producers are anxious that the 
state will not cooperate with them, and will instead invite private investors to build the plants, as SAGAR 
has planned. Fanners say that they prefer to be "businessmen as well as fanners," meaning that they hope 
3 Beneficiadora de Palma Africana Soconusco S.A. 
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to own part of a plant and receive dividends in addition to farm income. In any case they expect a commit­
ment to the construction of a new plant soon, since planting more area to oil palm is risky before demand 
for palm fruit is secure. 
Starting in 1997: The SAGAR Project 
Objectives 
The SAGAR project has the objective of planting 50,000 hectares in Chiapas, Campeche, Vera­
cruz and Tabasco with oil palm before the year 2000. It also aims to have private investors build ten 
extraction plants with a capacity of 20 tons of fresh fruit bunches per hour each. In Chiapas, 30,000 hec­
tares are planned. In designing the project, government officials are trying to organize producers in rural 
production societies, or SPR. Several of these SPRs can form associations, for example for extraction 
plants. Individual ejidatarios become members in these SPRs; it is encouraged that as many members from 
each ejido participate as possible to plant relatively compact land areas with oil palm. SAGAR expects 
SPRs to cooperate in input purchases, transport, etc. to achieve economies of scale. 
The Record of Accomplishments by Summer 1997 
At the time of my visit in July 1997, a project administration had been created in Chiapas. It is 
called PAPA (Programa Alianza Palma Africana). The extensionists at PAPA have inspected and 
approved 8,500 hectares of ejido and pequeiia propiedad land for participation in the oil palm project. To 
be approved, land has to be cleared, of good quality, and have the necessary infrastructure like access roads 
and drainage canals (if required); in addition, the owners' papers have to be in order. In 1996, project 
officials bought seeds for 5,200 hectares in Costa Rica, and established a pre-nursery and several nurseries, 
run by INIFAP (National Institute for Forestry, Agriculture and Livestock Research). For 1997, their goal 
was to plant 4,000 hectares in Chiapas and 1,200 hectares in Campeche. Seeds for another 5,200 hectares 
were purchased for planting in 1998. Cooperation between INIFAP and PAPA staff is mostly good, 
although during the summer of 1997 there was some friction when the beginning of the dry season neared 
and planting had not progressed far enough. 
SAGAR has put together an assistance package for producers. It consists of the seedlings, which 
are distributed free of charge, and 900 pesoslha for planting. In 1997, 10 month old seedlings were used; 
in 1998 the seedlings will be 12 months old when they are planted. Each producer's 900 pesos per hectare 
will be deposited in a trust fund called Fund for Agricultural Support of the State ofChiapas, or FOFAE; it 
is associated with PROCAMPO. These 900 pesos cover fertilizer, which will be distributed in kind; and 
the farmers' labor for planting and weeding, as well as transport. Prior to payment, the work has to be 
finished and inspected by one of the extensionists; then farmers receive a voucher that they can cash at a 
local bank. This way, farmers cannot use the funds for consumption purposes or for other crops, which 
was a problem in earlier projects. 
If the producer installs irrigation equipment, SAGAR will pay 45 percent of the costs up to a cost 
of 5000 pesoslha. Producers are responsible for all costs above 5000 pesoslha. Ejidatarios generally 
cannot afford irrigation equipment; in most of the project area flooding is a more serious problem than 
drought in any case. Several larger landowners however are interested in receiving these subsidies for 
irrigation. In the summer of 1997, work on irrigation systems had not begun, although some pequefios 
­propietarios were having systems designed. 
..­
The state and federal governments both allocate a portion of their budget to the palm project, which 
is combined and saved in the trust fund. A technical committee consisting of the state and national 
agricultural secretaries supervises the project's progress. 
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Unresolved Questions 
As mentioned above, the project seeks private investment in the extraction industry. To ensure 
timely processing and coordination between growers and processors, SAGAR desires a substantial degree 
of vertical integration and has developed three possible models for the institutional setup: 
1.	 The private (or plantation) model: Plantations and extraction plants are in the hand of private 
investors. They buy land, operate the plantation and the processing plant, and own the whole process 
from field to factory. 
2.	 The mixed (or shareholder) model: Small independent producers are in charge of planting, and 
investors are responsible for processing, and possibly for transport and technical assistance. In this 
model, the producers would be shareholders in the extraction plants, and investors would try to acquire 
some land to ensure the availability of raw material for the plant. A certain amount would be 
discounted from fanners' fresh fruit bunches sales until they payoff their shares in the extraction 
plants; afterwards they receive a dividend from profits. 
3.	 The independent (or contract farming) model: Independent producers cultivate the palms and sell 
fresh fruit bunches to the private processing industry. The two parties have a long tenn contract, which 
ensures continuity of the transaction for both fanners and plants. Prices are fixed at a certain discount 
from international prices, or through some other mechanism. 
In all three models the investors could also be responsible for services such as technical assistance 
and transport. In the summer of 1997, three investment groups had shown interest in setting up one or 
more processing plants in Chiapas, and negotiations were in progress. They had not decided which model 
to employ; this would in part be decided by the investors themselves. In Chiapas, the private model will not 
be viable because all land is owned by small and medium-sized producers, and plantations of thousands of 
hectares could not be established, although in the other states this is still an option. Since the ejido refonn, 
it is possible to buy land from ejidatarios, but the process is still very complicated and bureaucratic; it 
takes more than a year of paperwork. Land prices in the Soconusco were also reported to have risen sub­
stantially as soon as rumors about the expansion of the oil palm industry began to circulate. Even in 
Chiapas, the investors would like to buy some land to ensure a minimum supply of raw material for their 
plants. They fear collusion by the producers, which would drive up prices for fresh fruit bunches. 
In the following I include alternative institutional arrangements and case studies which will aid in 
the evaluation of SAGAR's proposed institutional models for Chiapas. The case studies include a brief 
history of oil palm in the country, infonnation about the institutional arrangement, and about the extent to 
which the government regulated and/or supported the sector. In each example below, the government ini­
tially played a role in encouraging the introduction of oil palm, and in supporting the sector until it became 
viable. 
Section B. The Institutional Alternatives 
The Plantations Model 
A plantation is a large farm estate which produces one or several crops for commercial purposes, 
employing a relatively large number of wage laborers that are organized under a management hierarchy 
(Hayami, 1994). Plantations are especially common where new land is opened up for production, which • 
often requires significant investments in infrastructure and machinery which are out of the r~ch of small 
independent fanners. They tend to produce export crops, often introducing new production and marketing 
technology. Their proponents argue that plantations transfer new technology and expertise to the rural 
sector, raise incomes, and generate foreign exchange earnings. 
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Critics on the other hand stress that the benefits of plantation agriculture tend to be very 
concentrated. Often linkages with the local economy are minimal, with little effect for development, 
especially in the case of multinationals. Furthermore, plantation agriculture tends to be more capital­
intensive than peasant farming, therefore creating less employment. Production and labor input per hectare 
tend to be lower than in smallholder systems. Since plantations usually engage in monocropping, their 
impact on the environment tends to be more negative than the more varied peasant production systems. 
Furthermore, the hierarchical organization of labor often leads to social conflict between laborers and 
managers. 
In Latin America, plantation systems tend to raise fears about a repetition of the United Fruit (later 
United Brands, then Chiquita) model. The extremely large transnational fruit companies where much more 
powerful than many Latin American governments, and they ended up practically running the whole country 
(the "Banana Republics). Plantation agriculture thus has a bad reputation and is associated with a very 
negative effect on equity. These companies held vast land areas, repatriated most profits, and did not con­
tribute much to development in the host countries. 
The Colombian Experience 
Colombian farmers started growing oil palms during the first half of the century, but it was not 
until the government started an import substitution program for vegetable oils in 1957 that palm oil 
production really began to grow. Oil palms were an attractive oil crop because they grow on low-value 
land, and because of their high oil yield per hectare. The initial growth slowed down because of palm 
diseases and the availability of cheap Peruvian fish oil under the Andean Pact free trade agreement, but 
during the 1970s, there was a sudden drop in fish oil production, and the Colombian government started 
giving tax exemptions for up to ten years for oil palm plantations over 500 ha. In addition, the government 
provided funds for research and extension activities, and growth resumed. By the late 1980s, Colombia 
had become the largest Latin American palm oil producer. 
In 1983, over 50,000 hectares had been planted to oil palm, 60 percent of which were on plan­
tations over 500 hectares in size. These plantations were better able to overcome difficulties related to 
processing etc., and further expansions in area took place almost exclusively on larger plantations, which 
now account for over three fourths of Colombian oil palm area. The estates operate their own mills, which 
also buy palm fruit from smaller farmers nearby. A large domestic refining industry produces margarine 
and cooking oils for the national market, mixing palm oil with other domestic and imported oils. Palm oil 
accounted for almost two thirds of all edible fats and oils produced in the country in the 1980s. Colombia 
protects its cooking oil industry with import tariffs, and production costs in the country are above world 
market prices. 
Although the palm oil industry developed in the hands of private entrepreneurs, the government 
provided a favorable environment through trade and tax policies, and also by supporting research and 
extension activities. The Colombian Farming Institute (ICA) is involved in palm oil research. In addition, 
the National Federation of Oil Palm Growers (Fedepalma) represents the producers' interests and dissemi­
nates technical knowledge. The bottleneck in oil palm cultivation is and has been capital. Some growers 
had to abandon their (usually smaller) farms due to lack of credit (Moll, 1987). As expected, large planta­
tions, with tax breaks from the government, have been better able to overcome problems associated with 
-credit availability, palm diseases and processing in Colombia than smallholders. 
... 
The Cooperative Model 
Cooperatives are associations of producers for the purposes of input acquisition, production, 
marketing and/or processing. While some cooperatives consist of fairly independent producers linked in 
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pursuit ofonly one of those goals, others are centrally managed and or83.I1i.zed as one enterprise. Since the 
cooperative members own all stages of the production process, they benefit from all profits, while sharing 
the risk with each other. Cooperatives thus can combine the benefits of horizontal integration, such as 
economies of scale in production and input purchases, with the benefits of vertical integration. 
Often cooperatives face problems with the resolution of conflicts between members; a frequent 
shortcoming seems to be a lack of administrative and managerial capacity and experience (Healy, 1987). 
Often cooperative farms become very inefficient and thus unprofitable. There are however some examples 
of very successful cooperatives, for example the EI Ceibo cocoa producers in Bolivia (Healy, 1987), horti­
cultural marketing cooperatives in the Netherlands, and cooperative creameries in Denmark (Hayami, 
1994). The Honduran experience with oil palm cooperatives is neither a pure success nor a pure failure. 
The demise of the cooperatives was largely a product not of internal problems, but of changes in the wider 
economy which ended the viability ofthe schemes. 
The Honduran Experience 
Two large multinational fruit companies, United Brands and Standard Fruit, introduced oil palms 
to Honduras. During the 1970s, the Honduran government started a settlement program on the North 
Coast which included oil palm cooperatives. The National Agrarian Institute (INA), which implements 
agrarian policy, initially had a central role in the planning, financing and implementation of the settlement 
projects. It was responsible for clearing the land, supplying inputs to farmers, establishing and managing 
the processing mills, and for formation and guidance of cooperatives. Additional financial resources came 
from the National Agricultural Development Bank (BANADESA), and from international assistance. By 
the mid-1980s, Honduras had become Central America's largest palm oil producer, although it accounted 
for only a tiny fraction ofglobal production. 
The oil palm projects included two organizational levels: the primary cooperatives, which produced 
fresh fruit bunches, and the secondary cooperatives, responsible for processing and marketing. A primary 
cooperative has between 20 and 100 members, about 50 on average. They grow their crops communally; 
depending on the region, there are an average of 5 to 12 hectares per member. Not the entire area is 
planted to oil palm. Other crops and wage labor, for example at the processing plants, are alternative 
sources of income for members. In the 1980s, around 70 percent of the area cultivated with oil palm in 
Honduras belonged to cooperatives, only 3 percent to independent smallholders; the rest was in the hands of 
multinationals who also had their own extraction plants (Moll, 1987). 
The refining industry is mostly in the hands of the multinational fruit companies. Combining palm 
oil with imported soybean and cottonseed oil they produce cooking oil, margarine, and by-products such as 
soap. These products are mainly sold on the domestic market, which is regulated by the state. The 
Honduran government sets maximum prices for the final products and enforces quality standards. While 
initially, the government also played a large role in establishing and supporting the cooperatives, later on 
these operated fairly independently. International consulting firms provided technical services to the 
cooperatives. However, when Honduras reformed its land tenure laws to encourage individual land 
ownership and titling, the oil palm cooperatives ceased to exist. Nowadays, oil palms in Honduras are 
grown mainly on large private plantations. 
-
Malaysia's FELDA Model 
In Malaysia, palm oil production has grown extremely quickly since the 1960s; Malaysia has 
become the world's most important producer of palm oil and accounts for about two thirds of exports. 
This phenomenal growth was possible initially because oil palm replaced rubber as a cash crop and could 
rely on a plantation infrastructure that was already available and facilitated large scale oil palm production. 
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In the 1960s, regulation increased, and the government was able to shift benefits from palm oil to low­
income producers, limiting dominance of large foreign-owned estates (Pletcher, 1991). The government 
played a crucial role, notably through the large FELDA4 settlement schemes which promoted smallholder 
oil palm cultivation. 
In 1960, FELDA began to implement oil palm settlement schemes, with the goals of reducing 
political unrest and poverty in the countryside, establishing a Malay middle class, and diverting rural-urban 
migration (Osman-Rani, 1987). Each scheme included about 1,700-2,000 hectares, with one family for 
every 4-8 hectares. The government first cleared the land, established palm plantations, and built roads and 
village infrastructure. The settlers were brought in when the fields were fully planted, their houses were 
built, and drinking water was available. During the first few years, the fanners worked on the plantations 
for a wage, until the revenues from palm oil began to cover the costs. At that point, settlers started to 
repay their debt to the government through deduction from their pay for palm fruit sales. The government 
recovered most of is investment in the schemes (about 70 percent), but they were still substantially 
subsidized. 
The 1960s: Experiments with Individual vs. Cooperative Ownership 
FELDA experimented with different institutional setups and land tenure arrangements. Initially, 
farmers received individual freehold titles to a portion of the scheme upon repayment of the debt; usually 
after about 15 years. The authorities then reformed this system into one of share ownership, where settlers 
as a group became owners of a cooperative when they repaid the debt. In this model, farmers did not work 
on a specific plot of own land; rather, the scheme's land was farmed collectively. This way, FELDA hoped 
to insure scheme coherence and avoid land fragmentation due to inheritance. The management assigned 
work to settlers and controlled financial operations and cash flow. This allowed the scheme administrators 
to maintain financial reserves, mix crops to reduce income variations resulting from price fluctuation, and 
even out settlers' monthly income over the year. Replanting could be staggered over several years, insuring 
continuity (Lamin, 1988; Pletcher, 1991). 
The 1970s and 1980s: Experiments with Cooperative Size and the Return to Individual Ownership 
Despite the advantages gained through scale economies, settlers began to protest against the 
cooperative model. They felt FELDA had too much control and treated them as estate workers rather than 
independent farmers. They wanted clear individual property rights and more responsibility in management. 
As a response, the administrators gave the settler committee a role in management and started to promote 
educational and developmental programs on the schemes. In the 1970s, FELDA tried the block system, 
where a group of 20 or fewer settlers are identified with a block of land. They do all the work without 
wages, and share the proceeds from palm fruit sales. This way farmers have more responsibility, but lose 
the benefits of large schemes; performance and income levels varied between blocks. In 1985, FELDA 
changed the management structure yet again, instituting another share system, where the scheme is 
managed as an entity, and settlers work as directed labor and receive a wage plus a dividend from the 
scheme's profits. 
Settlers perceive FELDA as paternalistic and reluctant to devolve control. In 1987, some settlers 
refused to join a cooperative claiming they had been promised individual land ownership. The dispute 
attracted national attention, and in 1988 the government backed down, giving settlers individual titles to 
­
their land once they had repaid their debt (Pletcher, 1991). Although centralized scheme management and 
cooperative work offered more coordinated administration and planning, settlers valued direct land owner­
ship more. 
4 FELDA (Federal Land Development Authority) was created in 1956 to develop settlement schemes for poor 
landless peasants, mostly concentrated on rubber and oil palm cultivation. 
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Success or Failure? 
Despite these conflicts over land tenure, the FELDA schemes have been quite successful. Until 
1983, almost 48,000 families had been resettled, and in 1987, over 712,000 hectares of plantations had 
been established. The drop out rates are very low, repayment rates are high, and there are long waiting lists 
for those who want to join a scheme. Settlers by and large have left poverty; there are some criticisms that 
participants are usually not the neediest, but rather people with a loyalty to Malaysia's ruling party 
(Pletcher, 1991). The over 400 FELDA schemes are now the most important producers of palm oil in 
Malaysia, before plantations; independent smallholders represent less than 10 percent of the oil palm area. 
The FELDA corporations process and market all products; settlers hold the majority share in these 
corporations and are represented on the board. 
Apart from its role in the FELDA schemes, the Malaysian government has succeeded in providing 
a policy environment which allowed the oil palm industry to grow. Domestic processing was encouraged 
through tax incentives which favored domestic refining. Another reason for palm oil's success in Malaysia 
was the Malaysian palm oil research institute PORIM. Financed through an export tax, this institute has 
raised productivity in palm oil production, for example through the introduction of weevils to improve 
pollination. While the Malaysian experience proves that oil palms can successfully be grown on small 
farms, it also demonstrates how important institutional arrangements are. The Malaysian government and 
FELDA have been able to combine high productivity and competitiveness with a positive social impact. 
The FELDA authorities, although reluctant to give up control, were flexible enough to adapt to farmers' 
demands about land tenure to ensure the survival of the schemes. 
Contract Farming 
In contract farming schemes, "contract farmers sell their crops under contract to private or public 
enterprises for processing or export in return for various price guarantees, inputs and services" (Glover, 
1990:303). The system was first implemented in the 1930s in the United States. It became especially 
widespread in the poultry industry, which changed from consisting of hundreds of competing mom-and-pop 
farms, feedmills and processors to become dominated by a few, vertically integrated businesses. At the end 
of the 1980s, more than 90 percent of all broilers were produced under contract (Watts, 1994). This 
contract specifies the number of cents per pound live weight that the farmer receives, plus incentives and 
penalties related to performance and quality standards. Competition is fierce, and poultry contractors often 
struggle to make a living. The hog industry is undergoing a similar transformation, and in the late 1980s, 
about 12 percent of all US pigs were being grown under contract (Watts, 1994). 
In Africa, Asia and Latin America contract farming was introduced during or after World War II, 
often to replace plantation production systems post-independence. Often the processing firms were (and 
still are) foreign multinationals, which led many writers to view them as neo-<:olonial exploitation systems. 
Benefits were concentrated in the processing firm, which reinvested them elsewhere (de Treville, 1986). 
Even in the US, the power of processors was often such that farmers were barely able to earn their 
livelihood; debts in company stores worked as barriers to exit which kept farmers in a situation almost of 
debt peonage. There are certainly enough examples were contract farming was not very beneficial for 
farmers. The distribution of benefits, and specifically farmers' ability to demand a share of the profits 
depends on relative bargaining power, an issue which will be addressed below. 
-

Contract farming can combine the advantages of small farms with the benefits of vertical 
integration. As on independent small farms, growers have high work incentives and low supervision costs 
for family labor. For the plant, contract farming lowers the transaction costs associated with the supply of 
farm-produced materials, and allows the internalization of external effects. Food processing firms often 
have high fixed costs, and therefore want to secure a steady supply of raw material inflows close to 
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capacity levels, which is difficult to achieve through open market purchases (Glover and Kusterer, 1990). 
Often, companies keep a nucleus estate for raw material production, and combine it with outgrower 
contracts and open market purchases (de Treville, 1986). Contract farming systems divide risk among the 
contracting parties: farmers usually bear most of the production risk (depending on whether the contract 
specifies an amount to be delivered, or the production ofa certain area); processors bear the marketing risk. 
There is a high degree of interdependence, and in the long run fluctuations in production and in the price of 
final products get transmitted through the entire production chain. 
Contract farming is not advantageous for all crops. It has advantages over independent small­
holder or plantation production with wage labor when a crop has high and relatively skilled labor require­
ments. Crops with long gestation periods on the other hand can often lead to debt problems and barriers to 
exit. This problem can be minimized where farmers have other income sources apart from the contract 
crop. Crops with high economies of scale in production tend to be less suitable for contracts, although 
these problems can sometimes be overcome with innovative management techniques. Where machinery is 
important, such as for example in sugar cane production, contracts can work, but growers often resemble 
hired workers more than independent farmers (Glover, 1990). 
There is a growing literature on contract farming and its role in development, especially regarding 
Africa. Comparative studies such as Glover (1990) and Watts (1988) identify lessons from observing 
existing contract schemes. They highlight several key factors that influence the viability of contract 
farming schemes. The first is related to prices and pricing policies. Large and lucrative markets for the 
product obviously increase the viability of a scheme by allowing for profits for both processors and 
growers. The distribution of profits depends on the contractual agreement. Farmers' participation in 
scheme profits depends on their bargaining power, which is related to several factors such as well-defined 
land tenure, horizontal organizations, and the plant's monopsony power. A second factor consists of 
macro-economic and macro-institutional policies, which includes both overall economic and political 
stability, and continuity and effective organization of services such as input supply, credit and payments. 
Third, the design of payments systems is important; it needs to be transparent, and minimize intra­
household conflict. This factor may be more important in Africa, where much farming is done by women, 
than in the Soconusco, where most farming activities are carried out by men. A fourth factor are monopoly 
and monopsony power. Monopoly power can enable the processing firm to make higher profits which may 
be shared with growers. Monopsony power on the other hand is often detrimental as the lack of alternative 
markets restricts the sellers' bargaining power. Being the only buyer on the other hand may enable firms to 
restrict free rider problems, which arise for example where other buyers benefit from a company's technical 
assistance programs. Fifth, barriers to entry and exit can threaten the success of a scheme. Barriers to 
entry such as high initial investment costs restrict participation in the scheme, sometimes excluding the 
poorest farmers, and thus limiting the scheme's effect on poverty. Barriers to exit lower a farmer's 
bargaining power, which tends to reduce growers' participation in profits. This can be the case with tree 
crops, where switching to a different crop is very costly. 
Farmer participation in management is another factor which contributes to good performance. The 
existence of a farmer organization with some influence on decision making tends to improve communica­
tion with the company and lower conflict. The last factor is income and crop diversification. Schemes 
where farmers do not depend solely on income from contract farming, but have some alternative income 
­sources, and/or grow some food on part of their land perform better. Risk for farmers is lower, and there 
are some indications that nutrition is also better in households which grow some of their own food (Glover, 
1990; Porter and Phillips-Howard, 1997). 
Since there tends to be a considerable power differential between farmers and often large com­
panies, governments often provide regulations and guidelines for contract design. TItat way they can 
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ensure that prices are not set too low, especially where firms have monopsony power, and that farmers 
receive a share of the profits. 
The oil palm scheme in Chiapas seems to be a good candidate for the contract farming system. Oil 
palms are a typical crop which requires relatively high initial investments, which can be overcome with the 
help of the processing firm and/or the government. They require relatively skilled labor, especially for 
harvesting. Substantial coordination is required to ensure timely processing. There is a large and growing 
market for vegetable oil and feed in Mexico. Since farmers maintain other income sources apart from oil 
palm, their dependence on oil palm is relatively low, which improves their bargaining position and reduces 
risk. If contracts ensure transparent payment schemes and an equitable distribution of benefits, there 
remain only two potential sources ofproblems as identified from the factors above. One is related to barri­
ers to entry and exit, as oil palms have a gestation period that may be too long for poorer farmers, which 
could limit its benefits to already better off farmers. Once land is planted to oil palm, abandoning the crop 
is costly, which means that farmers cannot credibly threaten to exit the program, which lowers their 
bargaining power. The other potential problem lies in monopsony power: if the new large private extrac­
tion plant(s) outcompete the existing, small ones, farmers may be left with very few markets for their 
product, which would tend to shift prices to their disadvantage. 
Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana: Two Experiences Compared5 
The oil palm originates in West Africa, and people in the area have long grown it in a semi-wild 
manner for palm wine, building materials, and oil. The oil is extracted on a small scale by farmers 
themselves and consumed as crude palm oil. At the time of independence (1957 and 1960), both Ghana 
and Cote d'Ivoire had important palm oil deficits, because since colonial times their economies had focused 
on cocoa and coffee production. Both decided to invest in oil palm after independence, and received 
additional funds from international lending agencies. In both countries, part of the oil palms are grown by 
contracted smallholders who participated in resettlement schemes. The governments broker the relationship 
between (partly state-owned) processing companies and smallholders by setting minimum guaranteed 
prices. While the major characteristics were similar in Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire, the organization of the 
contract farming schemes differed in important ways; as did the outcomes. 
Cote d'Ivoire: The Ehania Scheme. In Cote d'Ivoire the government began promoting oil palm produc­
tion quite aggressively after independence. In the early 1960s under the Plan Palmier, the entire southern 
coastal zone began to be covered with oil palm plantations. The parastatal SodepalmlPalmindustries came 
to oversee a total of 86,678 hectares oil palm fields, of which 60 percent were industrial plantations, and 40 
percent contracted smallholders (village plantations), with 8,582 smallholder families, and 6,000 workers 
employed by them. In addition, there were almost 12,000 hectares of private plantations. Ehania is a 
scheme with about 12,000 hectares of industrial plantations, and 16,000 hectares of village plantations 
worked by 3,134 smallholder families. 
The state provided forest reserves for clearing, and reformed property rights to make productive 
land use a condition for land ownership. Smallholders received subsidies and cash advances to cover the 
costs of clearing; and tending plantations. There was a six year grace period before repayment. By the end 
of that grace period, palms would be producing close to peak. Farmers above 40 years of age were 
required to have a codebtor to avoid defaults and to ensure scheme continuity. Fanns must be within 20 
-Ion of the processing plant, close to a road, and ecologically suitable for oil palm. Each farmer agrees to 
plant an area compatible with his/her labor force and management ability. The average holding size per ... 
smallholder is about 4.4 ha. 
5 A more detailed comparative evaluation of the two cases can be found in Daddieh, 1994. 
54 
Sodepalrn/Palmindustrie provides technical advice and inputs such as seedlings, fertilizer, and wire 
nets in exchange for legal title to the smallholder's entire output. The company assists contractors in secur­
ing financial aid and subsidies from the state, and loans for equipment and input acquisition. The collection 
of fresh fruit bunches from the road side is the firm's responsibility. Furthermore, the company has the 
responsibility for road provision and maintenance. Between 1963 and 1979, it opened up 5,000 Ian of 
feeder roads and villages received electricity, water, cultural centers and social facilities. This was not 
specified in the contract, but earned goodwill and support from peasants. 
The smallholders in tum agree to execute tasks such as clearing land, burning, planting, weeding, 
and applying fertilizer according to the agricultural calendar. They are responsible for harvesting on 
designated dates and carrying fruit bunches to collection points by the roadside to ensure timely processing. 
In the case of death or neglect, the company may repossess the farm until all loans are paid off. Producers 
who have land besides their oil palm fields tend to devote it to other cash crops such as cocoa or coffee. 
Many farmers do not have enough land for food production, and no credit and inputs are provided for food 
production. Food production on oil palm land (intercropping) is forbidden, which has led to conflicts. 
Smallholder oil palm schemes have injected significant income to rural economies in Cote d'Ivoire, 
but income distribution has not improved. Productivity on smallholder farms tends to be relatively low, 
which is probably a function of the low prices paid by Sodepalm. Increasingly, farmers divert fruit to sell 
on the open market. Although the improved oil palm varieties planted on Ehania schemes are less suitable 
for traditional home cooking, oil palm fruit receive double the Sodepalm price when sold on the market. 
Farmers have accepted that Sodepalm will pay whatever price it wants to pay; they have no negotiating 
channels. Many farmers are neglecting their trees and investing more time in other crops and activities as a 
form of covert resistance. There are allegations that collection agents demand bribes for collecting fruit, 
since farmers demand on timely pickup to ensure high quality. Furthermore, weighing tends to be a source 
ofconflict since it is often done in the absence of farmers, who feel cheated. 
Cote d'Ivoire has thus been successful at establishing oil palm plantations on large areas, and at 
raising production to 158 632 metric tons of palm oil by 1984. Inefficient organization of fruit collection, 
as well as corruption and low producer prices are threatening this success, and farmers are finding ways to 
bypass their contracts to fmd more profitable markets and income sources. 
Ghana: The Ghana Oil Palm Development Corporation (GOPDC) Arrangement at Kade-Kwae. 
Although they faced a palm oil deficit similar to Cote d'Ivoire's at the time of indepen-dence, Ghana's 
governments did little to stimulate production until the early 1970s. At that time, the government began to 
attract investment in large scale agriculture by giving financial incentives. Investors in the oil palm 
industry received preferential treatment for the first five years, including annual monetary transfers to 
ensure returns on their investment during the gestation lag. Although policies generally favored large 
farms, there were attempts to involve smallholders through outgrower schemes. Similar to Cote d'Ivoire, 
the government tried to provide a favorable environment for palm oil production, but with more modest 
results. One difficulty was the availability of land: in Ghana, the government did not have access to large 
land areas, and thus tried to expropriate land from village communities and peasant families. Not surpris­
ingly, this induced deteriorating relations with peasants, and to numerous court challenges. 
By 1982, about 5,100 hectares had been planted with oil palm; this first phase included about 
-
1,200 hectares of smallholders. By 1986, around 320 peasant households were participating in the 
schemes. A second phase, which was to be completed in 1990, had the goal of planting another 7,700 ha, 
50 percent of which were reserved for another 800 smallholders. These smallholders are tenants, not 
landowners. At first, each household received 8 ha, of which 7 were planted to oil palm, and one was 
reserved for food production. After 1981, as the government was unable to expropriate sufficient land, 
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each household received only 4 ha, with 0.8 hectares reserved for food production. Households were 
selected to ensure adequate labor supply; the ideal scheme family had five children. 
The division of responsibilities specified by the outgrower contracts is similar to the Ivoirien case. 
The company provides surveying and pegging, and employs chain saws to log trees. In addition, it provides 
seedling for cover crops, fertilizer, wire nets, and field boots (an item in high demand). These inputs are 
provided at cost and deducted from fanners' fruit sales. As in the Ehania scheme, the company is responsi­
ble for fruit collection, while fanners have to harvest at certain times. Although labor supply was such a 
central concern when selecting participating families, there have been shortages. About 14 percent of the 
growers employ wage labor, which the company sees as undesirable since it requires labor for its own 
plantations and wants to avoid rising wages. 
One important difference from the Ehania example is the existence of a Smallholder Association 
called SHAK. GOPDC saw this organization as a means of communicating with outgrowers. It has 
become a powerful voice for members that is used to express farmers' needs. Through SHAK, small­
holders have for example requested seedling after a drought had killed some palms. Other requests include 
motorcycles for easier access to fields etc. Only occasionally does SHAK deal with fresh fruit bunch 
prices, which indicates that farmers are satisfied with the prices that they receive. As in Ehania, food 
availability has been a problem. Food plots are too small to maintain the farmers' large families; and again 
inputs for food production are scarce. The local food market was not capable of supplying enough food, 
and SHAK intervened to request the use ofcompany trucks to transport food to the scheme area. 
Although in Ghana the government was not able to stimulate palm oil production on such a large 
scale as in Cote d'Ivoire, several features of the scheme have been more successful. Farmers are satisfied 
with prices, and thus maintain their plantations properly. Through SHAK, they have influence on 
management which ensures communication and voices farmers' needs and concerns. 
Section C. Implications for Chiapas 
Although the economic and political situation in the Soconusco is very unique, the experiences of 
Colombia, Honduras, Malaysia, and Western Africa can give some insight into the factors to consider when 
choosing an institutional setup for the oil palm industry. Colombia's plantation model, similar to 
SAGAR's private model, has the advantage that it minimizes transaction costs and inefficiencies in the link 
between plantation and industry. It has the disadvantage that benefits from the oil palm sector remain very 
concentrated in the hands of plantation owners, who hire laborers for plantation work. In the Soconusco, 
smallholders and relatively small independent farmers will grow the palms, so this model will not apply, as 
pointed out before. 
Honduras' experience with cooperatives illustrated both that this model can work, and that there 
may be problems in its sustainability over time. The cooperatives successfully grew oil palm until the 
government changed land tenure legislation to require individual land titling. The land titling process is 
very complicated and costly, making it inaccessible for most small peasant farmers. It facilitates land 
purchases by large landowners and is leading to considerable land concentration, among others on large oil 
palm plantations. Some of these large landlords hold the land for speculative purposes more than as a 
productive investment. This process has led to the disappearance of the oil palm cooperatives, and now the 
oil palm sector is mostly characterized by large farms. In Mexico, similar problems may result form the ­
reform of ejido laws, although the situation differs in important ways. Oil palm in Mexico is produced by 
individual farmers and ejidatarios, not on cooperative farms. Cooperatives exist in the processing stage, 
and are doing very well. Land titling in Mexico is more accessible than in Honduras, even where ejido land 
is privatized. In other areas of Mexico, land sales have led to some consolidation of landholdings, but in 
the Soconusco in 1997 that had not been the case. Although maximum land sizes are restricted, people 
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have found ways around these regulations, for example to establish large banana farms. It is difficult to 
predict if similar developments lie ahead for the oil palm industry. Some cooperation among independent 
smallholders, for example to purchase inputs or for transport could be beneficial, but there seems to be a 
lack of leadership and organization in this area. 
Maybe the most important lesson from Malaysia is the importance of flexibility in adapting the 
institutional setup to local conditions and to farmers' preferences. Malaysian farmers expressed a clear 
preference for individual land ownership over communal property. In all cases FELDA owned the 
processing plants, sometimes with farmer representation on the board. Since the land is already indivi­
dually owned by farmers, or they have permanent use rights, land tenure is not an issue in Chiapas. The 
Malaysian farmers' aversion to cooperative land ownership thus does not reflect on the viability of 
cooperative plant ownership in Mexico. 
The contract farming schemes in Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana contain valuable lessons for investors in 
Chiapas. Many of their problems are related to the fact that both examples are settlement schemes, where 
new land was cleared, and peasants were relocated to become oil palm farmers. Thus farmers were highly 
indebted to the companies, and exiting the schemes was difficult, even when prices paid were not 
satisfactory. Food availability problems can also partly be attributed to the fact that these farmers were 
newly settled in areas were food markets were incomplete or non existent. These problems should not be 
central in Mexico. Land does not have to be cleared, and the much lower establishment costs are at least 
partly covered by a grant from the government. Food markets are relatively well established, and shortages 
are not likely. 
Other determinants of success and failure in Western African schemes have direct relevance for 
Mexico. The central importance of price setting in an oil palm scheme's viability demonstrated by Ehania 
farmers who neglect their farms and divert fruit to local markets is a problem that could apply in the 
Soconusco. Furthermore, farmers need an opportunity to negotiate with management, to express their 
needs and concerns, and to influence price setting. Since smallholders face a considerable power differen­
tial when dealing with large companies, a grower's association can be an important contribution to good 
communication. It can act not only as a way for farmers to have an influence on managers, but can also 
facilitate the dissemination of information from the company to farmers. 
Since some degree of vertical integration is desirable for palm oil production, and since plantations 
have been ruled out as an option for Mexico, the question remains how to decide between contract farming 
and share ownership. Ifprices are set at a reasonable level, i.e. if farmers have sufficient bargaining power 
and there is some competition between processing plants, contract and shareholder systems can lead to an 
identical distribution ofbenefits. It is difficult to predict the fate of the small cooperative processing plants, 
but once larger plants start to operate, they may not be able to compete. In that case, the large plants could 
gain considerable monopsony power, and some mechanism to avoid conflict over price setting would be 
needed. Farmer participation in management and share ownership could lead to better communication 
between the two parties, and to a more equitable distribution of benefits. 
In interviews, farmers stressed their wish to "become businessmen" and own part ofa plant. If this 
is what farmers prefer, the shareholder model may be more likely to succeed in Chiapas than the other 
SAGAR setups. Oil palm producers are familiar with the prosperity of the members of the existing 
­cooperatives and aspire to belong to a similar enterprise. Two associations are currently requesting 
processing plants from the state, which the state government is not planning to give them, since they are 
trying to interest investors in building large scale plants. A shareholder arrangement may be a substitute 
for cooperative plant ownership and help to avoid resentment about this issue. 
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One fanner expressed concerns that too many o\\ners would make efficient plant management 
impossible, He considered the existing private plants to be better organized and more efficient. He 
therefore supponed the independent (contract) model, as long as contracts made sure that plant owners paid 
decent prices for fresh fruit bunches. As was mentioned above, this model could lead to the same distribu­
tion of benefits as the shareholder model. In practice, however, the independent model could easily lead to 
conflicts over price setting and over fruit quality. The mixed model, where fanners are shareholders, will 
give them a voice in management, while also giving them a stake in the plant's profitability. The symbolic 
value of o\\nership may be great enough to overcome antagonism and reduce conflict. The mixed, or 
shareholder arrangement therefore seems more likely to be sustainable in the long run. 
In the first three palm oil producing countries mentioned before, the government played an 
important role in the regulation and support of the palm oil industry. From quality standards for final 
products, to tax incentives for domestic refining and processing, it can insure that a prosperous domestic oil 
industry develops, Research to improve oil palm production, and technical assistance and extension arc 
further important government contributions. While so far, planting material and technical information has 
been imported from Costa Rica, a growing palm oil sector may require domestic investigation, either by 
INIFAP or by private agencies, Initial technical assistance and e>..1ension are part of the PAPA project. 
Eventually, the Ministry of Agriculture hopes to hand those responsibilities over to the private sector, 
Since good fruit quality and high ~ields are in the interest of the processing plants, its o\\ners could be 
made responsible for the dissemination of technical infonnation, Another important component which may 
detennine the success of the project the existence of adequate infrastructure, especially roads, will remain 
the responsibility of the government due to the fragmentation of oil palm land, 
,"' 
Chapter V
 
EVALUATING OIL PALM PRODUCTION IN CHIAPAS
 
This chapter evaluates the profitability of oil palm in Chiapas. The background has been laid out 
in previous chapters: Chapter II shows that there is a market for palm oil in Mexico, and Chapter III 
demonstrates that the policy environment is favorable to a switch to oil crop production, away from 
formerly subsidized crops such as maize. Chapter IV shows institutional setups, and how the choice of 
institutional arrangement can affect profitability by determining producer prices and the distribution of 
benefits. 
After a brief review of data sources and methodology, this chapter identifies fanners' income 
sources in a section devoted to farm budget analysis. This section includes an evaluation of fanners' finan­
cial vulnerability during the initial gestation period. The next section analyzes profitability both statically, 
using gross margins per hectare, and over time through net present values and internal rates of return. 
Section A. Data Sources and Methodology 
Data on Mexican and world vegetable oil and oilcrop production are from the FAO' s internet 
database called FAOSTAT. Information on prices is from publications such as Oi/crops Situation and 
Outlook Yearbook by ERS, and the World Bank"s Price Prospects for Major Primary Commodities, as 
indicated in the sources. Farm level information from ejidatarios and pequeiios propietarios comes from 
farmer inteniews which I conducted during my ,isit in July of 1997. 
Interviews 
Farm level data were collected in inten'iews during the summer of 1997. Since available time and 
resources did not allow for e:-.:tensive random sampling of the Soconusco population, a different approach 
was chosen. Instead of intenie\\ing farmers at random, great care was taken in their selection for inclusion 
in the study. At first] familiarized myself \\ith the project area by accompan~ing PAPA eX1ensionists on 
their daily tours of oil palm farmers, Through informal conversations \\ith both eX1ensionists and farmers, 
I was able to get a sense of the range of farm types represented in the area. 
I decided to choose four farmers from each of the three project zones for inteniews to cover the 
whole geographical area and maximize farmer diversity. After spending one or 1\\'0 days in the respective 
zone and talking eX1ensively v.ith eX1ensionists and farmers, I chose the four farmers based on a few crite­
ria described below, and on the work plan of the extensionists. Since I relied on them for transport and 
introductions to farmers, I usually interviewed in the ejidos where eX1ensionists were busy on those days. 
In each case, two of the inten'iewed fanners were already engaged in oil palm production, while the other 
1\\'0 were planting oil palm for the first time in 1997. Furthennore, fanners were chosen to represent all 
socio-economic levels. Thus some are relatively wealthy, while others are struggling to supplement fann 
income v.ith wage labor and other activities such as fishing or sev.ing. 
Inteniews were usual1y conducted in the presence of extensionists, sometimes within hearing 
range. I found most fanners either by their houses, or on the fields where they were working. Interviews 
were usually conducted in a shady spot either by the field or next to the house, often over some coconut 
water or another refreshment offered by the farmer or his v.ife. Most were quite v.illing to chat for a while, ­
and curious to talk to the hgringa". Most fanners participating in the oil palm scheme are men), although 
there are a few women, and this is reflected in the interviews: only one woman was interviewed. Most 
I often refer to a fanner as "he". This is only for purposes of simplicit)· and not meant to imply that there are no 
female fanners. 
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interviews included only the farmer himself, but sometimes his wife and/or children were present. Oil palm 
cultivation is almost exclusively men's work; women and small children only help collecting the loose fruit 
which are lost during the harvest. 
Instead of a fixed set of questions, the small number of interviews allowed a less rigid, more per­
sonalized approach. After being introduced, I told fanners about my reasons for seeking information on the 
subject, and explained my aim ofevaluating the economic of oil palm cultivation on small farmers. During 
a conversation about farmers' different crops, I filled in a table on areas planted to each crop, yield, 
amount sold, price, input use and so forth. An example of such a fonn is included in Appendix A 
(translated into English). Apart from information on income sources and production, there were also open­
ended questions on fanners' opinions on matters such as ejido refonn, the peso crisis, and much room for 
comments and suggestions. 
Because of time constraints and difficulties in obtaining accurate information through interviews 
based on recollection, I did not attempt to evaluate expenditures in a detailed fashion. Questions included 
where fanners shopped, and how much maize they purchased to assess their reliance on the market. A 
question on which price increases had had the greatest effect since the 1994/95 peso crisis indicated which 
items played an important role in expenditures. 
Interviews with pequeiios propietarios were somewhat different. I was able to converse with 
several owners of these larger fanns, or their administrators, and I interviewed five in some detail. Three 
were administrators, the absentee landowners could not be reached for comment. Two pequeiios propie­
tarios were interviewed personally; they both manage their own fanns. Where possible, I followed the 
same fonn from Appendix A. Since these fanns are not necessarily family fanns, infonnation on house­
hold composition, expenditures and so forth was only collected where relevant. Often even detailed pro­
duction infonnation could not be obtained since administrators did not make these decisions, and account­
ing was in many cases not carried out on the fann itself. The most important insight in those cases were 
the reasons for switching to oil palm production from some other crop, and other general comments. 
Two additional interviews with the administrators of the two cooperative extraction plants, El 
Arenal and BEPASSA, were extremely useful for production, marketing and price information. They fur­
thennore complemented general infonnation on the history of oil palm in Chiapas received from extension­
ists and other project staff. 
Sources of Bias 
The reliability of fann level data is often difficult to assess. Several sources of bias coexist and 
can distort results significantly. When asked about their income, most people tend to round up or down-­
they do not like revealing that information. To reduce this bias, I did not ask directly about fanners' 
income, but rather attempted to infer it from amounts sold, prices, and so forth. 
This method does not account for two main sources of bias, which may fortunately partly cancel 
each other out. One is the desire of showing off one's skills as a fanner, and thus to exaggerate yield and 
production information. The presence of extensionists in many interviews may have increased fanners' 
desire to appear competent, but also reduced their exaggerations to the realm of the believable. 
­
On the other hand, farmers perceived me, as an outsider accompanying the project's extensionists, 
as someone who may be able to lobby for increased support and subsidies for participants in the oil palm 
project. Several farmers took the opportunity to ask for more support payments. Thus, some fanners also 
had the desire to show that it was hard for them to make ends meet, and if not directly consulted about an 
income source, most would not have brought it up themselves. While the "good fanner' bias thus tended to 
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lead to inflated incomes, the "support worthy" bias counteracted this first bias, hopefully leaving the final 
figures somewhere closer to the actual amounts. 
Although asked about their last harvest, farmers tended to give average yield and production data. 
If the past year had been particularly bad due to a pest, for example in maize production, or if the field had 
been flooded, farmers automatically gave information from a "normal" year. Thus the data do not reflect 
crop failures, which happen quite often, especially in maize. Production risk in thus not reflected by yield 
figures, or by gross margins per hectare calculated later in the chapter. 
Section B. Farm Budget Analysis 
This section deals with fann budgets based on data from fanner interviews conducted in July 1997. 
These fann budgets reveal the profitability of oil palm per hectare as compared to the other crops fanners 
are growing. Yields, costs and prices vary, and thus gross margins per hectare are not unifonn across 
fanners. In addition to relative profitabilities, the budgets show farmers' income sources, and their depend­
ence on income from oil palm as compared to other crops. The overall level of household income, com­
bined with the dependence on fann income detennines fanners' vulnerability during the oil palms' gesta­
tion period. Both relative profitabilities and fanners' economic vulnerability critically determine the 
viability of the oil palm scheme. 
Since the fann budget information is based on only twelve complete interviews with ejidatarios, 
and two interviews with pequefios propietarios, none of the results are statistically significant. Rather, they 
are case studies of typical cases that represent a wide range of fann households. Calculating average 
income figures and such is thus meaningless, but the range of incomes represents a range to be found in the 
project area. Approximately half of the interviewed ejidatarios already produce oil palm (7), while the 
other half (5) were beginning to plant oil palms in 1997. The two groups, established oil palm farmers and 
new oil palm fanners, will be analyzed in some detail, as well as a couple of pequefios propietarios. 
Established Oil Palm Farmers 
The members of this group of fanners, who planted their oil palms in the early 1980s and 1990s, 
had considerably higher incomes than those who were only starting to plant oil palms in my sample. Figure 
V.l shows fanners' incomes and income sources. The seven fanners on the top are those already produc­
ing oil palm. It can be seen that the first three fanners are relatively more specialized in oil palm produc­
tion; they derive more than half oftheir income from oil palm. The other four fanners in the established oil 
palm fanners' group derive most of their income from other sources. Those with other income sources can 
be further divided into two better-off and two lower-income cases. 
Fanners Specializing in Oil Palm 
Three of the interviewed fanners belong in the group that derives more than half of their income 
from oil palm: Jose Garcia, Mario Gonzatez, and Pablo Mendez. Apart from oil palm, all three fanners 
also produce maize. However, subsistence production plays only a very minor role in their budgets; most 
of their production is for the market. Farmers Garcia and Gonzalez are both further expanding their oil 
palm area through the SAGAR project. In the following, each fanner's budget for 1997 will be discussed 
­in more detail. 
Jose Garcia2• This fanner lives in a cinder-block house in Zone 1, on his plot ofland in the ejido 
Luis Espinoza, where the El Arenal processing plant is located. This ejido has the strongest history of oil 
2 The names of all farmers have been changed in the interest of privacy. 
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palm production, with a high percentage of established producers. It is also where one of the oil palm 
nurseries and one of the cooperative processing plants are located. The Garcias have seven grown children, 
all of them married. Their two sons work on the farm with their father. The processing plant offered them 
jobs, but the farm is doing well and there is enough to do, so they do not engage in wage labor. Mrs. 
Garcia takes care of the house and raises 40 chickens, in addition to ducks, geese and turkeys for home 
consumption. The family raises pigs in the back yard, and sells about 15 young pigs every year. They also 
own about 15 cows, which give steady income from milk and cheese sales, and can be sold in emergencies 
to raise cash for example to pay medical fees. 
Jose Garcia is a member of the plant cooperative. His original parcela had about 20 ha, of which 
half a hectare is taken up by the road and the river. He planted 7 hectares to oil palm in 1982, and another 
5 in 1990. Some of the oldest plantations are not in very good shape anymore, and about 3 hectares were 
to be replanted in 1998. Jose furthermore bought about 4.5 ha ofland which he is planting with oil palm in 
1997. He is intercropping the new palms with maize, which he sells to traders (called "coyotes" in 
Mexico). On the rest of his land, he grows star grass (zacate estrella) as feed for his cattle. 
Table V.I shows the family's income sources. In the top part, the table details production and 
price data, and the gross value of the output. Where some of the output is consumed at home, it is valued 
at the market price. The next items show the costs associated with the production of each crop. The gross 
margin is the difference between the value of the output and total cost, first shown without, then with palm 
subsidy. Below, there is a list of other income sources. All amounts printed in bold add up to total house­
hold income. In the Garcias' case, almost two thirds of household income are from oil palm, which is 
grown on half of the land. Jose Garcia regularly applies fertilizer to his palm fields, and thus achieves the 
relatively high average yield of 24 tons per hectare per year although the profitability of his oldest palms is 
declining. The other main income sources are maize, either grown alone or intercropped with freshly 
planted oil palms, and livestock. 
The costs associated with oil palm production are substantially higher than those of maize 
production. In the Garcias' case, the costs of their twelve hectares of oil palm are more than nine times 
those of producing six hectares of maize. On a per hectare basis, oil palm costs are about five times those 
of maize production. Oil palm is still the Garcias' most profitable crop; per hectare its profitability is more 
than 50 percent above that of maize, even after costs are taken into account. Maize intercropped with palm 
has higher costs than maize alone because of the palm planting costs. These extra costs are covered by the 
subsidy. While oil palm thus generates more income, it also requires the farmer to maintain a high degree 
of liquidity to pay for labor, transport and fertilizer, the main costs associated with oil palm production. 
Since their income level is relatively comfortable, the Garcias are able to meet the liquidity requirements 
posed by oil palm. They consider oil palm to be a good and reliable source of income, which is confirmed 
by the fact that they are expanding their oil palm area by another four hectares. 
As all farmers participating in the SAGAR oil palm project, they received a subsidy of 900 pesos 
for each newly planted hectare of oil palm. This subsidy is only intended to cover initial planting and 
maintenance costs, and will only be paid during the first two years. For the Garcias, the impact of the sub­
sidy is relatively small; it constitutes a mere two percent of their income, which will most probably not be 
essential to their survival as oil palm farmers. 
• 
Mario Gonz81ez. Mario Gonzalez was recommended by the extensionists as a sort of role model 
.. 
for all oil palm farmers. He takes excellent care of his fields, and achieves the highest yields of all farmers 
3 Labor includes cleaning, but most of the labor costs are associated with harvesting. The harvesters transport the 
fresh fruit bunches to the road by cart; these transport costs are included under labor costs. Transport costs do not 
include transport from the palm to the road, only from the road to the processing plant. 
Table V.2. Farm Budget: Mario Gonz!lezTable V.l. Farm Budget: Jos~ Garda l 
Item" 
Crop Area Cropped (ha) 
Income Yield (t/ha) 
Production (t) 
Price per ton 
Gross Value of Output 
Costs 
Fertilizer 
Pesticides 
Herbicides 
Labor 
Transport 
Field Preparation 
Maize sheller rental 
Palm planting costs2 
Tota[ Costs 
Gross Margin (value - cost) 
Gross margin per ha 
Subsidy for new oil palm 
(900 pesos/hectare) 
Gross Margin (value + subsidy· cost) 
Gross margin ocr ha 
Other Cow sales 
Income Milk 
Cost 
Total income from livestock 
Backyard activities: Pig sales 
Total Household Income	 
New Palm 
Oil Palm Maize and Maize Total 
12 2 4 24 
24 S". 5 " 
282 8 20 
500 1,300 [,300 
[41,000 9,750 26,OOOJ76,750 
5,640	 660 [,760 
[05 280 
390 1,040 
[ 1,280 300 800 
[6,920 
[,800 4,800 
450 1,200 
3,600 
33,840	 1,010 6,290 41,[40 
107,160 8,740 . 19,110 135,610 
8,930 5,827 . 4,928 
3,600 
[07,[60 8,740 23,310 139,210 
8930 5,827 5828 
9,500 
14,235 
700 
23,035 
6,750 
168,995 
Source Wolff, C. [997. Fieldnoles. 
, In 1997 pesos unless otherwise specified 
, Includes two crops per year 
New Palm 
Item Oil Palm and Rice' Total 
Crop Area Cropped (ha) 8 . ·6 14 
Income Yield (t/ha) ··33 ·· ••• ·3 
Production (t) 264 18 
Price per t 
.. 
470 4,500 
Gross Value of Output . 124,080 81,000 205,080 
Costs 
Seed 3,000 
Fertilizer 4,560 
Pesticides 
Herbicides 840 
Labor •• ·1,920 
Transport (rental truck) ·15;840 
Field Preparation 6,000 
Maize sheller 
Palm Planting Costs 5,400 
Total Costs .28,320 15,240 43,560 
.. 
Gross Margin (value - cost) ...·95,760 65;760 161,520 
Gross margin per ha 11,970 10,%0 
Subsidy for new oil palm 5,400 
(900 pesos/ha) 
Gross Margin (value + subsidy ­ 95,760 71,160 166,920 
cost) 
Gross margin per ha 11,970 11,860 
Other Backyard activities. plantain 1,000 
Income 
PROCAMPO 6,720 
Total Household Income 174,640 
Source: Wolff, c.. 1997. Fieldnoles 
• In 1997 pesos unless otherwise specified. 
" Farmer's first time growing rice, so production data are estimates. 
0\ 
~ 
1 In July of 1997, when farmers were interviewed, US S I = 7.7 pesos. 
2 SAGAR estimates palm planting costs to be about 900 pesos per hcctare (which is equal 10 the subsidy for new 
oil palm). Since the planting process was not completed, and individual information could therefore not be 
collected, I assume that for all fanners, costs for planting oil palm amount to 900 pesos on top of the costs 
associated with planting the maize on the same land. This is less than the 1075 pesos estimated by SAGAR (sec 
Table V 15); bUI SAGAR docs not take into account thai tasks such as wceding benefit both palms and maize 
Furthermore, I subtract the value of the labor carried out by the family itself 
'( I 
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interviewed: 33 tons per hectare. As most farmers in this area, he planted his oil palm in 1990, so that it 
was close to maximum productivity in 1997. His family lives in a traditional house made from palm 
fronds; it is located on their parcela in Zone 2. They own a total of 14 hectares, half of which belongs to 
each spouse. They own another house in Tapachula, a relatively large city close to the Guatemalan border. 
For transport they have several bicycles, a horse cart, and a tractor4. The Gonzalezes are a very large 
family; they have twelve children. Of the eight daughters, four are married and have left the household. 
Four sons and four daughters live with their parents and work on the farm. They were attending school, 
but according to their father, they decided not to go anymore. According to the extensionists, Mario took 
them out of school one day to make them work full time on the farm. He is a member in the BEPASSA 
processing plant. 
As Table V.2 shows, the Gonzalezes derive almost all their income from oil palm and rice. 
According to Mario, maize is not worth growing anymore, so he will not intercrop his 6 hectares of new 
palms with maize. Instead, he will sow rice in the next season. Rice has the added advantage that it pro­
duces less shade for the palm seedlings, and thus does not slow down their growth as much as maize. He 
gave some estimates of expected rice production, which were confirmed with extensionists but seem rather 
optimistic. Overall, as high oil palms yields suggest, Mario Gonzalez seems to have been generous in esti­
mating his production, which would bias his overall income upward. Apart from the customary 900 
peso/ha subsidy for oil palm, the Gonzalez's receive PROCAMPO, a subsidy for basic food crop produc­
tion paid on a per hectare basis that was described in more detail in Chapter 3. Originally, they were 
receiving it for ten hectares of maize they were growing in 1993. Since then, however, they planted other 
crops on the land without properly notifying the PROCAMPO authorities, and their support was reduced to 
six hectares. In addition to his family's labor, Mario relies heavily on wage labor for the oil palm harvest. 
According to his projected yields and 1997 prices, Mario will receive a gross margin from rice 
production very similar to that of oil palm; it is only about one percent lower. Including new oil palm sub­
sidies, even this small difference all but disappears. Revenues from oil palm are very high, but again costs 
associated with oil palm production are much higher than those of rice production, which lowers the profit 
margin considerably. The main costs are transport, labor and fertilizer, as in the first case study. Trans­
port makes up almost two thirds of the total cost of growing oil palm. The Gonzalez family sells oil palm 
fruit to BEPASSA, of which Mario is a member. Again, the family is relatively well off, as their second 
house in the city and tractor ownership confirm. The oil palm subsidy is not essential for them either, 
making up just three percent of total income, or almost seven percent when combi~ed with PROCAMPO 
payments. 
Pablo Mendez. The Mendezes also have a large family with nine children. Five of them attend 
school, the other four work on the family farm. At the time of the interview, the family was gathered in the 
back yard of their cinder-block house in Zone 3. Pablo Mendez owns 10.5 hectares in his ejido, which he 
received in 1979. 
For transport he relies on a horse cart, or on rental trucks to take his oil palm harvest to the 
extraction plant. Since he does not belong to any cooperative, he sells to the two privately owned plants EI 
Desengaiio and La Lima. These two plants are relatively far from his fields, in Zone 1. Transport comes 
to 400 pesos for each trip with the rented truck, which equals 114 pesos per ton, or about one fourth of the 
sale price. Since he supplies all his own labor, Pablo only has transport and fertilizer costs in his oil palm 
-
business. More than two thirds of his total oil palm costs are transport costs. Pablo belongs to 
... 
ACEPALMA, an association of oil palm growers who want to request another processing plant from the 
4 It is very likely that Mario Gonzalez derives income from tractor rentals. Like most truck and tractor owners, he 
did not report this income. Therefore all income as well as all costs associated with trucks and tractors will be 
excluded from the family budgets, although I will note in the text which families own such a vehicle. 
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state, to be constructed in Zone 3, in or around Mapastepec. He hopes to be able to reduce his transport 
costs if a new processing plant is built in his zone. 
For his cash income, Pablo Mendez relies almost exclusively on oil palm, cultivated on close to 90 
percent of his land. One and a half hectares are reserved for maize production, which is used almost exclu­
sively in the household; none is sold. Apart from human consumption, maize is also used to feed the 
family's chickens, ducks and pigs. The Mendezes hardly buy any maize; they are practically self-sufficient 
in maize. Their only source of cash income apart from oil palm is mango, which they grow around the 
house. The gross margin from oil palm is almost 40 percent above that of maize. Pablo has decided that 
maize production is not worthwhile anymore, and is planning to plant another 1.5 hectares with oil palm in 
1998. 
Initially, when only one of the private processing plants existed, Pablo could not sell his fresh fruit 
bunch production and lost a couple of years' harvest, until more plants were built and demand increased. 
He says that he was confident that the plants would be built eventually, and thus decided to hang on. His 
economic situation pennitted him to wait for a few years until the plants were built. Now palms are his 
most profitable crop, and he derives most of his income from them (Table V3). Thanks to oil palm, the 
family lives quite comfortably. 
Oil Palm Farmers with Other Significant Income Sources 
This group includes four farmers~ all of them have oil palm fields and derive part of their income 
from this crop. As opposed to the first group, these four have significant sources of income besides oil 
palm farming. Income from oil palm makes up less than half the total in this group. When looking at 
Figure VI, it is striking that two of these farmers, Juan Perez and Francisco Fernandez, have much higher 
incomes than do the other two, Claudio Dominguez and Victor Vargas. I will therefore compare the two 
wealthier and the two poorer farmers in this group. 
The Two Better-offCases: Perez and Fernandez 
These two wealthier members of the group both derive a significant portion of their income from 
another farming activity; livestock in the Perez case, and plantain in the Fernandez case. 
Juan Perez. Juan Perez lives in Zone 2, in the village El Arenal which belongs to the ejido Luis 
Espinoza. His house is centrally located at the main intersection of the village; it is made of wood. A new 
brick house is on the same plot; it was begun four years ago and is almost finished. The prices of cement 
and other construction materials have risen quickly, which has delayed the construction. The new house is 
only used for an altar honoring Juan Perez's son, who died of an illness earlier in 1997. Since they have no 
other children, Juan and his wife have adopted two boys. They are teenagers and go to school; in the after­
noons and on weekends they help on the farm. His wife takes care of the house and raises 25 chickens, 6 
ducks, and 2 turkeys for eggs and own consumption. In the garden, they grow mangos and coconut for the 
household. Juan Perez is a member of the El Arenal cooperative processing plant and sells his oil palm 
fruit there. He owns a total of 10 hectares, of which 6 are planted to mature oil palms. He planted another 
hectare of oil palm in 1997, which is not intercropped with maize; the remaining three hectares are used for 
growing maize. His income sources are detailed in Table VA. Juan Perez derives most of his income from 
cattle (55 percent), which he does not keep on his own land, and oil palm (32 percent). • 
Although Juan Perez achieves a relatively low oil palm yield of 12 tons per hectare, oil palms are 
still his most profitable crop. He does not apply any fertilizer, which may be an explanation for the low 
yields. His palms are from the beginning of the 1980s, so they are in a phase where their yield should be 
declining. As the discussion on yields later on in the chapter will show, even for 17-year-old palms 12 tons 
Table VA. Farm Budget: Juan Pl!rez 
Table V.3. Farm Budget: Pablo Ml!ndez 
Item" Oil Palm Maize Total 
Crop 
Income 
Area Cropped (ha) 
Yield (tIha) 
Production (t) 
Price per t 
Gross Value or Output 
Costs 
Fertilizer 
Pesticides 
Herbicides 
Labor 
Transport (rental truck) 
Field Preparation 
Maize sheller 
Total Costs 
Gross Margin (value· cost) 
Gross margin per ha 
··9 •. ·•• ·.<1.~ 10.5 
23 ·5' 
207 ......·7.~ 
4$0 .•.• ><\300 
93,150 ···9,750 102,900 
9,810 1,050 
132 
324 
23,660 
.1,050 
33,470 2,556 36,026 
59,680 7,194 66,874 
6,631 4,796 
8,000 
74,874 
Other 
Income 
Backyard activities: Mango 
Net Farm Income 
Item" Oil Palm 
New Palm 
Maize and Maize' Total 
Crop 
Income 
Area Cropped (ha) 
Yield (t/ha) 
Production (t) 
Price per t 
Gross Value or Output 
Costs 
Seed 
Fertilizer 
Pesticides 
Herbicides 
Labor 
Transport 
Field preparation 
Maize sheller 
Palm planting costs 
Total Costs 
Gross margin (value· cost) 
Gross margin per ha 
Subsidy ror new oil palms 
(900 pesoslha) 
Gross margin (value + subsidy ­
cost) 
Gross margin per ha 
.. :~;;i~i .~ 
... 500".,3()()· 1,300 
36,oOO)1~;§oo . 2,600 
rHrHH . 
··········100·.···.··
........ .. 
li980 •. 
4t():
.:., '.. ' . 
3,84d··••••·~ ••• 
•S~76610~()t 
2,8S() . 
..... . . 
9,600 ··<7,()6Q .. 
. : . .. ... . 
. 26,400~;S40 . 
.. 4;400)1,423 
26,4<l<l .•. g~S40 
4,4<l<l1;423 
330 
70 
ioo 
180d 
240 
900 
1,820 
780 
78Q 
900 
1,680 
1,680 
II 
54,200 
18,480 
35,720 
36,620 
Other 
Income 
Animal sales 
Milk sales 
Total income rrom livestock 
28,000 
17,630 
45,630 
Total household income 82,250 
Source: Wolff, C. 1997. Fieldnotes. 
• In 1997 pesos unless otherwise specified. 
• Includes two crops per year. 
Source: Wolff, C. 1997. Fieldnotes. 
• In 1997 pesos unless otherwise specified. 
• Used for maize during one half year only, not intercropped the other half year.
 
b Includes two crops per year.
 
C Spring/summer season only.
 
d O"m tractor, cost arbitrarily assumed to be market price minus 10 percent
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per hectare are very low. The gross margin per hectare from oil palm fields is still more than three times 
that of maize. Including the subsidy for new oil palms, maize intercropped with palm compares a little 
more favorably to oil palm, but still its gross margin per hectare is below 40 percent that of oil palm. Since 
the Perez family's fields are in the same ejido as one of the processing plants, their transport costs are not 
as high as some other farmers'. Still transport remains their most important cost in oil palm production, 
followed by labor for harvesting and other tasks. 
The Perez family owns a tractor, which they normally rent out for additional income5. In 1997, 
however, the tractor broke down and required expensive repairs--a net drain on family resources. In addi­
tion to the tractor, the fact that they were able to build a new house from cinder blocks demonstrates that 
the family is not very vulnerable economically. The subsidy for their new hectare of oil palm contributes 
only very marginally to family income, and is probably not indispensable. Were they able to improve their 
oil palm yields--for example through fertilizer application, or by replanting some of their fields--the family 
could significantly improve their income, since more than half their land is planted to this crop. Improved 
extension services might be able to playa role. 
Francisco Fernandez. Francisco Fernandez lives in Zone 3, in his ejido's village, with his wife 
and a grandson who goes to school. The children have left the house. The Fernandez family keeps only ten 
chickens and ducks for family consumption. It supplements its income with the sale of mangos and pigs 
raised in the back yard (Table V.5). Francisco owns a total of 20 hectares, four of which are planted to oil 
palm. Four hectares are intercropped with plantain and cocoa; but so far only the plantain is productive. 
Another two hectares are covered with brush and trees, which are used for posts and fuel wood. The 
remaining ten hectares were being planted with new oil palm in 1997, intercropped with maize. 
Since he cannot rely on family labor, Francisco hires wage laborers to do most of the weeding, har­
vesting and other field work that he does not do himself. Labor is thus his most important cost in maize 
production, and is also an important cost in oil palm and plantain production. Francisco is a member of 
ACEPALMA, the association of producers in Zone 3 who want to build a cooperative processing plant. In 
the meantime, he sells his oil palm fruit to BEPASSA, one of the cooperative plants located in Zone 2. He 
owns a truck, which allows him to cut down on transport costs for the oil palm and other products. Trans­
port costs are still very high in both oil palm and plantain production. 
Although the yields given for oil palm and maize appear quite realistic, the value of Francisco's 
plantain crop is extremely high. It seems likely that he committed a mistake in indicating the value of pro­
duction, and the relative importance of plantain income should be viewed with some caution: The gross 
margin associated with plantain production is more than three times that of oil palm. Oil palm in tum is 
more than one third more profitable than maize on a per hectare basis. 
Apart from backyard activities and PROCAMPO subsidies, Francisco Fernandez is one of the few 
fanners who relies almost entirely on crop income. The fact that he owns a truck shows that his financial 
situation is relatively good. Although oil palm subsidies make up only about 5 percent of the household's 
income, they have helped the Fernandezes' cash flow during field preparation. Tractor owners charge con­
siderable fees for activities such as plowing, and since Francisco is planting ten hectares of oil palm at 
once, the cash outlays are quite high. Since the subsidy is paid shortly after each task is finished, it allows 
fanners to pay for hired labor and machine rentals. 
• 
5 Juan Perez was the only fanner who mentioned income from his tractor, although he insisted that in 1997 it was 
negative. For consistency, it was excluded from the fann budget. 
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Table V.5. Farm Bud~et: Francisco Fernandez 
Item 
Crop Area Cropped (ha) 
Income Yield (tIha) 
Production (t) 
Price per t 
Gross Value o( Output 
Costs 
Fertilizer 
Pesticides· 
Herbicides 
Labor 
Transport d 
Field Preparation 
Maize sheller 
Palm planting cost 
Total Costs 
Gross Mar~in (value - cost) 
Gross margin per ha 
Subsidy (or new oil palm 
(900 pesos/ha) 
Gross Mar~in (value + subsidy· cost) 
Gross margin per ha 
Other Backyard activities: 
Income Mango 
Pig sales 
PROCAMPO 
Total Household Income 
New Palm 
Oil Palm and Maize Plantain" Total 
4 10 4 
21 6 b 23 
8{ 60 92 
37,:~ 1,400 1000-1500· ..84,000 108,000 229,800 
2,104 
ii~:~ 640 1,800 .1,600 2,~oQ 2,400 
.·<9;500 
···6,000 
. • ··9,000 
6,704· 35,320 4,640 46,664 
31,096 .48,680 103,360 183,136 
·7,774 4,868 25,840 
.9,000 
31,096 57,680 103,360 192,136 
7,774 5,768 25,840 
2,550 
900 
1,650 
3,920 
198,606 
Source: Wolff, C. 1997. Fleldnotes. 
• In 1997 pesos unless otherwise specified. 
" Intercropped with cocoa, which is not producing yet 
b Includes two crops per year. 
C Depending on the season. 
d Gasoline cost for own truck, estimated by the farmer. 
The Lower Income Cases: Dominguez and Vargas 
These two fanners each have two hectares of oil palm, a relatively small area compared to the 
other oil palm producers. Apart from other crops, both their families rely on wage labor as a significant 
source of income. They are the only two oil palm fanners whose families regularly engage in wage labor at 
all. 
Victor Vargas. The Vargas household lives relatively far from the main road in Zone 3; it con­
sists of 7 children and Victor and his wife. Two of the sons work at the oil palm nursery, three help on the 
fann, and the remaining two are in school. In the backyard, the family raises 15 chickens, and around six 
pigs per year which they sell. They also have some fruit trees for their own consumption. The Vargas 
family is building a new house from cinder blocks, and owns a horse cart. The family also owns four 
horses, 20 sheep, eight cows and six calves. They used to own more cows, but these had recently been 
• 
.. 
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stolen at the time of the interview. Victor Vargas is trying to increase his herds, and is therefore not selling 
any cows or sheep in 1997. 
Victor initially owned ten hectares in his ejido, but sold three and bought another six; so now his 
total land area amounts to 13 hectares. Four hectares are used for pasture, the rest are cropped as can be 
seen in Table V.6. Victor is not a member in the cooperative plants, but sells to BEPASSA, one of the 
cooperatives. The Vargases' income is very diversified. Oil palms are the single most important source of 
income. They account for one fifth of the total, but are grown on only 15 percent of the land. Gross 
margins per hectare from oil palm are around twice those of maize, even when subsidies for new palms are 
considered. Off farm work is second in importance, around one fourth of total income. Other sources 
include maize intercropped with new palm, mango, milk and pig sales, PROCAMPO subsidies for maize, 
and subsidies for new oil palms. Since the Vargas family relies exclusively on family labor, their 
production costs in cash are relatively low. In oil palm, their main cost is transport, while in maize it is 
field preparation (machinery rental) and fertilizer. 
Table V.6. Farm Budget: Victor Vargas 
Item· Oil Palm 
Crop Area Cropped (ha) 2 
Income Yield (tIha) 25 
Production (t) 50 
Price per t 450 
Gross Value of Output 22.500 .. 
.. 
Costs 
500Fertilizer 
Pesticides 
Herbicides 
Labor 
Transport 3,750 
Field Preparation 
Maize sheller 
Palm planting cost 
Total Costs 4,250 
Gross Margin (value - cost) 18,250 
Gross margin per ha 9,125 
Subsidy for new oil palm 
(900 pesoslha) 
Gross Margin (value + subsidy - cost) 18,250 
Gross margin per ha 9,125 
Other Cow sales 
Income Milk sales 
Cost 
Total income from livestock 
Backyard activities: Pig sales 
orr farm work 
PROCAMPO 
Total household income 
Source: Wolff, C. 1997. Fie/dnoles. 
• In 1997 pesos unless otherwise specified 
• Inc! udes two crops per year. 
b Mango trees planted on pasture 
New Palm 
and Maize Manl!o 
3 4 b 
.5" 
... 15 ••.. 
1.300.·· •• 
19;5()o .•••.. 
.. .. 2,000 
Total 
13 
44,000 
. 
.... 
...... 
2,160 
696 
3.000 
1;S00 
... 2,700 . 
10,056 14,306 
9,444 
3,148 
2,000 
500 
29,694 
2,700 
12,144 
4,048 
2,000 
500 
32,394 
0 
3,300 
1,295 
2,005 
2,700 
-15,600 
3,360 
56,059 
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In 1990, Victor had initially planted seven hectares of oil palm. As there was nowhere to sell the 
fruit, he felled the palms on more than four hectares in 1994, although this is very costly and requires hard 
work. He could not have some of his land not produce any income. Some additional palms died for lack of 
care, and in 1997 only two hectares remained of the initial seven. Since at that time oil palm had become 
very profitable, he decided to plant another three hectares. His example demonstrates that while some 
farmers were so well off that they could afford to have unproductive fields for a few years, others could not 
afford this. Apart from highlighting the importance of a steady demand for their production, Victor 
Vargas's story shows the possibility that some of the poorer farmers may not be able to survive the first 
few years, when maize yields start to decrease on oil palm fields, but palms are not yielding much yet. 
According to SAGAR's and my own more optimistic yield projections, this period should be short, as the 
second half of this chapter will show. 
Claudio Dominguez. (Table V.7) Claudio is an older ejidatario in Zone 2, with two sons, four 
daughters, and two grandchildren. His wife died, and all the children moved away except for the two sons. 
One of them lives close by with his family. He helps his father on the farm, and they split the income from 
it. The other son recently returned from the city to live with his father; his wage income accounts for more 
than one fifth of total family income. He works as a day laborer at a nearby papaya plantation. Claudio 
Dominguez's house is old and made of wood; there are no chickens or other animals in the backyard, only 
some coconut and other fruit trees. He explained that since his wife died, no one could take care of the 
animals. While most families prepare their own tortillas from own or purchased maize, Claudio buys tor­
tillas. Neither he nor his son cook; housework seems to be strictly women's work that Claudio and his son 
will not take up even when it seems costly not to do so. Overall, his household made a poor and neglected 
impression, although Claudio seemed to be a very friendly and warm person who shared fresh grilled maize 
with the extensionists and me. The lack of backyard activities and household production of tortillas and 
other food items seems to have a significant effect on household welfare. 
The Dominguez family owns only four hectares of land that can be cultivated, and part of a hillside 
that is not arable land. Some cedro trees grow on that hillside, but because of deforestation legislation, they 
cannot be harvested. There are also about 60 mango trees on that land; they are grown under a type of 
contract which stipulates that the middleman pays for all inputs and has the right to purchase the entire 
harvest. 
The arable land is very diversified in its use, with small areas of oil palm, maize, and cocoa. The 
gross margin from cocoa appears very high at more than three times oil palm margins, which may be partly 
due to an underestimation of the land area devoted to the crop. Oil palm in tum is almost 50 percent more 
profitable than maize. The Dominguez family produces with very low cost; their only expenses are for fer­
tilizer, and transport in the case of oil palm. Their oil palm and maize yields are both very low, especially 
when considering that their palms are from the early 1990s, and should have been reaching their most 
productive phase by 1997. This may partly be due to low soil fertility on their rather marginal land. 
Claudio Dominguez is a member of the cooperative processing plant BEPASSA, where he sells his 
oil palm harvest. Before 1996, he lost three years' oil palm harvest because the private plant La Lima was 
saturated with raw materials and was not buying. Now profits from oil palm are good, and he is planning 
to expand his oil palm area in 1998. He plans to replace the maize, which is not very profitable. He will 
•however have to work on the access road to the additional land, it was not passable in 1997. Claudio is an 
example of a farmer who in 1997 believes in oil palm, although he had bad experiences with it in the past. 
New Oil Palm Farmers 
The five farmers in this group participate in the 1997 SAGAR project to plant part of their land 
with oil palm; they do not have any mature oil palm fields. Apart from this similarity, they are a very 
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Table V.7. Fann Budget: Oaudio Dominguez 
Item" Oil Palm Maize Mango Cocoa Total 
Crop 
Income 
Area Cropped (ha) 
Yield (tIha) 
Production (t) 
Price per t 
Gross Value of Output 
Costs 
Fertilizer 
Pesticides 
Herbicides 
Labor 
Transport 
Field Preparation 
Maize sheller 
Total Costs 
Gross Margin (value - cost) 
Gross margin per ha 
'2.430 
3;534 
8,616 
4,308 
2 
.. 13.5 
27 
450 
1~.t50 
'.'1,104 
'1;410 Ob 264 
4,440 5500 7,736 
2,%0 15,472 
• 1,4l() '.' .. 
.<•••.. } ...•.•• 
.'. ·.<184 
80 
5,208 
26,292 
4+hillside 
26,000 
Other 
Income 
OfT farm work 
PROCAMPO 
7,800 
1,680 
Net Farm Income 35,772 
Source: Wolff, C. 1997. Fleldnotes. 
• In 1997 pesos unless otherwise specified.
 
, Includes two crops per year.
 
b Buyer pays for all inputs.
 
Table V.8. Fann Budget: Eduardo Escobar 
Item" Maize Total 
Crop Area Cropped (ha) 3 6 
Income Yield (tIha) 3'
 
Production (t)
 9 ..............•..•........... ." 
Price per t . 'pOO 
Gross Value of Output • 0,700 •••.••.......'.,p..•. '.1J\J 23,400
 
Costs
 
Fertilizer
 
Pesticides
 .. ·.·.420
 
Herbicides
 ,1,080 
Labor 1;370 1 , 
Transport 
Field Preparation 1,800 
Maize sheller 1,220 
Palm planting cost 
Total Costs 5,890 .'. 8,590 14,480 
Gross Margin (value - cost) 5.810 3.110 8,920 
Gross margin per ha 1,936 1,037 -

Subsidy for new oil palm '.2,700 
(900 pesosIha) 
Gross Margin (value + subsidy - cost) 5,810 5,810 11,620 
Gross mar in r ha 1,936 1,937 
Total household income 11,620 
Source: Wolff, C. 1997. Fieldnotes. 
• In 1997 pesos unless otherwise specified 
, Includes two crops per year. 
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diverse group of fanners. Two of them are among the poorest fanners interviewed; for them oil palms 
represent the chance to grow a profitable cash crop that will become a secure income source. The next two 
fanners are relatively wealthy; they are replacing cattle or other cash crops with oil palm. The last 
example, Manuel Martinez, is a special case. He had planted part of his land with oil palm, destroyed the 
palms when they were not profitable, and is replanting oil palm in 1997. In the following, I analyze each 
fanner's budget and compare their reasons for switching to oil palm. 
From Subsistence to Cash Crop Production 
These are the only two fanners for whom production for subsistence makes up a significant part of 
total production in 1997. They had the lowest incomes of all fanners interviewed, derived mainly from 
maize. Both are very hardworking, and hope to achieve a higher and more secure income through oil palm. 
Their income is so low that they may face trouble making ends meet until palms start to generate income. 
Eduardo Escobar. In 1997, Eduardo Escobar was 77 years old; he had received his parcela five 
years earlier in Zone 2. Apart from himself, his household consists only of his young wife and an adopted 
four year old son. From a previous marriage, he has 13 children, all of whom have moved away to other 
areas or to the cities. He lives in his ejido's village, in a house he claims is made out of "straw", which 
probably means bamboo and wood. For transport he has a little horse cart; his horse's foal follows it 
around everywhere. The family also produces fruit for their own consumption, as well as 30 chickens and 
two pigs. 
On his six hectares he grows maize; three hectares are intercropped with oil palms. Because of his 
age, and since he cannot use family labor, Eduardo Escobar relies heavily on hired labor. Therefore, apart 
from field preparation, labor is his highest cost. He also has to spend a lot on herbicides since he cannot 
weed manually. His margins per hectare are very low, which is a result of a combination of low maize 
yields and high costs. In the past, he has grown rice, so oil palm is not his first cash crop. His fields are 
exceptionally well taken care of, with clean, weed-free circles around each palm. He plans to intercrop the 
palms with sesame in the dry season of 1998 because it is more profitable than maize. 
Eduardo sells about half of the maize harvest (Table V.8) to traders, or "coyotes", the rest is con­
sumed at home. His cash income is thus very limited, but he only has to buy maize when his harvest fails. 
Otherwise the family is self-sufficient in maize. They initially did not want to plant oil palm; but according 
to Eduardo he decided to participate in the project because he works too hard, and needs some secure 
income source that will allow him to hire wage labor. If all goes well, he plans to buy another six hectares 
of land. He had begun to apply for credit in 1997, which proved extremely difficult. He may rent land in 
the future to generate some additional income during the palms' gestation period. Although he refused to 
give information on the subject, it seems likely that at least some of his numerous children help Eduardo 
Escobar out economically in times of need. 
He is one of the few ejidatarios I spoke with for whom the project subsidy for new oil palm is a 
great help: it constitutes almost 20 percent of his income. Ifhe relies solely on his farm income to support 
his family, this subsidy is very necessary for Eduardo, and he may face some difficult times in the period 
after the subsidy is discontinued, and before oil palm income makes up for the difference. The subsidy is 
only planned for two years, but in the third year maize yields are likely to decline while oil palm yields may 
­
not be very high yet. 
.. 
Rosa Ramirez. The Rarnirezes' family economy is very complex and interwoven. Rosa's father 
Daniel Ramirez is an ejidatario in the Luis Espinoza ejido in Zone I, where the El Arenal processing plant 
is located. There are two villages on the ejido, one called El Arenal, like the plant, the other Luis Espinoza, 
like the ejido. There are conflicts over membership in the plant cooperative; the inhabitants of Luis 
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Espinoza feel people from El ArenaI discriminate unfairly against them by not admitting them as coopera­
tive members. Since Daniel Ramirez is getting older, he has divided his 20 hectares among four of his 
children. He lives with one of his sons; and there is a lot of cooperation and exchange between family 
members. The family land includes 14 hectares of oil palm, the production of which they sell to El Arenal, 
or to La Lima. El Arenal gives priority to members' production, and often refuses to buy fruit when its 
capacity is fulfilled by members' production. Daniel furthermore feels it is unfair that El Arenal pays a 25 
percent higher price for members' fresh fruit bunches, and accuses El Arenal of weighing incorrectly and 
therefore underpaying. Apart from oil palm, he owns 26 cows. 
Rosa has only two hectares; she is 40 years old and has three daughters who are in school, and a 
20-year-old son who works on the land. He also engages in wage work on Rosa's brother's farm. Rosa's 
husband has left the household, so she has to raise her children with only her father's help. The family 
raises a large number of birds in the yard: about 20 chickens and 40 chicks, two geese, and four local 
birds, which they sell only infrequently. They also have coconuts, and receive mangos from Daniel. 
On her land Rosa has planted oil palm intercropped with maize. She also rents 0.9 hectares from a 
pequeno propietario on which she grows only maize. All her production is for home consumption. Rosa's 
income sources are described in Table V.9. Apart from maize production, her main income sources are the 
son's wage work and pig sales. On average, they sell about seven pigs during a year. Rosa sometimes 
earns extra money by making dresses for women in the village; she also makes a lot of the family's own 
clothing to save money. Her maize yields are very low; according to Rosa the land was exhausted by the 
tobacco she grew before. Since the family does all the work itself, and does not use a lot of inputs, their 
production costs are relatively low as well. Still, the oil palm subsidy has a significant impact on gross 
margins per hectare of maize production. The subsidy accounts for more than 10 percent of household 
mcome. 
Rosa hopes to improve her income in the future. She has invested in a cow and a calf, and soon a 
second calf will be born. She wants to start a herd. Her maize field is not very productive anymore, as 
was mentioned above. The soil is exhausted and there are a lot of pests. Before, they grew tobacco on 
contract for the La Modema tobacco company, which exhausted the soil. La Modema stopped contracting 
with smallholders and rented land to produce its own tobacco. In the future, Rosa will have to rent land to 
survive until palms start to produce; maybe she will be able to buy some. Rosa's father also helps out eco­
nomically; for example he helped her build a new cinder-block house where she lives with her children. 
She, like Eduardo Escobar, is relatively dependent on continued support from the project in the form of 
subsidies, or on support from her family. 
Cattle and Oil Palm 
Although their income levels are fairly different, these two farmers have one thing in common: one 
of their main income sources is cattle. While Mauricio Gomez is reluctant to give up the more prestigious 
role of cattle farmer to switch to oil palm, Martin Paz is eager to do so. 
Mauricio Gomez. Mauricio Gomez is another example of the complex economic intra-family 
connections in the area. He is an ejidatario in Zone 3, with seven hectares, in addition to which he rents 
four hectares. Mauricio lives in a cinder-block house, and owns four bicycles and an ox cart. He has six 
children, three of which are still in school. They all help on the farm, and one works with his father full 
time. Another son has left to the United States. This son received a plot ofland of 1.5 hectares in the new 
ejido La Esperanza, located in Zone 2. Mauricio takes care of his son's land in his absence. The ejidata­
rios at La Esperanza have received a big plot of land, which is subdivided into individual parcelas. They 
have however decided to plant oil palm on the entire land, without limit between individual fields. 
• 
.. 
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Table V.9. Farm Budget: Rosa Ramirez 
Total 
Crop Area Cropped (ha) 
Item· 
2.9 
Income	 Yield (tIha) 
Production (t) 
Price per t 
Gross Value of Output 10,179 
Costs
 
Fertilizer
 
Pesticides
 
Herbicides
 
Labor
 
Transport
 
Field Preparation
 
Maize sheller
 
Palm planting cost
 
Total Costs
 5,321 
4,858 
Gross Margin per ha 
Gross Margin (value - cost) 
Subsidy for new oil palm
 
(900 pesosIha)
 
Gross Margin (value + subsidy - cost) .2.066< 6.658 
Gross Margin per ha 2,296 
Other Backyard activities: pig sales 3.150 
Income
 
orr farm work
 7.800 
240Sewing 
17.848Total household income 
. ·4;592 
2,296 
Source: Wolff, C. 1997. Fieldnotes. 
• In 1997 pesos unless otherwise specified 
• Includes two crops per year. 
The Gomez family's income sources are detailed in Table V.IO. The single most important source 
of income is cattle, although all crops together account for more than cattle income. At the time of the 
interview, the milk price was low, and according to Mauricio it was not worth milking the cows. At other 
times it is likely that the family derives considerable income from milk sales. The cattle are kept on seven 
hectares of pasture, which is also planted with mango and maraiion6 trees. Four hectares are dedicated to 
maize, all of which Mauricio sells to the tortilla store. Although on his own land Mauricio is not planning 
on replacing pasture or maize with oil palm, he recognizes the practicality of oil palms for his son's land, 
which is relatively far from his own fann. The palms take care of themselves, he says. Owning cattle has 
a special value for him beyond its profitability; in the region it is a source of status. 
• 
Looking at gross margins per hectare, first ofall it is striking that Mauricio is still losing money on 
his rnaraiion trees. Since there is only a single buyer for the product, which was still very new in 1997, the 
~. 
6 Marai\6n is a tree similar to mango. Its fruit has a pit which contains oil that can be e>.1racted for industrial uses. 
A marai'i6n program promoted the crop, but failed to provide a processing facility. The crop was thus only starting 
to produce revenue in 1997, as an extraction plant had been built in Tapachula. 
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Table V.IO. Farm Budget: Mauricio Gomez 
Item· 
Crop Area Cropped (ha) 
Income Yield (tIha)
 
Production (t)
 
Price per t
 
Gross Value of Output
 
Costs
 
Fertilizer
 
Pesticides
 
Herbicides
 
Labor
 
Transport
 
Field Preparation
 
Maize sheller
 
Palm planting cost
 
Total Costs
 
Gross Margin (value - cost) 
Gross margin per ha 
Subsidy for new oil palms 
(900 pesoslha) 
Gross Margin (value + subsidy· cost) 
Gross margin per ha 
Cow sales 
Income	 Milk sales 
Cost 
Total income from livestock 
Other 
Backyard activities: Pig sales 
II 
Total household income I 
Source:	 Wolff, C 1997, Fle/dnofes. 
• In 1997 pesos unless otherwise specified 
, Includes two crops per year. 
b On pasture. 
Maize 
4 
6" 
24 
1,300 
31;200 
New Palm 
and Maize 
1.5 
3 < 
6 
1;300 
7;800 
Maranon 
2 b 
125 kg 
250 kg 
3.501kg 
875 
Manl!o 
6Otrees~ 
11 
varies 
14,000 
Total 
12.5 
53,875 
" 
. 2,640 
2,000 
'5,280, 
' 2,400 
5;200 
1,920 
19,440 
" 
,660 
'Soo 
' "1~32b 
·',600' 
1,300 
480 
1,350 
6,210 
650 
I,Soo 
80 
2,230 
390 
9,600 
9,990 37,870 
11,760 
2,940 
1,590 
1,060 
-1,355 
-678 
4,010 16,005 
1,350 
11,760 
2,940 
2,940 
1,960 
-1,355 
-678 
4,010 17,355 
15,000 
0 
136 
14,864 
4,500 
36,719 
, Only one crop during 1997/98; the farmers in La Esperanza missed the planting season for maize 
The Gomez family's income sources are detailed in Table V.IO. The single most important source 
of income is cattle, although all crops together account for more than cattle income. At the time of the 
interview, the milk price was low, and according to Mauricio it was not worth milking the cows. At other 
times it is likely that the family derives considerable income from milk sales. The cattle are kept on seven 
hectares of pasture, which is also planted with mango and marafion6 trees. Four hectares are dedicated to 
maize~ all of which Mauricio sells to the tortilla store. Although on his 0\\11 land Mauricio is not planning 
on replacing pasture or maize with oil palm, he recognizes the practicality of oil palms for his son's land, • 
which is relatively far from his 0\\11 farm. The palms take care of themselves, he says. Ov.nmg cattle has a 
special value for him beyond its profitability; in the region it is a source of status. 
Maraiion is a tree similar to mango. Its fruit has a pit which contains oil that can be ex1racted for industrial 
uses. A marai\on program promoted the crop, but failed to provide a processing facility. The crop was thus only 
starting to produce revenue in 1997, as an extraction plant had been built in Tapachula. 
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Looking at gross margins per hectare, first of all it is striking that Mauricio is still losing money on 
his marafi6n trees. Since there is only a single buyer for the product, which was still very new in 1997, the 
information on prices and costs may not be very accurate. Because they had to prepare the land for oil 
palm by removing trunks, plowing and so forth, the farmers at La Esperanza missed the planting season for 
maize, and will only harvest one maize crop during 1997/98. This leads to a significant income loss. Since 
they only have 1.5 hectares, all these farmers have other income sources, such as wage labor in the US in 
the case of Mauricio's son. For these farmers as well the subsidy can be a very important support to help 
them bear oil palm planting costs. 
Martin Paz. This farmer has a large cinder-block house in Zone 3 with relatively new living room 
furniture. Furniture is a rarity in the area; as are separate living and bedrooms in the houses. Both are 
signs of wealth, as is the pickup truck Martin owns. The family includes four sons and three daughters. 
Only one son remains in the household and works the farm with his father. The pazes' farm includes 30 
hectares of land; Martin, his wife and his son each own ten hectares. The family also owns a pickup truck. 
Until 1997 all of the pazes' land was in pasture. They own 40 cows and sell both milk and cows. The 
family also raises 30 to 40 chickens for their own use, and two pigs. They grow some mangos, which they 
occasionally sell. 
In 1997 Martin paz decided to plant half of his land with oil palms; he will probably have to sell 
some cows since his pasture area will be reduced. The oil palm land is intercropped with maize. Martin 
insists that maize is not a profitable crop for him, which is confirmed by the low margin per hectare he 
achieves. He explains that he expects higher returns from oil palm than he gets from cattle. A comparison 
between returns from cattle and oil palm is difficult and will be discussed in more detail in the following 
summary. Table V.ll shows the Pazes' farm budget. Since most of his income is from cattle, Martin will 
most probably be able to support himself during the oil palm's gestation period, even if he did not receive 
the subsidy. 
A Special Case: Manuel Martinez 
This farmer lives in Zone 2, where he has ten hectares in the ejido Luis Espinoza. He has two 
daughters and four sons. One is still in elementary school, three have moved to Mexico City, one to Tuxtla 
Gutierrez, and one works with Manuel on the farm. His wife has left him, and is currently staying with one 
of her children in Mexico City. He is thus one of the few farmers who buys tortillas instead of preparing 
them at home. His children take care of the family's 12 chickens. They also have a few coconut and 
avocado trees in the garden, and sell some mangos. 
Manuel has several different income sources (shown in Table V.12), including farm and non-farm 
income. His farm income amounts to only about 60 percent of the total. The rest consists of income from 
fishing, and some mango sales. Manuel and his adult son go fishing in the estuary by the coast about three 
times per week to supplement the household's income. Several farmers mentioned that before cultivating 
oil palm, they had to engage in fishing as well, but that they stopped when their farm income rose high 
enough. Fishing thus does not seem to be a popular way to earn one's living. In addition, Manuel and his 
son occasionally engage in wage labor when there is an opportunity, although he could not indicate how 
often. Pressed to give an estimate, he gave the figure of 6 to 12 days per year per person, which would 
-

only come to an additional 300 to 600 pesos. 
On his ten hectares, Manuel grows maize and plantain, and has planted seven hectares of oil palm. 
His plantain achieve a very high margin per hectare, although he does not have any costs (he harvests him­
self). The figures on plantain production may not be too reliable. His maize yields are about average, but 
he missed the planting season for maize on his oil palm fields. 
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Table V.ll. Farm Budget: Martin Paz Table V.12. Fann Budget: Manuel Martinez 
Source: WoltT, C. 1997. Fieldnotes. 
• In 1997 pesos unless otherwise specified. 
a Includes two crops per year. 
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Manuel had already planted four hectares of oil palm in 1992/93. He did not officially participate 
in the early 1990's oil palm project, but rather planted the seedlings that were left over when the project 
ended. Therefore he received no support, in credit, technical assistance, or inputs. A year later he had to 
destroy his oil palms because he needed income, and he planted tobacco. Costs associated with tobacco 
production were prohibitive and prices were low, so he abandoned tobacco as well, and is now returning to 
oil palm. He explains that the members ofhis ejido's extraction plant (El Arenal) seem very happy with the 
crop. He is not intercropping his new palms with maize because that way they grow faster, and because he 
missed the planting season for maize. His other two hectares of maize were not doing well; he was having 
trouble with insects, but very optimistically still expected to harvest two tons per hectare. 
While his story seems like a string of bad luck, the extensionists offered another explanation. As 
many fanners in the area, Manuel has been struggling with alcohol problems, and related debts. His rela­
tively high income level, as shown in his budget in Table V.12 does not agree with his relatively poor 
appearance and need to engage in wage labor and fishing, which usually only the poorest fanners do. 
Alcoholism and the need to pay back debts are a possible explanation for these inconsistencies, and for 
other contradictions in his interview. Most fanners in the area drink quite heavily as I witnessed on the 
days when they went into town to cash their support checks from the palm oil program. There is also defi­
nitely social pressure involved; drinking and buying drinks for one's friends seems to be an important com­
ponent of social interaction and a source of status. 
Pequeftos Propietarios 
Only two of the pequeiios propietarios I spoke to managed their own fanns, as opposed to the 
absentee landowners who put administrators in charge of most of the larger fanns. Luis Piiia and Pepe 
Carretero have very little in common, except that they are participating in the oil palm project in 1997. The 
most obvious difference between them is the size of their land: whereas Luis Piiia owns more than 100 
hectares, Pepe Carretero owns 24 hectares, less than some ejidatario families. The distinction between eji­
datarios and pequeiios propietarios is thus somewhat artificial. 
Pepe Carretero. (Table V.B). This fanner owns a very nice large house in Acapetahua, and his 
24 hectares are close by in Zone 2. He has two children; the son drives a truck; the daughter has studied 
computer science and works at the PAPA headquarters in Escuintla. She is married, has a young son, and 
is thinking about moving to Mexico City of the US, where she would have better career chances. Both 
children are fairly 
independent and will not be included in the family's budget. Pepe Carretero's main income source is cattle; 
he owns 40 cows and 17 calves. 
He also has 13 hectares planted with oil palm since 1991. Initially he had planted 16 hectares, but 
rodents destroyed three hectares. During about two years he lost his oil palm harvest because there was 
nowhere to sell, but now he is a member of BEPASSA, and appreciates the value of oil palm. During the 
bad years he mistreated his plantations, for example letting cattle graze between the palms, which is one of 
the reasons for his low yields. He also does not apply any fertilizer, probably because he is not aware of 
the potential yield increase due to fertilizer use. His low yields are partly compensated by low production 
costs, and margins per hectare are not extremely low. The main cost in oil palm production is labor for 
-
harvesting and cleaning7. Transport cost with his own truck are relatively low. Pepe Carretero is planting 
... 
another seven hectares of oil palm in 1997, which he does not intercrop so the palms can grow quickly. 
7 Cleaning is a literal translation of "limpiar". Fanners cut the weeds that grow around oil palms, usually with a 
machete. 
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These palms he plans to treat better, to achieve higher yields. His relatively high standard of living shows 
that he could survive without the subsidy. 
Pepe Carretero is convinced that oil palms are more profitable than cattle. The price of milk falls 
considerably in the rainy season, and cattle theft is a great risk. Some farmers are thinking about asking 
for credit to build a pasteurization plant; others favor a plan to bring a Nestle plant to the area. With his 
24 hectares, Pepe feels he cannot have a profitable cattle farm. He would have to "industrialize", investing 
in infrastructure, feed and other inputs. That is a considerable investment, and he may not be able to 
compete with people who have much larger cattle farms. Oil palm has the advantage that it produces a 
secure and steady income stream. The disadvantage is the great dependence of oil palm farmers on the 
processing industry. Pepe sees potential problems with palm diseases, especially if many people begin to 
grow the crop. Research and extension services are thus essential. 
Luis Pina. Luis' farm is on a much larger scale than any of the other farms included in this 
survey. The Piiia family owns one house on the farm and another one in Escuintla. Luis owns a total of 
109.5 ha in Zone 2, and is planting 40 hectares of oil palm in 1997, which he does not intercrop8. In 1998 
he is planning to plant another 55 hectares. His other income sources are about 21 hectares of maize, 
produced with high input use and thus higher yields and profitability than on the smaller farms, and about 
115 heads of cattle. Table V.14 shows their relative importance in the family's budget. Luis Perez also 
mentioned cattle theft as a reason for wanting to switch to oil palm. To avoid having to sell his cattle 
because of reduced pasture area, he will try to build stables and convert his ranch to more intensive cattle 
production. 
Luis Pii'ia achieves the highest maize yields of any farmer in this study. He also has access to his 
own tractor, fertilizer, sufficient labor, and does not suffer from pest problems. His margins per hectare 
from maize production are thus extremely high. Since his income is very high, Luis does not depend heav­
ily on the oil palm subsidy, although it amounts to more than 10 percent of his total income. For him, 
farming is a very commercial, large-scale activity; and he would be able to bear the costs for an investment. 
Because he can use his land as collateral, for him access to credit is also not such a problem as for 
ejidatarios. 
Conclusions from the Case Studies 
The case studies show that overall, oil palm is a profitable crop for the farmers who grow it. There 
are several factors affecting profitability at a given point in time, including yields and costs. These factors 
will be discussed in some detail below. The farm budgets also allow a comparison of the gross margins per 
hectare of different crops with that of oil palm. Finally, although they may be biased and not reflect farm­
ers' income with a high degree of accuracy, the case studies give an idea of farmers' overall economic 
situation, and therefore allow an evaluation ofhow necessary the project's subsidies for new oil palms are. 
Figure V.2 shows the oil palm farmers' yields, costs and gross margins per hectare, it allows easy 
comparisons. 
Oil Palm Yields 
Oil palm yields depend on several things, some of which are not directly under the farmer's control: 
soil fertility, drainage, and weather. The age of the palms also plays a significant role, as yield projections ­
in section C of this chapter will show. The palms planted at the beginning of the 1990s were beginning to 
reach mature yields in 1997, although the timing and level of maximum yields depends on the early care 
given to the palms. Those farmers who had the time, resources and foresight to fertilize their palms, keep 
8 Although farmers such as Luis are still called "pequeno propietario", their farms are anything but small. 
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the fields weed-free and protected from cattle are harvesting much more than those who did not take such 
good care of their palms initially. 
The case studies include eight farmers who already produce oil palms. As Figure V.2a shows, 
their yields vary considerably, between a high of 33 tons per hectare, and a low of 12 tons per hectare. The 
farmers specializing in oil palm (Garcia, Mendez, Gonzalez) all achieve relatively high yields. This is in 
part because they had the confidence that oil palms would become profitable, even when demand and prices 
were very low; they trusted that processing plants would be built. These farmers also had the resources to 
sustain their families in those initial years; their relatively large and/or fertile parcelas had allowed them to 
accumulate enough resources to survive a few bad years. Therefore they took better care of their palms 
than did those who thought they would never be profitable, which in 1997 was paying off through higher 
yields. 
The group of oil palm farmers with other income sources includes very different yield levels. 
When initially demand for oil palm fruit was very low, many neglected their oil palm fields and concen­
trated on other crops. This delays the growth of the palms, and reduces yield. Some, such as Pepe 
Carretero, let their cattle graze between the palms. When the palms are relatively short, cows eat the palm 
fronds, which slows their growth (and is nutritionally not very valuable for cows). These farmers were 
experiencing much lower yields in 1997. Most had improved their care since they realized palms were 
quite valuable after all, applying fertilizer and cleaning regularly, for example Claudio Dominguez. 
The new oil palm farmers' yields will thus depend critically not only on the technical assistance 
and information they receive from extensionists about growing oil palm, but also on the time and money 
they can afford to spend taking care of their oil palms. The project's subsidy is designed to cover planting 
costs during the first year, and maintenance costs during the second year. It could thus allow poorer farm­
ers to invest more into the care of their palms, which would permit them to achieve higher yields later on. 
When comparing farmers budgets, it becomes clear that the two major costs in oil palm production 
are labor and transport to the processing plant. Some farmers also spend on fertilizer, but those costs tend 
to be much lower. As Figure V.2b shows, transport costs tend to be extremely high, between almost half 
and 90 percent of total costs. They often amount to one fourth of the value of production. Since the 
processing plants are clustered in Zones I and 2, some farmers live relatively far from the plants. Often the 
access roads to the farmers' parcelas are barely passable, which further raises transport costs. 
In general, the laborers who harvest the palm fruit take them out to the road, either on wheel­
barrows or on ox carts, and trucks come to pick them up from the field and take them to the processing 
plant, where they are weighed. Since the trucks are so expensive, farmers harvest only once every two 
weeks even in peak production months, although weekly harvesting would be optimal to ensure the right 
degree of ripeness. Farmers do not cooperate, for example to rent one truck for several farmers. It is sur­
prising that even the cooperative plants do not own a truck or organize a lower-eost transport system. 
Fresh fruit bunches could be weighed on the truck instead of at the plant, and one truck could pick up 
several farmers' harvests. When asked about it, both plant managers and farmers explained the problem 
was a lack oftrust; each wanted to take his production to the plant to insure correct weighing. 
­
In the future, it may be possible to organize collection centers in the ejido villages or at some other 
point, where scales could be installed to weigh the fruit. Cooperatively owned or private trucks could then 
transport the fruit to the plants, and several farmers could share the fare. Thus they could harvest more 
frequently, even if their production is not sufficient to fill a truck. It does not seem likely that farmers will 
organize without some coordination by plant managers or project personnel. 
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Figure V.2. Conclusions from Farm Budgets 
The second highest cost in oil palm production is labor. Most fanners hire wage labor, at least for 
the harvest. Using family labor is cheaper, and it is extensively used for cleaning. Harvesting is very hard 
physical work that requires substantial skill, it is thus usually not carried out by children, women, or older 
ejidatarios. The high value of oil palm production has increased the opportunity cost of on-fann family 
labor, and few established oil palm fanners engage in wage work, and almost all of them hire labor on a 
regular basis. The advantage of oil palm is that it requires relatively constant labor input around the year, 
so that fanners are not dependent on expensive labor during peak seasons, but can engage in long-term 
agreements. This also bl?Defits wage laborers since it reduces insecurity. Since landless laborers are rela­
tivelyabundant, labor costs are not expected to rise significantly. 
Gross Margins per hectare 
The returns from one hectare of oil palm compare favorably to the returns from most other crops. 
Naturally, gross margins vary with yields and costs, as can be seen in Figure V.2c. Claudio Dominguez 
has the lowest returns, around 4,250 pesos per hectare. The farmers who achieve the highest yields also 
receive the highest returns from their oil palm, up to almost 12,000 pesos per hectare in the case of Mario 
Gonzalez. Many farmers receive about 8,000 pesos per hectare of oil palm. In most cases farmers grow 
maize as well as oil palm. Maize, especially when grown with low input use, is not very profitable in the 
area. Most farmers grow local varieties that are lower-yielding than improved varieties because the 
improved varieties are not well adapted to the climates and soils of the Soconusco. Since maize used to be 
heavily subsidized, many farmers are used to growing it. It has the additional advantage that as a food 
crop, marketing risk is relatively low because people could consume their own maize. Since the marketing 
risk for oil palm is relatively low since new processing plants have expanded demand, and since maize sub­
sidies have been reduced, many farmers are giving up maize in favor of oil palm because it is more 
profitable. 
Other farmers are making the transition from cattle to oil palm farming. It is difficult to calculate 
a return per hectare of cattle land since many farmers exchange favors such as grazing cattle on harvested 
fields without assigning monetary prices. Furthermore, cattle income is not steady; farmers sell animals in 
times of need but not regularly. Assuming that Martin's 40 head of cattle were sustained solely by his 30 
hectares of pasture land, it would give a return of 1,400 pesos per hectare, which seems low. Mauricio's 
26 cows live on seven hectares of pasture. Again, assuming that he uses no additional pasture land, that 
gives a return of approximately 2,100 pesos per hectare. Luis Piiia, a pequeno propietario who will be 
discussed later, achieves only a margin of approximately 1,300 pesos per hectare of cattle land. Compared 
to returns from oil palm and other cash crops, those margins are low. Farmers were asked to recall how 
many animals on average they sold in one year, which may bias results depending on the memory of the 
farmer. If they did not sell many animals in the period preceding the interview, they might underestimate 
overall sales. Cattle land does not have to be cleared and prepared. Switching from cattle to a crop that 
requires field preparation is thus costly and requires a substantial investment, which is another reason apart 
from social status why some fanners prefer not to replace their cattle. 
Apart from its profitability, oil palm has other advantages such as low production and price risk, 
less vulnerability to pests and diseases (so far in the Soconusco, not in general), and less risk from the 
effects of adverse weather and theft. Oil palms thus not only produce a relatively high return, they also 
constitute a steady and low-risk income stream. Since farmers are usually very risk averse, this adds to the 
attractiveness of oil palm. ­
Subsidies 
The most important subsidy that oil palm farmers receive are the palms themselves, combined with 
free technical assistance. The substantial cost of about 3,000 pesos per hectare for palm seedlings allows 
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many poorer fanners to plant palms who would otherwise not be able to. The oil palm project's cash sub­
sidy is designed to cover oil palm costs during the first year, including staking the fields, transporting 
seedlings from the nursery to the field, planting, and fertilizing. For the second year, an additional cash 
subsidy was intended to cover maintenance costs such as fertilizer and cleaning. After the second year, no 
more subsidies were planned. Figure V.3 shows what percentage of fanners' income the cash subsidy con­
stitutes. In general, for the farmers who already produce oil palm, the cash subsidy makes up a trivial 
fraction of total income. For the poorest fanners the subsidy may have an important progressive effect, 
allowing them to take good care of the young palm, and thus increasing future yields and therefore income. 
The poorest farmer, Eduardo Escobar, is the one who depends the most on the cash subsidy; it makes up 23 
percent of his income. The subsidy may playa more important role in more than just the poorest cases in 
increasing fanners' liquidity, allowing them to pay for services related to oil palm planting, such as seed­
ling transport and wage labor for planting. The fertilizer component of the subsidy is handed out in kind to 
reduce fungibility. 
Since fanners specializing in oil palm tend to be quite well off, they do not need a cash subsidy to 
expand their oil palm area. Likewise, cattle fanners tend to have sufficient income and assets to sell to 
support them through a few years until palms begin to payoff. This is especially true for pequeiios 
propietarios. A cash subsidy better targeted only to the poorest farmers may allow the project to save 
money to spend on more technical assistance later on, or to solve transport problems. On the other hand, 
this would definitely create targeting costs, and conceivably resentment among better-off farmers whom the 
project may not wish to alienate. To avoid a further economic stratification of oil palm farmers, the poor­
est farmers should be monitored closely to make sure they are able to survive the first years without too 
much income loss, and without having to neglect their palms and therefore lower their income earning 
potential. 
Section B has analyzed the profitability of oil palm through farm budgets. Comparing gross mar­
gins per hectare shows that in any given year, oil palm can compete with most other crops in terms of eco­
nomic returns. If compared to maize, the most common crop grown in the Soconusco among farmers 
switching to oil palm, oil palm is much more profitable in almost all cases. Another way to assess the rela­
tive profitability of maize and oil palm in dynamic: investment analysis can show how the profitability of 
oil palm compares with that of maize over the entire life of the palm, including the gestation period. This 
dynamic analysis is carried out in section C. 
Section C. How Profitable is Oil Palm? 
Since oil palm yields vary over the productive life of the palm, evaluating its profitability at any 
one point in time cannot give a complete picture of how it compares to other crops, especially annual crops 
without an initial gestation lag. The methodology of cost-benefit analysis is ideal for comparing the value 
of income streams over time. In order to evaluate the profitability of oil palm over time, it is necessary to 
project revenues and costs over the productive life of the palms. This requires projecting prices, yields, and 
costs of production 25 years into the future. Since predicting the future is always rather challenging, pre­
dicting events such as palm oil prices and yields, which depend on a myriad of other factors including 
unpredictable ones such as the weather, is impossible. Rather than giving a "precise" estimate of future 
parameters, I therefore attempt to provide a reasonable range within which future developments are likely 
to fall. The following sections explain how I obtained my yield, cost and price scenarios, and what the 
• 
underlying assumptions are, followed by the profitability analysis. 
Yield Scenarios 
Oil palm yields vary widely; they are influenced by various factors such as sunshine, temperature, 
rainfall, soil quality, fertilization, pests and diseases, pruning, and so forth. Since the palms distributed by 
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the current palm project are of a different variety than palms already grown in the area, and because care 
and input use are likely to be different, yields cannot simply be assumed to be equal to currently observed 
yields. Furthermore, nobody has kept yield records for Chiapas' oil palms during past years, and yield 
variations over the life cycle of the palms are crucial for net present value calculations. Since it is impossi­
ble to make an accurate prediction for yield in Chiapas, I attempt to construct an approximate range which 
is likely to contain the future yield. Figure V.4 shows a variety of yields from around the world found in 
the oil palm literature. The figure shows that yields tend to follow a certain pattern over their productive 
life, taken here to last 26 years. In the beginning, yields increase steeply, reach a maximum about seven to 
ten years after planting, and then slowly decrease. Palms are usually replaced after 20 to 30 years because 
decreasing yields, and, more importantly, the palms' growing height make replanting more profitable in the 
long run. Only two data points are available for current average yields in Chiapas. They are the observed 
average yields for the farmers delivering to the BEPASSA processing plant. These yields are relatively low 
because many farmers neglected their palms, which developed more slowly than usual. 
Although this scenario is based 00 actual observations from Chiapas, it is pessimistic for several 
reasons. Until BEPASSA started operating in March 1996, farmers in that area did not have a market for 
their oil palm fruit, and therefore did not take very good care of their palms. They did not always apply 
fertilizer when recommended by extensionists, neglected cleaning and pruning, and many even let cattle 
graze between young palms. The results are delayed growth and low yields. Furthermore, the palms 
planted in 1990/91 are not of the current, high-yielding and quickly maturing variety. If the palms planted 
in 1997/98 receive better care, they should yield substantially more. While the BEPASSA average was at 
about 10.5 and 14 tons per hectare six and seven years after planting respectively, other farmers reach 
higher yields even with the old variety. In the Ejido Luis Espinoza, where farmers had access to an extrac­
tion plant earlier on, they invested more in palm care and now reach yields of up to about 30 tons per 
hectare for palms planted in 1990/91. 
The first two scenarios are a high and a low estimate; actual yields will probably fall in between. 
As an example, I constructed an intermediate yield scenario (Figure V.5). Based on Williams and Hsu's 
average physical environment, it predicts yields close to those observed in Luis Espinoza. To avoid 
intersections with the best yield curve, some data points were altered slightly, and the downward-sloping 
portion ofWilliams and Hsu's average scenario was adjusted downward a bit. These adjustments make the 
two scenarios less confusing and hardly change present values at all. The medium estimate predicts a high 
yield of 27.8 tons per hectare reached in year nine after planting, so maximum yield falls between the two 
extreme scenarios. Initial increases in yields are also intermediate; harvesting starts later than in the 
optimistic scenario, and it increases at rate between the dramatic increase shown by the optimistic curve 
and the slow growth of the pessimistic scenario. 
Assumptions Regarding Costs 
To calculate a net present value for investments in oil palm, not only yields, but also costs have to 
be predicted. In July of 1997, only planting costs could be partly observed; maintenance cost estimates are 
based on maintenance costs on already established fields, and on SAGAR information about labor and 
other input requirements. Table V.15 shows the costs of establishing one hectare of oil palm on previously 
cleared land. 
-

Almost all land in the project area is cleared pasture or crop land, although some farmers have to 
remove isolated trees and tree trunks from pastures to facilitate field preparation and/or reduce shade. 
Farmers receive a subsidy of 900 pesos for each hectare planted to oil palm, which covers most of the costs 
involved in planting. Palms are given out for free, their value is about 3,000 'pesos per hectare. The 900 
pesos include both cash payments and payments in kind. Fertilizer is distributed in kind, and payments for 
farmers' labor input are made in cash when the task is completed and has been inspected by project staff. 
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Figure V.5. Yield Scenarios 
Source: Based on Figure V.4. 
When third persons, such as machinery owners, truck drivers, or field hands have to be hired, the work has 
to be carried out first, and again the subsidy is paid after inspection of the completed task. Sometimes, for 
example in the case of transport, farmers have to pay less than they receive. They can use excess funds 
towards their own contribution of 175 pesos, or to cover travel costs to the bank in Acapetahua where sub­
sidy payments have to be picked up. Because of the subsidies, the farmers' initial investment is very low. 
Once the palms are planted, maintenance costs begin. During the first few years (depending on 
assumptions about yields, prices, and costs the time period varies), costs for cleaning, fertilizer, and so 
forth exceed revenues. These initial negative cash flows are offset by revenues from maize intercropping, 
but remain a significant factor lowering net present value, especially if discount rates are high. The cost 
scheme presented in Table V.16 lists expenses for individual items. These figures are approximate; they 
vary from farmer to farmer, in different ejidos, and over time. Harvesters in Chiapas usually do not only 
cut fresh fruit bunches, they also prune palms, pile palm leaves in the aisles between palm rows, and carry 
fresh fruit bunches to the road where they load them on carts or trucks. Collecting loose fruit is usually a 
job for children. 
Although some farmers and their sons harvest by themselves, many hire professional harvesters for 
this task which requires some skill and strength. In the table, family labor is valued at market rates, which 
means 25 pesos per jomal, or 30-50 pesos per ton of fresh fruit bunches for harvesters. Depending on yield 
and palm size, one harvester can harvest between 100 and 250 bunches per day. Allowing time for 
pruning, carrying and piling leaves, an average of one hectare (with 143 palms, harvested twice a month) 
per harvester seems reasonable. On most farms, family members are responsible for cleaning and applying • 
fertilizer and other inputs. Cleaning the cajetes around palms with a machete twice a year takes about 8 
person-days, or 200 pesos. Initially, when palms are small and do not provide much shade, weed growth 
will be quicker, and palms are more susceptible to competition from weeds.· Therefore, until about four 
years after planting, cleaning costs are about 300 pesos higher, which allows for two additional cleanings 
and more than three times the amount of herbicide used later on. 
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Table V.15. Costs of Establishing One Hectare of Oil Palm 
Item Amount (pesos) 
Field Preparation (machinery rental) 
Measuring + stakes 
Digging holes 
Palm Transport 
Loading and unloading 
Palm distribution on field 
Planting and fertilizer application 
Fertilizer (15 kg) 
Subtotal 
Value of palms (paid by SAGAR) 
Total establishment cost 
500 
50 
62.5 
286 
50 
25 
62.5 
39 
1,075 
3,003 
4,078 
Subsidy (partly paid in kind) 
Farmer's contribution (Total cost - value of palms - subsidy) 
900 
175 
Sources:	 SAGAR 1997b. EI Programa Nacional de Palma Africana de Aceite. 
Mexico City. 
Wolff.C. 1997. Fieldnotes. 
Table V.16. Oil Palm Maintenance Costs 
(higher cost scenario; in pesos) 
Cost 
Labor Costa 
Harvest 
Cleaningb 
Fertilizer application etc. 
Amount 
1,000 
200 
100 
Input cost 
Fertilizerc 
Herbicide 
Pesticide 
1,630 
30 
50 
Total Maintenance Cost 3,010 
Transport about 40 pesos/ton 
Sources: SAGAR 1997b. EI Programa Nacional 
de Palma Africana de Aceite. Mexico City; and 
Wolff, C. 1997. Fieldnotes. 
a Family labor is valued at market rates 
b Initially about 500 (including herbicide), until 
palms provide enough shade about 4 years after 
planting 
As recommended by SAGAR 
Table V.17. Oil Palm Maintenance Costs 
(lower cost scenario; inpesos) 
Cost Amount 
Labor Costa 
Harvest 1,000 
Cleaningb 200 
Fertilizer application etc. 100 
Input cost 
Fertilizerc 500 
Herbicide 30 
Total Maintenance Cost 1,830 
Transport about 40 pesosfton 
•Sources: Sources: SAGAR 1997b. EI Programa 
Nacional de Palma Africana de Aceite. Mexico 
City; and Wolff, C. 1997. Fieldnotes 
• Family labor is. valued at market rates 
b Initially about 500 (including herbicide), until 
palms provide enough shade about 4 years after 
planting 
C Approximate current expenditure on fertilizer 
C 
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The only pesticides currently in use are rat poisons, because rats are the only pest which caused 
significant damage (to young palms only). Extensionists believe that pesticide use may have to increase in 
the near future as insects affecting palms become more common. A somewhat arbitrary figure of 50 pesos 
per hectare has been included in total costs in accordance with SAGAR estimates. About four jornales a 
year, or 100 pesos are budgeted for fertilizer and pesticide application. Including both labor and input 
costs, total maintenance costs amount to 3,010 pesos per hectare per year, or 3,310 pesos allowing for 
higher cleaning costs during the first four years. In addition, transport to the extraction plant costs an 
average 40 pesos per ton, which is not included in total maintenance cost in Table V.l6, but is included in 
net present value calculations. 
While good care is no guarantee for high yields, it is likely that frequent cleaning and fertilizer 
application will result in yields above the pessimist scenario described in the previous section. Farmers 
who have very low yields probably use less inputs, and therefore have lower costs than those in Table 
V.16. Thus, Table V.17 shows an alternative cost scheme for farmers with low costs. These farmers usu­
ally use mostly family labor for harvest and weeding, which reduces their cash needs, but does not lower 
cost in the economic sense. Therefore, the low cost scheme includes the same labor costs calculated previ­
ously. To reduce costs, these farmers economize on input purchases, using significantly smaller amounts 
of fertilizer or none at all. Many farmers currently spend about 500 pesos on fertilizer per year if they buy 
fertilizer at all. While herbicide use is very wide-spread to reduce the labor needed for cleaning, many 
farmers do not apply pesticides, and the low cost scenario does not include pesticide expenditures. Total 
maintenance cost under this cost scheme amounts to 1,830 pesos, roughly 40 percent below the initial 
scheme, or 2,130 pesos during the initial years. 
Price Projections 
It is impossible to predict the prices of any agricultural commodity even for a few years into the 
future. However, for anyone investing in a long tenn project such as growing oil palm, future prices are an 
extremely important determinant of the net present value of the investment. Since the productive life of the 
oil palm is about 25 years, that is the relevant time frame for price projections in this case. The most rea­
sonable estimates of future prices tend to start with a past long-term trend, and project it into the future, 
modifying for expected changes in demand and supply. In its International Agricultural Baseline Projec­
tions to 2005, the ERS (USDA) expects the prices of all major commodities to continue falling until 2005 
in real terms, although at a slower rate than past long-term trends due to strong growth in world demand. 
These projections are based on assumptions of economic and political stability. They were elaborated 
before the Asian crisis of 1998, and may thus overestimate the growth of global demand, which would tend 
to bias prices upward. 
The Mexican vegetable oil price will most probably continue to be determined by the price of US 
soybeans, the country's principal source ofvegetable oil. Historic soybean and product prices are shown in 
Figure V.6. Current prices in V.6a vary considerable, but overall increase with inflation. Figure V.6b thus 
shows the same prices adjusted for inflation, with their respective trends. The Figure shows that prices 
have a definite downward trend, interrupted by the typical peak during the early 1970s which corresponds 
to the world food crisis. Since it is hard to compare the trends in the Figure, Table V.l8 shows past price 
trends for soybeans and products. Soybean oil prices are falling faster than the prices of soybeans or meal. 
The reason for this faster decline in oil prices is that soybeans are usually crushed primarily for meal. 
... 
Demand for animal feed is growing very fast, so that meal prices are falling more slowly than oil prices 
worldwide. Meal prices are decreasing at an even slower rate than soybean prices. Figure V.7 illustrates 
.' 
different projections for soybean prices until the year 2005 from the literature. Overall, the USDA esti­
mates are much more optimistic than World Bank projections. Table V.19 shows the average annual price 
change between 1997 and 2005 associated with each projection, and thus gives an idea of trend expected 
for the future. 
---
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Table V.18. Past Real Soybean and Product Price Trends 
Item 
Average Annual Price Change (%) 
1965 -1996 
-2.0 
-1.4 
-2.3 
1975 -1996 
-2.8 
-1.3 
-2.0 
Soybean Oil 
Soybeans 
Soybean Meal 
Source: Based on Figure V.6.
 
Table V.19. Expected Real Future Soybean Oil Price Trends
 
Projection Averaee Annual Price Chanee (%) 
World Bank: high estimate -0.8 
World Bank: middle estimate -1.2 
World Bank: low estimate -3.7 
USDA: US price +0.2 
USDA: international price +0.8 
Source: Based on Figure V.? 
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The large difference between these projections gives an idea of the difficulty in reaching a reliable 
projection. For my three price scenarios, I chose one cautiously optimistic case based on the USDA pro­
jection for the US, which projects prices to increase by 0.2 percent per year. The second scenario is based 
on the long term trend since 1965, where prices decline by two percent per year. Finally, the worst case 
scenario projects prices to fall by 3.2 percent annually. Figure V.8 shows these three scenarios, and 
historic US soybean oil prices since 1965. The last case is based on the World Bank's more cautious pro­
jections. My middle scenario is more pessimistic than the World Bank's. Since overestimating prices 
could lead to substantial losses for farmers and investors, it seemed more prudent to err on the pessimistic 
side, which would lead to higher profits than anticipated. 
To translate these soybean oil prices into palm oil prices, I assume that in Mexico the margin 
between the two oils will stay constant over the period of analysis. In July of 1997, the price for crude 
palm oil in Mexico was about 545 dollars (4,200 pesos), which is very close to the US soybean price for 
1997. It is difficult to predict the development of this relationship. On one hand, health concerns may 
depress the price for palm oil since it is mostly saturated. On the other hand, as more palm oil becomes 
available, demand for uses such as margarine, where solid oils have an advantage, may increase. Since it is 
hard to say which trend will predominate, I assume they will cancel each other out more or less. An addi­
tional source of insecurity is the rel.ationship between palm oil and fresh fruit bunch prices. In July 1997, 
the fresh fruit bunch price (58 dollars, or 450 pesos) was about 11 percent of the crude palm oil price. This 
relationship depends on the processing technology and on the institutional arrangement between farmers 
and industry, which has not been determined. It is likely that processing efficiency will improve with larger 
scale plants. How much of this gain will be passed on through higher prices to farmers is uncertain, parti­
cularly if the new plants develop some market power. I therefore assume that the relationship between 
palm oil price and fresh fruit bunch price will stay constant as well. Thus, in the net present value analysis 
I apply the projected rates of soybean oil price decrease to fresh fruit bunch prices. If the relationship 
between the prices that my analysis is based on should not be representative of the true relationship in the 
future, my projections are easily adjusted up or down. 
Before beginning oil palm net present value analysis, a brief section on maize will be useful for 
comparison. Since maize is the crop most widespread both among present and future oil palm growers, 
comparing the profitability of maize to that of oil palm gives a sense of the alternatives available to 
farmers. 
Maize Profitability Over Time 
As the farm budgets showed, the profitability of maize varied considerably from farmer to farmer. 
Therefore, I used a whole range of yields to calculate net present values (NPVs) for comparison with oil 
palm profitability. Table V.20 shows one example to illustrate how net present values are obtained. The 
profitability of maize is evaluated over the productive lifespan of oil palms, taken to be 26 years. By con­
ventiQn, the first year is defined to end after the initial investment expenditures. Therefore, in the first year 
there are only maize planting costs, no benefits. The costs of 1,200 pesos per planting season are defined 
based on information from farmer surveys. After year one, each year contains two planting seasons, and 
therefore twice the cost, or 2,400 pesos. 
Compared to information presented in farm budgets in section B, these costs seem somewhat high. 
­The difference stems from the treatment of family labor. In the farm budget analysis, only costs actually 
paid in cash were included. Here, family labor is valued at minimum wage to represent economic costs. In 
reality, costs vary considerably across farmers, but for simplicity only one cost scenario was taken into 
account for maize. Table V.20 shows yields, assumed to be constant over the years, and prices, which 
multiplied give revenue. Revenues minus costs give the net income from one hectare of maize each year. 
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Figure V.S. US Soybean Oil Price Scenarios 
Source: Based on USDA (ERS): Oil Crops Situation and Outlook Yearbook. 
Table V.lO. Maize Net Present Value 
(in 1997 pesos) 
Yield Net Present 
Year (tons) Price Revenue Cost Income Value 
I 0 1300 0 1200 0 -1200 
2 4 1300 5200 2400 2800 2500 
3 4 1300 5200 2400 2800 2232 
4 4 1300 5200 2400 2800 1993 
5 4 1300 5200 2400 2800 1779 
6 4 1300 5200 2400 2800 1589 
7 4 1300 5200 2400 2800 1419 
8 4 1300 5200 2400 2800 1267 
9 4 1300 5200 2400 2800 1131 
10 4 1300 5200 2400 2800 1010 
11 4 1300 5200 2400 2800 902 
12 4 1300 5200 2400 2800 805 
13 4 1300 5200 2400 2800 719 
14 4 1300 5200 2400 2800 642 
15 4 1300 5200 2400 2800 573 
16 4 1300 5200 2400 2800 512 
17 4 1300 5200 2400 2800 457 
18 4 1300 5200 2400 2800 408 
19 4 1300 5200 2400 2800 364 
20 4 1300 5200 2400 2800 325 
21 4 1300 5200 2400 2800 290 
22 4 1300 5200 2400 2800 259 
23 4 1300 5200 2400 2800 231 
24 4 1300 5200 2400 2800 207 
25 4 1300 5200 2400 2800 184 
26 4 1300 5200 2400 2800 165 
Total Net Present Value = 20,761 
(Discount Rate = 12%) 
Source: Based on Wolff, C., 1997. Fieldnotes 
-

•. 
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This net income is discounted by a factor of 12 percent each year to yield the present value9, and the 
present values add up to total net present value. 
Maize prices were discussed in some detail in Chapter III. As Figure III. I (p.35) showed, Mexican 
maize prices fell as a result of policy reforms. It is difficult to predict how these prices will continue to 
behave in the future. Therefore, I consider a range of possibilities in the net present value analysis, includ­
ing annual decreases between one and four percent. Since in 1995, Mexican floor prices for white maize 
were slightly below international prices, I also include the possibility that prices remain constant. Using 
tables similar to Y20 for each combination of scenarios, I calculated a range of maize NPVs. They are 
represented graphically in Figure V.9. The maize production scenario with a yield of four tons per hectare 
that is represented in Table V.20 is marked by a cross in the figure; I use the net present value associated 
with this scenario for comparisons with oil palm. While the four-ton yield is about average for the 
Soconusco, the assumption that real prices will not fall in the future is fairly optimistic. If maize prices 
should fall in the future instead of remaining constant, maize would compare even less favorably to oil 
palm. Choosing an optimistic scenario for maize thus tends to underestimate the advantages of oil palm, 
which is more prudent than overestimating these advantages. 
Oil Palm Profitability 
Using the projections described above, I calculated the net present value associated with different 
price, cost and yield scenarios. The net present value resulting from each combination of price, cost and 
yield scenarios is calculated in a table very similar to the ones used for maize net present values. Table 
V.21 is an example which illustrates the methodology. It represents the most optimistic price and yield 
projections, combined with the higher cost scenario. The first column shows the age of the palm. The 
palms are planted in the field at the end of year one, which, again by convention, includes all the establish­
ment costs but no revenues. In reality, farmers are growing maize (or another crop) on these fields every 
year even before the start of the project. However, since the maize income would be the same in both the 
maize and the oil palm cases, the omission does not cause distortions. The second and third column show 
yield and price developments under the current assumptions. Revenues are yields multiplied by prices; and 
adding revenues from oil palm and maize, and subtracting costs gives net income. Discounted net income 
is shown in the present value column, which adds up to total net present value, 41,691 pesos in this case. 
Since comparing the net present values from all scenarios just using tables is extremely confusing, 
I have summarized them in four graphs in Figure V.10. On the left hand side, V.10a and V.10b represent 
the higher cost scenario, while V.IOc and V.IOd show the lower cost scenario. The two graphs on the top, 
V.10a and V.10c, show the net present values as bars which are grouped according to yield scenarios, 
while V.IOc and V.IOd group NPVs by price scenarios. The graphs on the right hand side show that costs 
have a major impact on profitability. Under low cost assumptions, all scenarios show oil palm as more 
profitable than maize, except for the most pessimistic yield scenario combined with medium or low prices. 
Under the higher cost scenario, maize compares more favorably to oil palm. Only the combination 
of high or medium prices with high or medium yields ensures that oil palm is more profitable than maize; 
the combination of low prices and optimistic yields, or medium prices and medium yields leads to a NPV 
about equal to that of maize. While this may not look too encouraging at first glance, one should remember 
that higher costs are associated with higher input use, which for example includes more fertilizer than the 
-

lower cost scenario. More fertilizer use would, at least on average, produce higher yields, so that the most 
9 Ideally, the discount rate should represent the opportunity cost of capital. During the 1990s, Mexico's exchange 
rate, interest rates, and inflation rate were notoriously unstable; therefore the 12 percent is somewhat arbitrary. 
According to Gittinger (1982), 12 percent is a common choice for project analysis. Since the same discount rate is 
used for both maize and oil palm profitability analysis, relative profitabilities are not affected. 
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Table V.2t. Net Present Value of Oil Palm 
(in 1997pesos) 
Price Scenario 1: Annual Owlee - 0.2"1.
 
Yield Scenario 1: Optimistic Yield
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Total Net Present Value ~ 41,691 (Discount Rate = 12%) 
-

Source: Based on Wolff, C. 1997. F",ldnoIU • In 1997, the pnce IS 450 pesos ($58 44) per Ion of fresh fruil bunches (FFB), llICIeasmg by 0.2% per year 
b Revenues include a 900 peso ($116.90) subsidy during the fltSltwo years, plus the cost of the palms ($390), which are distributed free ofcharge 
< From interaopping (5 harvests during fltS12.5 yean), asswnlng a 10% loss in yield each year because of increased palm shade. As in the maize NPV table (V.18), 
the fltSl year includes only costs. In any case, maize income would be the same in both the maize and the oil palm case, and can thus be excluded withoul leading to 
distortions in relative profitability. 
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pessimistic yields scenario is unlikely to occurlO• Likewise, while the optimistic yields scenario' is not 
impossible combined with low costs, it is not as probable as under high costs. Since yields depend not only 
on input use, but also on soil fertility, climate, drainage, and other factors, adequate input use alone is no 
insurance for high yields. 
Overall, yields and costs seem to have a bigger impact on NPVs than the price scenarios, although 
assumptions about price decreases of two or even three percent per year are quite drastic. This is encour­
aging insofar as it implies that even if the processing industry should have considerable market power and 
use it to depress producer prices, or if unpredictable developments in the palm oil markets should lead to 
price decreases, the viability of oil palm farming would only be affected in the most drastic scenarios, or if 
price decreases were combined with very low yields. On the other hand, the importance of yield develop­
ments highlights the need for effective technical assistance, including the availability of inputs, and treat­
ment of diseases and/or plagues if they develop. 
Costs are perhaps the most important factor affecting palm profitability. While my cost scenarios 
differ because of variations in input use, there are other factors which affect cost differences across farm­
ers.· The farm budget analysis showed that transportation constitutes a very important proportion of oil 
palm costs. Considering the impact of costs on profitability, there are great incentives to solving farmers' 
transport problems. If farmers themselves do not manage to organize for collective action and operate a 
transport cooperative, the new private processing plants could improve farmers' well-being and profit mar­
gins by picking up fresh fruit bunches from the fields, or from collection centers in the villages. Since 
timely processing has a big impact on oil quality, efficient organization of raw material delivery is also in 
the interest ofprocessors. 
What the difference in costs, yields, and prices means for profitability in any given year is illus­
trated in Figure V.II. Figure V.lla corresponds to the higher cost scenario, and Figure V.IIb to the lower 
cost scenario. They both represent a static picture of profits from oil palm and maize in year 11. Maize 
profits of2,800 pesos correspond to a yield of five tons and constant maize prices, the scenario presented in 
Table V.19 (p. 92). Each line represents the oil palm profits associated with one price scenario at varying 
yield levels. Recalling the yields in Figure V.5 (p. 88), in year 11 even the most pessimistic yiel~ scenario 
was at 23 tons per hectare. At 23 tons per hectare, oil palm profits are above maize profits in all price 
scenarios, even in the (highly unlikely) worse than worst case scenario of a yearly price decrease of 4 
percent and with high costs. With optimistic yields of 28 tons in year 11, farmers will be making a 
handsome profit in both the high and the low cost scenario. This static snapshot of oil palm profits thus 
shows what the net present values from Figure V.IO mean for annual profitability. 
Section D. Conclusions on Profitability 
Summarizing the results of this chapter, it is clear that oil palm has the potential to continue being 
a profitable crop for small farmers. The seven ejidatarios and one pequeno propietario surveyed who 
already grow oil palms all derive respectable gross margins from their oil palm fields, higher than those 
associated with com, cattle, and most other cash crops represented in the sample. The oil palm farmers' 
standard of living has improved considerably in most cases, as shown by new cinder-block houses, trucks, 
and other vehicles. Almost all ofthese farmers were expanding their oil palm area in 1997. Their example 
• 
10 There is an extensive literature on the fertilizer response of oil palms. The response to P (phosphate) depends on 
the soil. According to Zakaria et al. (1991) one kg of P fertilizer per palm leads to a yields increase of about one 
ton per hectare per year (more on inland soils, less on coastal soils). Another study of fertilizer responses in 
Sumatra finds that the optimum urea application rate (280 kglha) leads to a production increase of 3.9 tons per 
hectare per year, while the optimal phosphate rate (250 kglha) leads to a production increase of 5.3 tons per 
hectare per year (Tampubolon et al. 1990). 
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had a positive demonstration effect on other farmers in the area, and many hope to improve their economic 
situation by planting oil palm. 
The forward-looking profitability analysis in Section C also produced positive results. It is hard to 
predict future profitability developments, which is why the projections in this chapter are explicitly based 
on a series of assumptions. Profitability per hectare of oil palm is generally high, except in extremely 
unfavorable price, yield, and cost scenarios. Compared to maize, returns from oil palm are high, even 
when ignoring risk and uncertainty, as was done in this study. Overall, the net present value of oil palm 
proved most sensitive to cost and yield variations. Only the most unfavorable price projections influence 
oil palm profits enough to jeopardize their viability for farmers. 
Prier daaace/yur 
14000
.------------------------------, 
12000 
v.lla. Higher Cost Scenario 
I~OOO 
o 2~, (~S9 pesos) 
12000 
·1% (~07 pesos) 
10000 
·2'/" (368 pesos) 
·W, (322 pesos)8000 
-<4~, (299 pesos) 
6000C 
~
.. ~ooo 
Ma.izcProfll 
2000 
0
 
-2000
 
..cooo
 
Yicld (lollS!ha) 
V.11 b. Lower Cosl Scenario 
Source Wolff 1997. Fleldnores. and Figure V.2. 
Figure V.II. Impact of Price and Yields Cbanges on Oil Palm Profit 
(in year 11. constant 1997 pesos) 
100 
Oil palms thus appear to be a profitable option for smallholders in the Soconusco that allows them 
to significantly improve their economic situation. The farmers' most vulnerable period is the gestation 
period, until palms become productive. In the sample scenario shown in Table V.21, palms do not start to 
produce a positive income until the fourth year, and profits are low until the fifth or sixth year. After the 
initial years, and especially once maize production declines and ends, the poorest farmers surveyed might 
encounter serious financial difficulties and cash flow constraints. They may be able to supplement their 
income through wage work, fishing, or by renting additional land to produce annual crops. If these supple­
mental income sources should not be sufficient, some kind of public assistance may be needed to avoid 
economic hardship for the families. Since lack of time and income can also have negative effects on future 
yields due to neglect of palm fields, the government may want to provide a continued cash subsidy, at least 
for the neediest. This could help to prevent a negative effect on income distribution in the area. Alterna­
tively, the new private processing plants (as well as the old ones) could provide credit programs. 
Government and/or processors could also have a big impact on farmer incomes by working on 
raising yields or lowering costs, especially for transportation. As was mentioned before, there is significant 
scope for benefits through better-organized transport, either in the form of a cooperative, or linked to 
extraction plants. Finally, extension services and facilitation of input supply may have a significant effect 
on yields, and thus raise profitability. Research and extension services will be especially important if the 
initial absence of serious disease and pest problems turns out to be transitional. In that case, continued 
viability may depend on the ability of these services to produce effective solutions and distribute them in a 
timely fashion. 
-
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Chapter VI 
IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The previous chapters have shown that oil palm can be a profitable crop for small fanners in the 
Soconusco. Chapters II through IV explored the market for vegetable oils, the Mexican policy environ­
ment, and institutional setups, and Chapter V evaluated returns to oil palm. But profitability alone is not a 
guarantee that oil palm will contribute significantly to regional economic development. Section A explores 
the impact of oil palm cultivation on regional development in the Soconusco. Finally, section B draws 
some recommendations from the lessons learned in the course of this study. 
Section A. Implications for Rural Development in the Soconusco 
As in many developing countries, structural adjustment in Mexico was more successful at reducing 
state intervention in the economy than at initiating a process of economic growth that would effectively 
reduce poverty. This is especially true in the agricultural sector; the dismantling of the complex system of 
parastatals, subsidies and support prices has not led to an immediate surge in private investment and 
growth. Both de Janvry et al. (1995) and Delgado (1998) would argue that structural adjustment is 
necessary, but not sufficient to promote growth in agriculture. Apart from a favorable policy environment, 
new, market-oriented institutions are needed. New marketing channels have to replace government 
marketing agencies. Furthermore institutions are needed to facilitate investment and information flows, and 
to provide services such as credit, insurance, extension, and input supply. These institutions can be public 
or private; most likely a combination of more effective public institutions and private-sector involvement 
will be required. In Mexico, the Ministry of Agriculture is thus for example actively promoting private 
investment in agricultural processing. 
The oil palm project falls within this framework of increased private-sector involvement in 
agriculture. The combination of smallholder production with industrialized private processing promises to 
combine a positive impact on equity by raising smallholders' incomes with the advantages of large-scale 
processing and marketing. Furthennore, the private investors are expected to provide services such as 
extension, transport and possibly credit to the farmers. The processing company may thus be able to 
substitute for services formerly provided by the state. The project's impact on the regional economy will 
have two components: one is determined by the impact of oil palm cultivation on farmers and the other 
rural population, the other will depend on the institutional arrangement between farmers and the processing 
industry. The first component, the impact of oil palm, has already begun in the areas were farmers are 
growing oil palm, and could thus be partly observed. The second component depends on the institutional 
arrangement chosen, and is more subject to speculation. 
So far, the major effect of oil palm has been to raise the income of farmers who cultivate them. 
Most of them spend their increased income on consumption goods such as televisions and radios Almost 
all oil palm farmers have a new house built with non-traditional materials, usually cinder-block. Some of 
them have also purchased vehicles such as trucks or tractors. Although farmers did not report this, they 
probably rent these vehicles out, increasing both their own income and the availability of transport and 
tractor services in the area. 
Oil palm has also created a relatively steady demand for skilled labor for harvesting. Since this 
work is too heavy to be carried out by children, many farmers' children can stay in school longer than 
previously, usually through middle school and sometimes even high school. There was one case were the 
increased opportunity cost of family labor led the farmer to take his children out of school, which clearly is 
not desirable since it reduces the options available to the children later in life. Since this was only an 
isolated case, it may be more attributable to the father's personal philosophy than to a generalized trend. 
Overall, increased family income should lead to more time and resources to send children to school. In 
-
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addition to labor demand on farms, the processing plants employ a small number of permanent employees, 
in addition to temporary ones during peak production times. 
Since the disposable income of many farmers' had increased, they also spent more in local 
businesses. One tendency seems to be to buy ground maize instead ofgrinding it at home; and buying some 
prepared foods or sodas. One pequeno propietario observed that since the ejido Luis Espinoza became 
involved in oil palm production, the number of "cantinas" (bars) in the area, including the nearby town 
Acapetahua had increased dramatically. Farmers seem to spend a considerable amount of money on beer 
in these cantinas. I could confirm thi~ trend during my stay; after being paid the project subsidy at a bank 
in Acapetahua, for example, farmers tended to spend the rest of the day drinking in a cantina or at the 
market. 
While farmers who grow oil palm experience income growth, this is not an equitable effect. Those 
farmers who have more land, an can afford to plant more of it to oil palm, tend to profit more from oil 
palm; thus economic stratification is maintained and even reinforced. The 1997/98 project made an 
attempt to be more progressive by subsidizing the initial costs of planting oil palm, and by distributing 
palms for free. While this certainly helped the more economically vulnerable participants, the area's 
poorest farmers were often unable to participate in the first place. The poorer farmers tend to live in the 
newer ejidos close to the coast, especially in Zone 3. They receive only five hectares of land on average. 
Since they are only beginning to farm, they are very dependent on the income from the land; often they 
grow mostly maize for own consumption. Planting a significant proportion of their land to anew, and in 
those areas relatively unknown crop is too great a risk. The soils in these new ejidos, which tend to be 
closer to the mangrove swamps on the coast, also tend to contain some salt, which makes them unsuitable 
for oil palm production. These ejidos are often relatively far removed, and transport costs to the existing 
processing plants would be prohibitive. Therefore these farmers would depend on the construction on a 
new plant in Zone 3. Since construction has not begun, farmers see this as an added risk. The oil palm 
project therefore excludes some ofthe poorest farmers. An attempt at including these poor farmers through 
an initial cash subsidy is made, but a subsidy better targeted at the poorest farmers could have a bigger 
impact, while not supporting the wealthier farmers' drinking habits. 
The landless population in the area tends to be very poor as well, and they benefit only indirectly 
from the project, for example through employment on oil palm farms or at processing plants. The overall 
increase in farm income is likely to have an impact on the regional economy by raising effective demand, 
thus creating some additional employment. In the future, the oil palm scheme's economic impact will 
depend in large part on the processing industry, and its linkages to the regional economy. Since it is too 
early to observe these linkages in the Soconusco, examples from other parts of the world may be able to 
give some insight. 
Since the institutional link between farmers and processors has not yet been defined, it is too early 
to evaluate their potential impact on regional development. Much will depend on relative bargaining 
powers, and specifically on the farmers' ability to demand participation in scheme profits. Vegetable oil 
processing typically does not have very important linkages to other industries, except possibly the 
production of oil containers. If investors decided to operate a refinery apart from oil extraction plants, a 
local industry for final oil products such as margarine or shortening could develop. Since the Soconusco is 
relatively far removed from the large consumption centers around Mexico City, this may economically not 
• 
be viable. 
Although oil palms do not promise an immediate end to poverty in the Soconusco, they can playa 
significant role in generating rural income. This will benefit primarily the oil palm producers themselves, 
but it will also spill over into the local and regional economy to some degree, and are thus a step in the right 
direction. Economically and ecologically sustainable rural income sources like oil palm allow smallholders 
to remain farmers, without pushing them off land and into migration as is happening in many areas of 
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Mexico. The full benefits of oil palm cultivation will only manifest themselves once more area has been 
planted, and local linkages have had a chance to develop. 
Depending on its success at achieving its objectives, the oil palm project could make a significant 
contribution to the Mexican fats and oils market. Once the oil palms reach their highest yields in about 
2005 - 20 I0, they will be producing about 30 tons of fresh fruit bunches or six tons of palm oil per hectare. 
If the oil palm project reaches its objective of planting about 50,000 hectares with oil palm by the year 
2000, annual palm oil production will be around 300,000 tons by 2008, or around one fifth of total 
vegetable oil availability in Mexico in 1995. This would allow Mexico to reduce its vegetable oil imports 
by almost half their 1994 level, which implies significant foreign exchange savings. If only half of the 
projected area is planted, palm oil will still contribute one tenth of total availability, or replace one fourth 
of vegetable oil imports. 
To get a sense of the opportunity cost of producing palm oil in Chiapas, I calculated the domestic 
resource cost of palm oil. The domestic resource cost compares the opportunity cost of domestic 
production to the value added it generates. Since assessing the opportunity costs of primary resources 
would be very time consuming, I compute the domestic resource cost for oil palm by comparing its gross 
value per hectare to the gross value per hectare ofmaize, both valued at world prices (Tsakok, 1990). 
Using 1994 prices in constant 1982-84 dollars for both commodities, the gross value per hectare of maize 
is 416 dollars (at a yield of four tons per hectare and a price of 104 dollars per ton); while the gross value 
per hectare of oil palm is 1,884 dollars (at a yield of 6 tons of oil per hectare, and a price of 314 dollars per 
ton of palm oil). The domestic resource cost in this case is 0.22, which means that the opportunity cost of 
one dollar used for palm oil production would have generated only 22 cents in maize production. Using the 
more cautious palm oil yield of 5 tons per hectare, the domestic resource cost increases to 0.26, which is 
still extremely favorable for palm oil. While this is only a rough approximation to the domestic cost of 
generating (or in this case saving) one dollar of foreign exchange, it shows that palm oil production in the 
Soconusco is a productive use of the area's resources, and that it is viable not only from a private, but also 
from a social point ofview. 
Section B. Recommendations 
Much ofthe success of the oil palm project in Chiapas will depend on the institutional arrangement 
that will link growers and processors. Apart from profitability itself, the institutional link affects the 
distribution of benefits, and, as described in the previous section, the impact on the regional economy. As 
was mentioned in Chapter IV, other countries' experiences with smallholder oil palm production and with 
vertical integration in agricultural production can give helpful insights for the Soconusco. 
If a contract farming arrangement is chosen, it is important to adapt the contract to local conditions 
as much as possible. For farmers it will be important to secure some bargaining power to avoid 
unfavorable price setting. The shareholder arrangement, where farmers own part of the processing plant, is 
more conducive to giving farmers some influence on management. This was discussed in more detail in 
Chapter IV. It is worth repeating here that ultimately, the farmers' bargaining power determines their 
benefits from the oil palm scheme, and thus the survival of the scheme. The Malaysian experience with the 
FELDA schemes shows how important it is to be flexible, and able to adapt institutional setups to local 
preferences. It is therefore in everyone's best interest to establish transparent channels for negotiation and ­
communication. This is aided by the existence of farmers' organizations, the formation of which should be 
promoted. The processing companies should also hire locals for all possible positions because it facilitates 
communication with farmers (Porter and Phillips-Howard, 1997). 
Since the share of benefits received by farmers can be the same under the shareholder and the 
contract farming arrangement, farmer wellbeing depends more on their bargaining power than on the setup 
chosen. However, since the shareholder arrangement necessarily gives farmers a voice in management, this 
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is the institutional setup I recommend. It is more likely to lead to flexibility, transparency and effective 
communication, and it fulfills fanners' wishes to 0\\11 a share of the processing plant. If fanners are 
content with their institutional arrangement, the oil palm scheme has the greatest chances of being 
successful. 
The Ministry of Agriculture has carried out the financial analysis of extraction plants under 
different institutional arrangements (SAGAR I997b). The analysts reach the conclusion that oil palm 
processing is a very profitable enterprise. The internal rates of return vary between 24 percent and 35 
percent, depending on whether the investors also run a nucleus estate to produce some of the raw material 
or not. Since these are quite comfortable rates of return, the processors can afford to provide incentives for 
farmers to increase the quality of their plantation, and to plant additional area to oil palm. In the long run, 
higher yields and volume ofproduction will lead to greater cost effectiveness through economies of scale. 
Chapter V mentioned that transportation accounted for a large fraction of farmers' oil palm 
production costs. The cost of transport lead farmers to harvest less frequently than desirable for quality 
reasons. Thus, a well-organized transport system, including fresh fruit bunch pickup by processing com­
pany trucks, for example from village collection centers could lower these costs, while simultaneously 
ensuring fruit freshness and timely delivery. Some part of the transport problem has its roots in poor 
infrastructure, namely bad roads and few bridges. Farmers themselves work on access roads to enable 
trucks and tractors to pass. The processing company may be better able to work on infrastructure 
improvement, or to lobby the government to invest in local infrastructure. This would increase farmers' 
margins from oil palms sales, and increase cost efficiency over all. 
There will be a continued need for extension services, even when oil palms have all been planted. 
The Mexican government is planning to withdraw from extension and technical assistance once the new 
private processing plants start operating. In order to ensure high yields, the new private extensionists need 
not only to educate farmers about proper fertilization and so on to ensure high yields, but they should also 
prepare for the appearance of pests and diseases. While the Soconusco has so far been spared, in 
Colombia for example farmers lose significant revenue due to palm diseases. Some cooperation with 
government or private research stations will be required to find adequate treatments for these pests and 
diseases when they appear. Successful oil palm producers around the world all have a governmental 
research organization, notably Malaysia's PORIM (Palm Oil Research Institute of Malaysia). While there 
is no reason that private researchers cannot provide this service, the incentive to invest in such an 
organization may only arise when it is too late. Some foresight could prevent substantial losses later on. 
During the next few years, the existing PAPA extension service should take care to follow up 
especially on the poorest oil palm farmers' welfare, to insure that they are able to survive the gestation 
period without additional assistance. Furthennore, it is important that all farmers be taught the proper care 
of oil palms, especially those who planted their first palms in 1997/98. If farmers fail to take appropriate 
care of the palms while they are growing, their growth will be delayed and they may never reach their full 
yield potential. In many areas, palms are intercropped with a leguminous cover crop. This practice not 
only reduces the need for fertilization because the cover crop fixes nitrogen in the soil, it also protects the 
soil from the direct impact of the weather, which can be damaging until the palm canopy is dense enough. 
Furthermore, cover crops reduce the need for weeding, which can further contribute to lowering production 
costs. .. 
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APPENDIX A 
Sample Interview Form (filled out during a conversation with the farmeri 
Name:
------------------------­
Zone: _ 
Ejido: _ 
House material: wood~alm__bamboo__brick__cinder-block_ 
Location of house: in ejido village by parcela _ 
Total land area:
---------------------­
Number offamily members in household: _ 
Number of children: boys ~girls _ 
- studying, _ 
- working offfarm _ 
- working on farm _ 
Wife/husband's occupation _ 
Does farmer engage in wage labor? When?__No. ofdays/month__ 
Does the farmer own a vehicle? bicycle ox cart pickup truck 
truck tractor
--­
Member in extraction plant? Which? _ 
Utilities/comments
--------------------­
1 Translated from Spanish. 
• 
.. 
109 
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Crops 
Which? 
Ha 
Yield 
Amount sold 
Sold where? 
Price 
Transport cost 
- how? 
Seed cost 
Fertilizer cost and 
amount used 
Pesticide cost and 
amount used 
Labor cost and days: 
- sowmg 
- weeding 
- harvest 
- other 
Machine rental costs 
Other costs 
Differences: second 
season? 
-------------------------
-------------------------
111 
Livestock 
Type ofanimal: _ 
How many? _ 
Sales: how many? When? _ 
Price:
Costs:
Comments: 
Backyard Activities 
For own consumption For sale (amount and 
price) 
Poultry: 
- chickens 
- ducks 
- turkeys 
Pigs: 
Fruit: 
- coconut 
- mango 
Vegetables and others 
Comments: 
------------------
112 
Oil Palms 
Planting how much? _ 
Will intercrop with com? _ 
(Are palm well taken care off? Weeding etc.: observed): _ 
Does he plan on keeping up with weeding etc.? _ 
Has the farmer ever had palms before? _ 
Comments: 
Ifhe had palms and destroyed them: Area: _
 
When plantedldestroyed? _
 
Prices and costs at the time:

Comments:
 
------------------------
------------------
----
113 
Expenses 
Maize purchases: how much? when? _ 
Where do they shop? _ 
How has the devaluation affected them? _
 
Which prices? _
 
General Opinions 
How has the ejido reform affected them? _ 
- the area?
Has a lot of land been sold?
Is there anything else you think I should know/ include in my study?
• 
Any general comments? 
,. 
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